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consequences of working from 
home1
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Date submitted: 21 December 2020; Date accepted: 5 January 2021
The Covid-19 health crisis has led to a substantial increase in work done 
from home, which shifts economic activity across geographic space. We 
refer to this shift as a 'Zoomshock'. The Zoomshock has implications for 
locally consumed services; the clientèle of restaurants, coffee bars, pubs, 
hair stylists, health clubs located near workplaces now demand those 
services near where they live. In this paper we measure the Zoomshock 
at a granular level for UK neighbourhoods. We establish three important 
empirical facts. First, the Zoomshock is large; many workers can work-
from-home and live in a different neighbourhood than they work. Second, 
the Zoomshock is very heterogenous; economic activity is decreasing 
in productive city centres and increasing residential suburbs. Third, 
the Zoomshock moves workers away from neighbourhoods with a 
large supply of locally consumed services to neighbourhoods where the 
supply of these services is relatively scarce. We discuss the implications 
for aggregate employment and local economic recovery following the 
Covid-19 pandemic.
1 We gratefully acknowledge financial support from UK Research and Innovation and the Economic and 
Social Research Council (ESRC grant number ES/V004913/1). A supplementary online appendix is available 
at https://perma.cc/P6RR-NMW4.
2 Nottingham School of Econom cs, Universita di Roma Tor Vergata and CEPR.
3 University of Sheffield.
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1 Introduction
A defining feature of modern life is the office. And the concentration of offices
in city centres and business parks has meant commuting is a fact of life for
many workers. As the lot of a commuter is to spend much of their time away
from home, their consumption reflects that. Workers buy sandwiches for lunch,
coffee during breaks, and after-work drinks. They also visit retail shops near
their offices, have their hair cut between meetings, visit gyms before work, they
use taxis, have their car serviced while they are in the office, and so on. These
are all examples of locally consumed services (LCS): these are services defined
by necessarily being supplied and demanded in a given place.
The Covid-19 pandemic has led to an unprecedented shift in the fraction of
work that is done from home versus the office. This geographic shift in pro-
ductive activities, which we refer to as the Zoomshock, moves work and workers
from their offices in high density urban areas to comparatively low density resi-
dential neighbourhoods. This has had important consequences for providers of
LCS. Establishments previously patronised by commuters are suffering, while
neighbourhood establishments have seen a surge in demand from homework-
ers.
This paper has two objectives. First, we propose an empirical measure of
the Zoomshock. This metric reflects the change in of work activities (measured
as the number of employees or total income) for a given neighbourhood. It
weights the difference between workers who work and live in a given neigh-
bourhoods by their ability to work-from-home. We use this method to estimate






















VETTED AND REAL-TIME PAPERS
pattern emerges: the Covid-19 Zoomshock has moved productive activity away
from formerly highly output city centres into residential areas.
Second, we examine the consequences of the Zoomshock for LCS in the af-
fected neighbourhoods and employment in the larger industry. In the short to
medium-run the Zoomshock creates a geographic supply-demand mismatch;
there are many LCS businesses in city centres but relatively few in the residen-
tial suburbs. Even when we allow for perfect mobility of labour, the fact that
capital is slow to move, and the lack of density in the suburbs, means that LCS
employment will fall below its pre-Covid-19 level.
We believe that the concept of Zoomshock will prove useful for deigning
policy that seeks to minimise the economic damage caused by the Covid-19
pandemic, and to use scarce resources devoted to economic recovery as effi-
ciently as possible. Although preliminary, several implications are clear from
our analysis. First, at the local level there is very significant geographic hetero-
geneity within urban areas in how working from home will impact LCS busi-
nesses. Any recovery assistance policy should reflect this heterogeneity and fo-
cus resources on firms and workers in neighbourhoods who have experienced
a negative Zoomshock. Second, the aggregate consequences across neighbour-
hoods of the Zoomshock will be in larger in some areas. Local authorities where
the skewness of the neighbourhood-level Zoomshock distribution is greater are
likely to suffer a greater employment loss in the LCS industry. Finally, it is criti-
cal that we understand better the long-run consequences of the Zoomshock. The
efficient policy prescription will depend crucially on how many former com-
muters continue to work-from-home once the Covid-19 pandemic subsides. If
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ers, for at least some of the time, it may portend long-lasting changes in the
productive structure of localised areas: 50% of the commuters to an area switch
to working-from-home for two days per week is a 20% loss in potential demand
for the area LCS. In the long term, establishments providing LCS may drift from
the high streets to the suburbs.
It should be stressed that we do not attempt to fully capture the effect of the
Covid-19 pandemic on the LCS industry. This industry has been hit particu-
larity hard by social distancing measures, and will undoubtedly be negatively
impacted if the broader economy struggles to recover following the pandemic.
Here we abstract from these effects of the pandemic, both for LCS and the
broader labour market, and focus on how homeworking specifically will impact
these businesses. These consequences, and the implications for recovery policy,
are have not yet been studied but the potential implications of working-from-
home for the recovery of employment and output in the wake of the Covid-19
pandemic are, as we will see, of first-order importance.
This paper complements empirical studies that look at the regional geogra-
phy of economic risks arising from the Covid-19 pandemic (Davenport et al.,
2020). We emphasise the importance of working with relatively small areas:
in theory, and as we will empirically demonstrate, a small local area may be
severely affected by the Zoomshock while neighbouring areas potentially bene-
fit from the shock. Zoomshocks are also very complex: they depend on (i) com-
muting patterns: these are highly asymmetric, most commuters travel from
“residential areas” in cities, the suburbs, or the countryside to work in city-
centres; (ii) the ability of commuters to work remotely: office workers with little
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with greater difficulty if at all; (iii) commuters’ demand for LCS: this in turn
depends on both the commuters’ income and the fraction they spend on LCS—
expensive wine bars are LCS, but home delivery of cases of fine wine is not, and
how much of the LCS are consumed at work— the services supplied by garden-
ers and nannies are by their nature not consumed at the work location. (iv) and
finally on the ability of supply to adjust to increased demand: a community
with many home-working residents may find that some continue to demand
similar LCS as when they commuted, e.g. they may still prefer to buy their
lunch, rather than prepering it themselves. But existing businesses might be
unable to increase their supply to satisfy this demand.
This paper contributes to an emerging evidence base on the costs, in labour
market terms, of stay at home orders. Baek et al. (Forthcoming), provides evi-
dence that stay at home account for less than a quarter of total Covid related job
losses in the US. But this impact has been uneven. Crossley et al. (2021), using
panel data for the UK, find that the impacts of the pandemic have been most
pronounced for those on the lowest incomes, and those from minority ethnic
groups. Mongey and Weinberg (2020) find similar results for the US. Angelucci
et al. (2020) also find that health losses are disproportionately concentrated on
these groups. Barrero et al. (2020) suggest that 42% of jobs lost due to Covid in
the US will be permanent.
It also contributes to a second strand of the post-Covid literature whose fo-
cus is on which, and how many, jobs can be done from home. Dingel and
Neiman (2020) provided early U.S. and international evidence. Alipour et al.
(2020) provide similar evidence for Germany. In this paper we add to this liter-
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wage heterogeity in ability to work-from-home to geographic heterogeneity.
Gottlieb et al. (2020) study what share of jobs are tele-workable across coun-
tries, documenting that fewer jobs are tele-workable in lower income countries,
in part due to the higher share and nature of self-employment in those coun-
tries.
Others have documented the impact on consumption patterns (Baker et al.,
2020; Barrero et al., 2020; Chronopoulos et al., 2020). To our knowledge there
has been little attention to the spatial aspects of these changes.
This is one of the few papers to consider the spatial aspects of working-
from-home. In contemporaneous work Delventhal and Parkhomenko (2020)
provide a quantitative model for Los Angeles to study how in the long-run
teleworking may affect the spatial distribution of jobs and residents. In another
contemporaneous contribution Delventhal et al. (2020) introduce a quantitative
spatial equilibrium model in which workers are heterogeneous in the amount
of time they work “on site”. Their model predicts a non-monotonic impact of
teleworking—increasing activity in the most productive cities while also in the
lowest density areas.
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we specify how we measure the
Zoomshock, characterising it by geographic shifts in workers and geographic
shifts in GDP. In Section 3 we discuss the data which we use in our primary
analysis: this comes from the UK Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings. In
Section 4 we use these measures to examine the Zoomshock across Britain, and
how working-from-home has changed the geography of productive activities.
In Section 5 we discuss, and provide some theoretical basis for, the impact that
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aggregate LCS employment. We conclude with some discussion of the out-
standing information needed and implications for short and longer-term policy.
2 The Zoomshock
We use the term Zoomshock to describe the geographic change in economic ac-
tivity due to the shift towards working-from-home during the Covid-19 pan-
demic. Here we present metrics that can be calculated using existing data and
capture the differences in the sign and magnitude of the Zoomshock in different
neighbourhoods. We consider two different ways of thinking about a change in
economic activity. The first is by looking at the geographic change in the num-
ber of workers (which will be the focus of our empirical analysis). The second
is by looking at the geographic change in GDP, measured as the income of these
worker.
Consider first the change in the number of workers within a geographically
defined zone, z. This change can be estimated by considering three character-
istics: 1) the number of workers who work in z; 2) the number of workers who
live in z; 3) and whether the jobs performed by these workers can be done at
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form their work at home. This is the difference between the number of workers
who are able to leave zone z to work from their home located in zone z′ 6= z,
and the number of individuals who are resident in zone z and are able to work
from home instead of having to go in person to zone z′′ 6= z.





i (1[residencei = z]− 1[worki = z]) , (2)
where 1[·] ∈ {0, 1} is an indicator function. 1[residencei = z] equals 1 if indi-
vidual i lives in zone z, and 0 otherwise; 1[worki = z] equals 1 if individual i
works in zone z, and 0 otherwise. H and Di are vectors of occupation-specific
work-from-home indices and individual i’s occupation, respectively.
The product HD′i ∈ [0, 1] is worker i’s work-from-home index, with which
we weight each observation. We adapt the home-working classification of Din-
gel and Neiman (2020) for each of our 380 four-digit UK Standardised Occu-
pation Codes, with minor adjustments required to map US job descriptions
to the UK ones. Formally, given a set of occupations o = 1, . . . , 380, H =
(h1, h2, ..., h380) ∈ [0, 1]
380 is a vector of occupation-specific indices for which
an element ho ∈ [0, 1] reflects the feasibility of performing the duties required
by occupation o in a location other than “work”. A delivery driver will gener-
ally have a home-working index of ho = 0, an IT software consultant will have
an index of ho = 1. Other workers may have an intermediate value, as they
can perform some tasks remotely, but some require their physical presence.1
1As examples of occupations with an index of 0.5, forklift truck drivers, artists, and credit
controllers are among them. For security guards, the index is 13 , for estate agents
3
4 , and for
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Di ∈ {0, 1}
380 is a vector of occupation dummies for individual i’s main job,
that is a vector whose o-th element is 1 if and only if occupation o is individual
i’s main job.
Our resulting work-from-home index matches well with data reflecting ac-
tual working from home (see https://perma.cc/P6RR-NMW4 for analysis).
We also find that workers who can work from home are paid more (this corre-
sponds to Aum et al. (2020) for the US): controlling for industry, year, age, hours
worked, gender, and region of residence, a worker who can work from home is
paid over 40% more that one who cannot.
Expression (2) has a number of properties worth pointing out. First, occu-
pations which cannot be done at home, such as those in the LCS industry, will
not change the values of ζz; occupations for which ho = 0 carry no weight. Sec-
ond, ζz reflects the economic activity of those who commute in or out of zone
z; individuals who work and live in the same zone will not affect (2). Third, ζz
aggregates to higher levels of geographic space. For any geographic area made








i (1[residencei = z]− 1[worki = z]) . (3)
When areas or zones vary considerably in population, as is the case with British
local authorities, it will prove convenient, for the sake of comparison, to work
also with a per capita Zoomshock: this is obtained by dividing the RHS of Ex-
classified as not suitable for home-working, 124 as partly suitable, and 94 as fully suitable. We
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i (1[residencei = z]− 1[worki = z])
∑z∈A ∑i 1[worki = z]
× 100. (4)
Expression (4) is percentage change in employment activities in area A. ζ̂A can
also be calculated for a specific zone, z, as a special case where A = {z}.
The above expressions look at the change in the number of workers across
geography due to a shift to working from home. It is also useful to measure
changes in economic activity in terms of the change in the value of output pro-
duced in a specific area. To do this we weight equations (3) and (4) by income
for each individual i, which we denote by yi.
















iyi (1[residencei = z]− 1[worki = z])
∑z∈A ∑i 1[worki = z]
× 100. (6)
2A substantial recent literature has studied the efficiency of working from home. Bloom et al.
(2015) provide evidence from a within-firm RCT that homeworking increases the productivity
of call-centre workers by up to 22%. Mas and Pallais (2017) find that the average call-centre
worker is willing to pay 8% to work from home. Although, Battiston et al. (Forthcoming) pro-
vides evidence that face-to-face communication improves productivity. One reading of these
somewhat contradictory results is that the optimum level of working-from-home is some mix
of office- and elsewhere-based work. Here, we assume there is no aggregate impact on the
productivity of those working-from-home. We also abstract from other consequences of work
flexibility (Kelly et al., 2014; Allen et al., 2015; Beckmann et al., 2017; Felstead and Henseke,
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3 Data
We calculate the expressions on the RHS of (2) and (3) using information from
the secure version of the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE). The ASHE
contains a random 1% sample of all employees in England, Wales, and Scot-
land.3 In addition to detailed occupation and earnings information, we also
observe the precise geographic location of employment and residence for each
individual in our data. We construct pre-Covid-19 employment distributions
using the 2017, 2018 and 2019 waves of the data. This provides us with obser-
vations on approximately 200, 000 workers.
We conduct our analysis at the level of the Middle Super Output Area (MSOA)
for England and Wales and Intermediate Zone for Scotland (for brevity we refer
simply to MSOA hereafter). These are areas of roughly the same residential
population size (the mean population is around 9000 people).4 We also con-
sider a second, coarser, geographical partition, the Lower Tier Local Authority
(LAD).5 These are administrative and political units, and vary substantially in
size. The largest, Birmingham has a population of over 1 million while the Isles
of Scilly a population of just over 2, 000.
Only 11% of UK workers have the home and the work address in the same
MSOA, and there is considerable variation in this proportion across the coun-
3Unfortunately, data for the ASHE, required for our analysis, is not available for Northern
Ireland.
4In principle it would be possible to work with even finer geographies but MSOAs are pre-
ferred since they are large enough that they will in general represent a local community with
some shops, etc., rather than just a collection of houses. Smaller areas would also ask too much
of the data.
5Specifically, we analyse the Local Authority Districts in England, the Council Areas in Scot-
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Figure 1:
Commuters by MSOA and Local Authority
Note: The horizontal axis is the percent of residents who work outside of the MSOA
(left) and LAD (right) in which they live.
Data source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the ONS Annual Survey of
Hours and Earnings, 2017, 2018, 2019.
try. In Figure 1 we show the distribution, across all MSOAs, in the proportion
of workers who live and work in different MSOAs (i.e. commuters). Clearly,
the role of commuting is a significant; in over 97% of MSOAs more than 60% of
residents commute for work (Figure 1, left panel). One naturally expects that
the proportion of commuters will decrease as the area we look at is larger, but
the proportion of commuters remains significant when we look at local author-
ities: around 50% of workers commute to a different local authority than that
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Figure 2:
Residents and workers who can work-from-home, Bassetlaw
Note: These maps show, for each MSOA, the number of workers who are resident in
each MSOA and can work-from-home (left map), and the number of workers whose
place of work is in the MSOA and can work-from-home (right map).
Data source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the ONS Annual Survey of Hours
and Earnings, 2017, 2018, 2019.
tion: some LADs have over three quarters of their residents working elsewhere,
in others LADs fewer than one in five do so. Thus, commuting even between
large areas is common and varies in extent.
4 Geography of the Zoomshock
As an illustration, we begin our analysis—like so many others—by considering
Bassetlaw. This is a relatively small LAD, 150 miles north of London. There
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ployed residents who can work from home: this is first term in Equation (1),
and is depicted on the left map of Figure 2. We next compute the corresponding
number of workers whose place of work is in an MSOA in Bassetlaw, but who
can work-from-home in a different MSOA (possibly also in the Bassetlaw local
authority): this is the second term in (2), and is depicted on the right map of
Figure 2. The MSOA known as Bassetlaw 014 (the large dark red region on the
left map of Figure 2) has approximately 1465 workers who live in the MSOA,
but 5661 workers who work in the MSOA. Of the former, we compute that 485
workers can work-from-home, approximately one third. Of the latter, 1,828 can
work-from-home, again just about a third. Therefore, if all workers who can
work from home do so, we expect Bassetlaw 014 to see a net decrease in em-
ployment of approximately 1, 828 − 485 = 1, 343 workers.
The maps in Figure 3 show the corresponding Zoomshock for each of the
MSOAs in the Bassetlaw local authority. The map to the left of this figure illus-
trates the net inflow of homeworking workers (Equation (2)), and reflects the
difference between the left and right maps of Figure 2. Red (blue) areas corre-
spond to MSOAs in which home working results in less (more) economic activ-
ity, that is MSOA z for which (2) is negative (positive). The depth of the shades
of red and blue corresponds to strength of the flow, a deeper shade indicates
a larger flow. Boundary between colour bins are set, for positive and negative
values separately, at Zoomshock values approximately at the 20th, 40th, 60th,
80th and 95th MSOA percentiles for Britain.
The right hand side map of Figure 3 reports the same exercise for Equation
(5), so the Zoomshock reflects changes in the value of economic activity across
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tivity due to home-working, and roughly corresponds to the potential change
in the annual GDP for a area z. Notice that quintile assignments of the two Bas-
setlaw maps in Figure 3 are roughly in agreement with one another, but there
are differences, for example, there are two changes in the sign of the flow: one
MSOA for which the change in the flow of workers is negative (positive), while
the corresponding GDP change is positive (negative). An area with a negative
net-flow of workers (a red shade on the LHS map) and a positive GDP net-flow
(a blue shade on the RHS map) is one where the residents are relatively highly
paid workers, and although those who stop commuting to work from home are
fewer, they are sufficiently better paid on average to more than offset the in-
comes of the larger number of workers who no longer need come into the area
to work. In the maps and analysis that follow, for brevity, we focus primarily on
the Zoomshock in terms of workers, and leave the important analysis of income
flows for future research.
The primary drivers of variation in the Zoomshock are the distribution of
where people live relative to where they work, and the geographic clustering of
work which is potentially suitable for home-working. We illustrate the second
in Figure 4 for the Greater London Authority. The left-hand-side map shows
the geographic distribution of all employment; the right hand side map shows
employment weighted by the home-working index. The comparison between
the two panels makes it clear that jobs suitable for home-working are dispro-
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Figure 3:
Zoomshock by workers and GDP, Bassetlaw
Note: These maps show quantiles of expressions (2) and (5) by MSOA. Quantile bound-
aries are calculated separately for positive and negative shocks to represent the 25th,
50th, 75th, and 95th percentiles for Great Britain.
Data source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the ONS Annual Survey of Hours
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Figure 4:
Employees and employment suitable for working-from-home, Greater London Authority
Note: The maps show the netflow of workers from each area (see the note to Figure 3 for details). On the LHS, each area is
an MSOA, on the RHS a London Borough.
Data source: ONS Business Structure Database , 2018. Proportion of homework by MSOA based on authors calculations
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Figure 5:
Geographical differences in suitably of jobs for working-from-home.
Note: The horizontal axis reports the estimated percent of total employment, within an
MSOA, that is suitable for working-from-home.
Data source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the ONS Annual Survey of Hours
and Earnings, 2017, 2018, 2019.
Both maps show that neighbouring areas may have widely varying propor-
tion of workers with the ability to work remotely. This is summarised more
generally for the whole of the UK in Figure 5. In some MSOAs more than 60%
of residents can work-from-home, while in many others only fewer than 30%
of residents can work-from-home. The same is true at local authority level. As
we shall see, it is this heterogeneity that gives the Zoomshock its bite. In Fig-
ure (6) we illustrate the Zoomshock for the Greater London Authority, at the
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ity (ζ̂A from Equation (4)). Both maps confirm the familiar pattern of work-
ers living on the periphery of the metropolis and working in the inner city. If
MSOA Zoomshocks are generated within local authorities, we would expect to
see ζ̂A ≈ 0. These maps demonstrate that this is not the case, workers in central
London are commuting from beyond the local authority.6
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Figure 6:
Zoomshock, Greater London Authority
Note: These maps show quantiles of expressions (2) and (3) by MSOA (left) and local authority (right). Quantile boundaries
are calculated separately for positive and negative shocks to represent the 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th percentiles for Great
Britain in the left-hand side map and the 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th percentiles for Great Britain in the right-hand side map.
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These maps illustrate the importance of a very granular view: there are
sharp, often extreme, differences among neighbouring areas. These differences
are lost when a coarse partition is chosen. The map on the LHS in Figure 6
shows a more fragmented distribution, indicating that there are substantial vari-
ations within boroughs. This can be seen in more detail in the close up of the
London boroughs of Hackney and Kensington and Chelsea that we show in
Figures 7a and 7b. Even though Hackney as a whole is an area of net inflow
(more people are returning than are leaving), there are pockets with a large net
outflow (those in pink and deep red in the map). The picture is similar, if with
the reverse signs, for Kensington and Chelsea; patterns of deep red neighbour
areas of blue.
This is not just a London (or Bassetlaw) phenomenon. We also report the
Zoomshocks for (the nine local authorities of) Greater Birmingham and Soli-
hull, for (the ten local authorities in) Greater Manchester, and for (the four
local authorities in) the Sheffield City Region: these are Figures 8-10. Again
these highlight the highly asymmetric pattern of commuting from where peo-
ple live to where people work: some areas predominantly serve as residences,
others are mainly places for work. In the Appendix to this paper (https:
//perma.cc/P6RR-NMW4), we provide Zoomshock maps for a wide variety
of LADs and counties across England, Wales and Scotland.
In Figure 11, we map ζ̂A by local authorities for the the whole of Great Britain
(omitting the Shetland and Orkney Islands). A couple of interesting features are
worth point out. First, the majority of the areas on the map are blue, suggesting
a positive Zoomshock. This is unsurprising, as pre-home-working economic
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Figure 7:
Zoomshock, Hackney and Kensington & Chelsea
(a) Hackney (b) Kensington and Chelsea
Note: This map shows quantiles of Expression (2) by local authority. Quantiles bound-
aries represent the 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th percentiles for Great Britain, calculated
separately for positive and negative shocks.
Data source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the ONS Annual Survey of Hours
and Earnings, 2017, 2018, 2019.
larger (in terms of area) local authorities appear to be more likely to have posi-
tive Zoomshocks, while small local authorities are more likely to have negative
Zoomshocks. This reflects an important feature of the Zoomshock, economic ac-
tivity is flowing to less-densely populated parts of Britain. These features both
suggest that working-from-home is leading to economic activity being signifi-
cantly less geographically concentrated.
In Table 1 we list the ten local authorities with the largest negative and pos-
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Figure 8:
Zoomshock, Greater Birmingham and Solihul
Note: This map shows quantiles of Expression (2) by local authority. Quantiles bound-
aries represent the 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th percentiles for Great Britain, calculated
separately for positive and negative shocks.
Data source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the ONS Annual Survey of Hours
and Earnings, 2017, 2018, 2019.
predictable, as six of the top ten are in Central London. However, other local
authorities, such as Nottingham and Newcastle are perhaps a little more sur-
prising. The magnitude of the Zoomshocks are substantial—three-quarters of
workers in the City of London and half of those in Westminster can work-from-
home. The boroughs with the largest positive shocks are again predominantly
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Figure 9:
Zoomshock, Greater Manchester
Note: This map shows quantiles of Expression (2) by local authority. Quantiles bound-
aries represent the 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th percentiles for Great Britain, calculated
separately for positive and negative shocks.
Data source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the ONS Annual Survey of Hours
and Earnings, 2017, 2018, 2019.
Another interesting feature of the data is the differences in the GDP shock.
East Dunbartonshire has a larger increase in the number of workers than East
Renfrewshire, but the implied increase in GDP is only around one third of the
size. This emphasises that not only is there important heterogeneity in the num-
bers of workers in an MSOA able to work-from-home but there is also substan-
tial variation in how much they earn and likely spend. This is important as it
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Figure 10:
Zoomshock, Sheffield City Region
Note: This map shows quantiles of Expression (2) by local authority. Quantiles bound-
aries represent the 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th percentiles for Great Britain, calculated
separately for positive and negative shocks.
Data source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the ONS Annual Survey of Hours
and Earnings, 2017, 2018, 2019.
the City of London, previously characterised by large numbers of highly paid
commuters are the places most affected. One thing this highlights is that the
places that might be most affected are those where, even if fewer in number,
commuters account for a large share of GDP.
5 The Zoomshock and LCS workers
The analysis so far illustrates the considerable variability of the Zoomshock
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Figure 11:
Zoomshock, Great Britain local authorities
Note: The maps show the netflow of workers from each MSOA (Equation (2), see the
note to Figure 3 for details).
Data source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the ONS Annual Survey of Hours
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Table 1:
Largest negative and positive Zoomshock by local authority





City of London -75.6 -2,592,970
Westminster -49.9 -1,218,470
Camden -43.1 -648,598











Waltham Forest 60.3 1,156,035
East Dunbartonshire 57.4 384,360





Calculations correspond to expressions (4) and (6).
†GDP shown as pounds per annum.
Data source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the ONS Annual Survey
of Hours and Earnings, 2017, 2018, 2019.
the LCS sector. The key point is that while the Zoomshock is itself additive
across zones—as can be seen from expressions (3) and (5)—the consequences of
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not additive. This is because the presence of frictions, such as imperfect labour
mobility and capacity constraints, means that a movement in LCS demand from
one zone to another will not, in the short- and medium-run, be perfectly mir-
rored by a movement in LCS supply.7 As a result, we expect to see a decrease
in aggregate LCS employment, with wages increasing in positive Zoomshock
neighbourhoods.
A complete formal analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, instead in
this section we present an intuitive graphical analysis of the short-medium run
effects of the Zoomshock on the distribution of LCS employment and economic
activity. We show that the aggregate impact on LCS employment in a LAD
depends crucially on the shape of the distribution, and specifically the skewness
of positive MSOA Zoomshocks.
To this end, Figure 12 depicts the demand and the supply for LCS work-
ers in zone z in the pre-Zoomshock equilibrium, given by (L∗z , w
∗
z ), where Lz
is the number of LCS workers and wz is the wage. To simplify the analysis we
make the assumption that all the demand for LCS workers comes from non-LCS
workers. This strong assumption is only to aid calculations and carve in sharper
relief the distinction between the two groups of workers.8 The pre-Zoomshock
intersection of demand and supply in zone z reflects a long-run spatial equi-
librium. This is reflected by the shape of the supply function, depicted as the
dashed curve where LCS workers are in their preferred job and residence. From
7To focus on the effect of the geographic change in where work is done, we assume that LCS
demand from workers is independent of whether they work from home or the office. This is
likely an overly-optimistic assumption. For example, having access to a one’s own kitchen may
decrease demand for restaurant food when one works at home relative to the office.
8Thus, a barber (who is a LCS worker) may have lunch in a local restaurant, and if he stops
working, due to the fact that many of his customers are teleworking, the restaurant will lose the
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Figure 12:




Note: This figure illustrates the market for LCS workers in a zone z. The downward
sloping curve shows demand for workers (Lz) at each wage (wz). The dashed and solid
upward sloping curves depict two possible supply curves for z.
this equilibrium in order to attract new LCS workers, businesses in zone z will
need to pay progressively higher salaries. Initially, the increase might only need
to be small to attract workers close to indifferent between their current zone and
zone z, but then larger increases will be needed to persuade others to move to
or to commute to zone z. The shape of the supply function, in particular the
“steepness” of the curve beyond the initial equilibrium, depends on the charac-
teristics of zone z, such as the geographical proximity and type of neighbouring
zones. As an example, in a sparsely populated zone an LCS business may find
that larger wage increases are necessary to attract additional staff, who would
have to travel substantial distances to work.9
The aggregate effect of the Zoomshock on LCS employment for a LAD de-
pends on the distribution of the shock across the MSOAs that make up the LAD.
9The steepness of the curve will depend on the willingness of unemployed LCS workers to
commute as well as on capacity-constraints, etc. Marinescu and Rathelot (2018) show that in
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Figure 13:










Note: This figure illustrates possible Zoomshocks for eight zones across two fictional
areas.
In Figure 13 we illustrate this for two fictional LADs, Loamshire and Wessex,
each containing four MSOAs, one in each quadrant of the LAD. To highlight
the aspects that affect the link between the overall effect of the Zoomshock
and the shape of the distribution of these shocks in the area, we make assump-
tions which are deliberately extreme. The demand function for LCS (black solid
curve) is identical in all eight areas, and so in the long run equilibrium each area
has the same employment for LCS workers who are all paid the same wage. The
eight demand and supply diagrams in Figure 13 depict the LCS market in each
of these MSOAs.
We also posit the supply functions to be the same in the eight zones. This
again is to highlight the role of skewness in the Zoomshock, and could be re-
laxed with no change in the results. What matters is that, beyond the pre-shock
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depicts a large decrease in demand (brought on by a negative Zoomshock) in
the north-east MSOA of each of Loamshire and Wessex. In these zones, half
the workers stop commuting there to work and instead work-from-home. This
is represented by the demand function for LCS workers in these areas shifting
to the red curve, where LCS labour demand at the previous salary, is exactly
half as it was before. What distinguishes Loamshire and Wessex is where the
teleworkers reside. In Loamshire they all live in the north-easterly MSOAs. In
this MSOA the demand curve shifts to that of the blue line: the demand has
increased by 50%, a rightward shift equal in size to the leftward shift of the red
curve in the north-west. In the two other MSOA there is no change, as no one
previously commuted to or from them, so the equilibrium in these two “south-
ern” MSOAs is unaltered. The total employment of LCS workers in Loamshire
changes by the difference between the the decrease in the north-west zone, the
distance between L∗z and A1, and the increase in the north-east zone, the dis-
tance between A2 and L
∗
z . That, is, the total employment in Loamshire following
the Zoomshock is 2L∗z + A1 + A2.
But now consider Wessex: here the workers who were commuting to the
north-west zone and are now teleworking are evenly distributed across the rest
of the LAD, so that in each of the three other MSOAs, the demand curve for LCS
workers shifts by a third of the distance of the shift in the north-east MSOA in
Loamshire, as depicted in the RHS panel of Figure 13. The analogous argu-
ment shows that the post-Zoomshock employment in Wessex is A1 + 3A3. The
convexity of the supply of labour beyond the pre-Zoomshock equilibrium im-
plies that the distance between A2 and L
∗
z is less than three times the distance
between A3 and L
∗
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Figure 14:








































Note: This figure illustrates possible Zoomshocks for eight zones across two fictional
areas.
fact that workers cannot relocate frictionlessly between MSOAs is greater in
Loamshire. Thus in the comparison between the two counties, the loss of LCS
employment depends not on the magnitude of the aggregate Zoomshock, but
on the skewness of the distribution of the shocks: Wessex’s distribution is more
skewed than Loamshire’s (which is in fact symmetric).
The next figure shows however that it is only right skweness (that is posi-
tive skewness) that matters. In Midsomer, the shock pattern is symmetric, ex-
actly the same as in Loamshire, whereas the county of Rutshire, has one MSOA
with the same positive shock as Midsomer, the north-west in both counties, but
smaller negative shocks in the three other MSOA, making the shock distribu-
tion in the county left skewed. Yet the overall impact on LCS employment is
the same in Rutshire and in Midsomer, due to the linearity of the supply func-
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There are already two lessons to take from this preliminary analysis. The
first is that, in aggregate, we expect the Zoomshock will lead to a decrease in
LCS employment. This is a consequence of short-run labour market frictions
and capital availability that mean a shift in LCS demand from one neighbour-
hood to another will not be mirrored by a similar shift supply. The second
lesson is that we expect the consequences for employment across an LAD to be
worse the more skewed is the Zoomshock across the MSOAs which make up
the LAD.
5.1 The Zoomshock and Locally Consumed Services: Some Ev-
idence
There is significant anecdotal evidence of the negative impact that the Covid-
19 pandemic has had on the LCS industry, particularly in urban centres such
as central London. Given the large negative Zoomshock we estimate for central
London (Figure 6), this is not surprising. We now provide quantitative evidence
as to the scale and distribution of this shock. As stated in the introduction, we
define LCS as any good or service for which the market is geographically con-
strained, both supply and demand must take place in a fixed geographic loca-
tion. Restaurants, hairdresser and theatres are obvious examples. Although the
goods purchased in a department store are not part of locally consumed ser-
vices per se, the service provided by the department store, providing an outlet
and assistance in which to purchase goods, is a local service.10 We define busi-
nesses and employees in the locally consumed service industry according to 615
10Our definition of local services is closely related to the tradeable and non-tradeable goods
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four-digit Standardized Industry Classification codes.
The overall distribution is shown in Figure 15. Here we see that, both within
the Greater London Area (left panel) and outside it (right panel), the propor-
tion of MSOAs experiencing a negative shock is increasing with the number of
the local service employees. That is, in our data, LCS employment is concen-
trated in neighbourhoods in which there are many jobs suitable for working-
from-home. The average MSOA which experiences a positive Zoomshock has
687 employees working (pre-Covid-19) in LCS within the MSOA. The aver-
age MSOA experiencing a negative Zoomshock has 2139 employees working
(pre-Covid-19) in LCS within the MSOA. Despite the fact that only 28% of
MSOAs are predicted to experience a negative Zoomshock (1990 MSOAs), these
MSOAs account for 54% of all the local service employment. Overall, in Britain
4,252,963 employees suffer a negative shock, against versus 3,583,376 employ-
ees in MSOAs experiencing a positive shock.
Figure 15 shows that a small number of MSOAs are experiencing very large
Zoomshocks, an increase in employment in some cases of over 300%. These
large changes are concentrated in the MSOAs with the fewest LCS employees.
For most MSOAs experiencing a positive shock this is smaller, reflected by the
mass of points just above the red-dashed horizontal line which separates posi-
tive and negative shocks. This combination implies the distribution of positive
shocks to be characterised by most shocks being small and close to the mode,
with a few large shocks far to the right. That is, right-skewed. Moreover, the
largest shocks have been in MSOAs where the composition of employment sug-
gests there is the least existing capacity. It is reasonable to suspect that this lim-
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Recall from Figure 14, that while the data also show that distribution of nega-
tive shocks is also skewed—this is not what matters for the aggregate outcome.
While, the right-most observations in the left and right panels represent an aver-
age of over 8,000 and 22,000 employees respectively it isn’t the concentration of
these losses, but rather the inability of MSOAs experiencing positive shocks to
re-employ them that leads to the negative aggregate effect on LCS employment.
This is the UK government’s official measure of relative deprivation. It is
based on 39 separate indicators and aims to capture the lack of resources needed
to meet needs across a wide range of an individual’s living conditions, not just
lack of financial resources.
We close our analysis by noting that the losses in LCS employment are likely
to exacerbate geographic inequality. Figure 16 shows that LCS workers are dis-
proportionately likely to live in MSOAs high Index of Multiple Deprivation
scores.11 In the most deprived MSOAs, roughly 45% of residents are employed
in the LCS sector. Thus, the skewness of the negative shock distribution may
not matter for the overall level of LCS employment losses, but to the extent that
workers in MSOAs with the most negative shocks live in similar locations, we
may expect the increase in poverty to be highly geographically concentrated.
This concentration might have important policy implications.
11This is the UK government’s official measure of relative deprivation. It is based on 39 sep-
arate indicators and aims to capture the lack of resources needed to meet needs across a wide
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Figure 15:
Zoomshock and local service employment
Note: This figure regresses, for each MSOA, the Zoomshock (Equation 4) against the
log-employment in the local service industry. Binned into 100 evenly sized groups.
Data source: Change in MSOA employment based on authors’ calculation using the
ONS Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings, 2017, 2018, 2019. Log-employment in
local services by MSOA calculated using information from the ONS Business Structure
Database, 2018.
6 Conclusion
This paper looks at an important economic consequence of the Covid-19 pan-
demic. The pandemic has lead to a significant shift in the geographic distribu-
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Figure 16:
Index of Multiple Deprivation
Note: Binscatter plot: each of the dots represents many MSOAs, to avoid cluttering the
diagram.
Data source: Percent employment in local services by MSOA calculated using informa-
tion from the ONS Business Structure Database, 2018.
to this redistribution as the Zoomshock.
There are three takeaways from our results. First, the Zoomshock is large—
many people can work form home and many people live in a different neigh-
bourhood from the one where they work. This is true both for specific neigh-
bourhoods and when we aggregate to the level of local authorities. Second,
the Zoomshock is extremely heterogeneous. Within UK local authorities, some
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while others have seen a surge. In general, while the most prominent fea-
ture of the Zoomshock has been the relocation of economic activity from a few
densely populated city centres to the suburbs, the precise changes are often
quite different in seemingly similar neighbourhoods. Third, the Zoomshock
is moving workers away from neighbourhoods with a large supply of locally
consumed services to neighbourhoods where the supply of these services is
relatively scarce. As LCS are, by definition, geographically immobile in the
short-run, this suggests a possible geographic mismatch of supply and demand
that may have consequences for aggregate LCS employment. We found that
the scale of the losses depends crucially on the shape of the distribution of
Zoomshocks, and in particular that what matters is the skewness of positive
shocks. If the positive shocks are approximately uniformly distributed, then
losses due to frictions, such as capacity constraints, will be lower than if the
Zoomshock is concentrated on a small number of neighbourhoods. This makes
it crucial to obtain a precise measure of the Zoomshock at a highly granular
level.
An objective of this exercise is to produce guidance for policy makers in
the UK, and in other countries, in the formulation of a Covid-19 economic re-
covery strategy. The exact nature of the policy prescription depends on how
long-lived will be the increase in working-from-home. If we expect that once
the UK emerges from the current public health crisis, workers will return to the
office and pre-Covid-19 economic activities are restored, then there is a role for
policy to aid local service businesses that are currently struggling to survive. In
this case aid should focus in neighbourhoods which are experiencing the largest
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work to continue to take place at home once public health restrictions are eased,
then policy should encourage and facilitate LCS businesses relocating to where
is the demand. That is, businesses in LCS industries should be encouraged to
move from neighbourhoods experiencing large negative Zoomshocks to neigh-
bourhoods with positive Zoomshocks. Further understanding of the impact
of the Zoomshock on economic activity will also be needed in view of the fact
that the different characteristics of the zones experiencing positive and negative
Zoomshocks will affect their ability to support LCS businesses: for example a
large café thriving in a busy city centre may not survive in a well-to-do sparsely
populated rural environment.
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1. Introduction
The economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic has been severe and persistent. In 2020, the
global economy is expected to experience its worst recession since the great depression of the 1930s
with the highest share of countries experiencing contractions in per capita GDP since 1870 (WBG,
2020).1 Estimates by Apedo-Amah et al. (2020) show that firm sales declined by more than 70%
around the peak of the crisis (as measured by the steepest drop in Google Mobility), and have
remained more than 40% below last year’s levels even several months later. Two-thirds of firms have
either fired employees, reduced worker hours or wages, or asked workers to take leave. More than
half of micro and small businesses (those with less than 20 employees) are in arrears or expect to
fall into arrears in the next six months. And while there are welcome news of vaccines and new
treatments for COVID-19, these are unlikely to be available everywhere at once meaning that the
economic pain is likely to persist for some time.
In response to the crisis, governments around the world have relied on a wide range of policy
measures to support firms and households. While these responses have been uneven across countries,
they are unprecedented in their magnitude. Fiscal stimulus in high-income economies has reached
10% of GDP or more, with around 40% going to firm support. In developing countries, faced with
more limited fiscal space, governments have allocated between 1% and 3% of GDP to this purpose,
with about a quarter of this amount dedicated to supporting businesses. Irrespective of the amount
of the resources invested, data on whether these are reaching the intended beneficiaries, addressing
their needs, and helping firms adjust to COVID-19 are desperately needed to inform policy-making.
This paper provides the first such assessment on a global scale.
Specifically, the paper utilizes a unique dataset covering more than 120,000 firms across 60
countries during the months of April-September 2020 to present a set of novel stylized facts on
the policies implemented to support businesses from a firm-level perspective. It characterizes the
beneficiaries of implemented policies, contrasts the policies implemented with ones that firms state
are most important to them, identifies reasons for not accessing policy support, and links policies
with firm performance, layoffs, expectations, and uncertainty. The paper also provides some initial
indicative evidence about the targeting and effectiveness of policies.
Our main findings are grouped into four sets of stylized facts. First, we show that policy support
has been especially limited for the most vulnerable firms and countries: micro firms are about half
as likely to access support as large firms, and firms in high-income countries are about five times
more likely to receive public support than firms in low-incomes countries. Second, we identify some
mismatches between policies reported as most needed by firms and policies that firms are more
likely to receive, particularly in upper-middle and high-income countries. Third, we document that
targeting of initial policy responses was limited as well as some mistargeting, likely as a result of
barriers to access support and lack of targeting capacity, with firms that did not experience shock or
sales drop benefiting from support and firms experiencing large negative shocks not having access
to public support. Fourth, we find indicative evidence of effectiveness: our results show that policies
such as credit and cash transfers appear to be helping firms address liquidity constraints while
receiving wage subsidies seems to be associated with lower probability of firing workers.
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This paper contributes to several related strands of the literature. Recently published volumes
such as Baldwin and di Mauro (2020) have reviewed the range of emerging policy responses to
COVID-19 and provided advice on how policy frameworks should evolve – although most of the
focus has been on high-income economies and China. Authors such as Cororaton and Rosen (2020),
Granja et al. (2020), De Marco (2020), Kozeniauskas et al. (2020), and Cui et al. (2020) have focused
on the reach and targeting of specific programs in China, Italy, Portugal, and the US. Additionally,
this paper contributes to the emerging literature by authors including Chetty et al. (2020), Granja
et al. (2020), ?, and Cui et al. (2020) that have provided some early evidence on the effectiveness
of programs to help firms weather the impacts of the pandemic in the same countries, as well as
previous studies such as De Mel et al. (2012) and Bruhn (2020) that focused on experimental and
quasi-experimental evidence from previous crises in Sri Lanka and Mexico.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the data. The following
two sections present policies that have been announced, including evidence on access to policies,
as well as policies that firms identify as more needed. Then, we present evidence on mismatches
between the demand and supply of policies, mistargeting, and barriers to accessing public support.
Recognizing that the COVID-19 crisis has significantly altered firms outlook and heightened uncer-
tainty (Altig et al., 2020), the section that follows specifically focuses on the relationship between
receiving policy support and firms expectations and uncertainty. Lastly, we present some prelimi-
nary evidence about the effectiveness of different policies. The paper concludes with a discussion of
policy implications and directions for future research.
2. Data
We rely on data from the first wave of the Business Pulse Surveys (BPS) developed by the
World Bank Group (WBG) to measure the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the private sector
(Apedo-Amah et al., 2020), as well as the COVID-19 follow-up rounds of the World Bank Enterprise
Surveys. This novel harmonized dataset offers the most comprehensive assessment of the short-
term impact of the shock (from April through August of 2020). The sample includes more than
120,000 businesses in 60 low, middle, and high-income countries in the six regions where the WBG
is present.2 The sample covers micro, small, medium, and large businesses across all main sectors
(agriculture, manufacturing, retail, and other services, including construction).
The questionnaire collects information on business performance through the COVID-19 shock on
some critical economic dimensions: operations of the business, sales, liquidity and insolvency, labor
adjustments, firms responses, and expectations and uncertainty about the future (Apedo-Amah
et al., 2020). Businesses are asked about their preferredmechanisms of support during the pandemic.
We grouped these mechanisms in the following categories of policy instruments: monetary transfers,
deferral of payments, access to finance, support with tax obligations, wage subsidies, and others.3
Businesses are also surveyed on whether they have received any of these mechanisms of support
2The survey covers East Asia and Pacific (EAP), Europe and Central Asia (ECA), Latin America and the Caribbean
(LAC), Middle East and North-Africa (MNA), South Asia (SAR), and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Among high-income
countries, our dataset includes Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Poland, Romania, and Slovenia.
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from local or national authorities, and if they have not, they are asked about the reasons why.4 The
dataset then offers a unique window into the private sector to assess both the need for policy and
the availability of public support during the COVID-19 shock.
Given the variation in country samples and timing of the surveys, we follow Apedo-Amah et al.
(2020) and introduce different controls in the analysis. Unless stated otherwise, we usually include
in the analysis dummies for size, sector (i.e. 10 sectors), country, and the timing of the survey in
terms of weeks relative to the peak of the COVID-19 shock.5 To control for differences in the number
of observations in each country sample, we weight our results using the inverse of the number of
observations in each country, that is, in the spirit of traditional cross-country analysis, each country
has the same weight in our analysis.
3. The supply and access to policy support
To respond to the economic downturn caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, countries around the
world have enacted a large suite of stabilization and recoverymeasures. According to theWorld Bank,
governments across the world have implemented 1,607 measures directly aimed at supporting firms
in 135 countries. More than three quarters of these measures are concentrated in three categories:
debt finance support, employment cost support, and tax support.6 Debt finance support has been the
most common, accounting for more than a third of all policy measures adopted. Within this category,
new lending under concessional terms accounts for 43%, followed by the deferral, restructuring or
rescheduling of payments (26%) and credit guarantees (13%). Employment support constitutes
roughly one quarter of all measures that have been announced, with wage subsidies (38%) and
support to self-employed individuals (26%) being the most common within this group. The third
most common group of policy responsemeasures is tax relief, representing one-fifth of all measures.7
Importantly, the type of policy responses varies systematically across countries. Low income
countries tend to use a less-diversified set of interventions, with debt finance interventions accounting
for almost half of all measures, but rely less heavily on employment support. High-income countries
rely less heavily on debt finance or tax relief (31% and 17% of all measures, respectively), but use
employment support measures (32%) more frequently. More direct forms of income transfers, i.e.
wage subsidies and direct monetary transfers, are more common among firms in richer countries.
Such differences suggest that variations in government administrative capabilities, fiscal space, the
4The questions read: 1. What would be the most needed policies to support this business over the COVID-19 crisis? (Choose
up to three)Menu of options: monetary transfers, deferral of payments, access to finance, support with tax obligations,
wage subsidies, and others; 2. Since the outbreak of COVID-19, has this establishment received any national or local government
measures issued in response to the crisis? Menu of options: Yes, No; 3. Did any of these measures involve any of the following?
(Choose all that apply) Menu of options: monetary transfers, deferral of payments, access to finance, support with tax
obligations, wage subsidies, and others; 4. What of the following options best describe the reason why this establishment did
not receive any national or local government measures issued in response to the crisis? Menu of options: I was not aware; Too
difficult to apply; I am not eligible; I have applied but not received it; Other.
5This is measured using country-level Google Mobility Data.
6See World Bank, Map of SME-Support Measures in Response to COVID-19. Data and visualizations available here:
https://bit.ly/2SelF96. Policy responses are classified in eight different categories: business advice; business climate;
business cost support; debt finance support; demand support measures; employment cost support; other finance support;
and tax relief.
7Primarily through rate reductions, credits, waivers, and/or deferrals of VAT, payroll, social security, and land taxes
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extent of informality, financial sector development and the reach of the tax system, determine the
policy toolkit available to governments in each country.8
Despite the plethora of measures launched around the globe, only one out of four firms had
received any type of public support at the time we conducted the surveys. This means that the large
majority of firms around the world have faced the economic shock due to the COVID-19 pandemic
without any type of public support. Panel (a) in Figure 1 shows the probability of utilizing public
support across countries by income group, controlling for the fact that the survey was implemented
at different stages of the pandemic as well as for sector and size fixed effects. One important caveat
is that different countries had a different supply of public support, therefore we should expect
lower access in countries where public support policies implemented were more limited. Still, the
results show stark differences by income levels: the probability of receiving some public support is
11% in low income countries, 15% in lower-middle income countries, 30% in upper-middle income
countries, and 53% in high income countries.
Figure 1: Access to public support.
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The likelihood of receiving public support is also increasing in firm size (panel (b) in Figure 1),
and this likelihood varies between 18% for micro firms and 30% for large ones. When looking at
sectors, we do observe higher likelihood of receiving public support in some of the most affected
sectors of the lock-down, such as accommodation (33%) and food preparation services (32%) (panel
(c) in Figure 1). Finally, as expected, formal firms are more likely to access public support, albeit the
difference is not large nor statistically significant.9 While formal registration is needed for accessing
some support programs, and utilization rates are low, informal firms are still able to access some
support policies which highlights an effort by some government to provide universal support to the
pandemic.
Table 1 breaks down access to policy into each group of programs, and shows that there are
significant differences across income in terms of what policies firms are more likely to have received.
The likelihood of receiving wage subsidies, access to finance, and payments deferrals dramatically
increase with income, and high income countries are significantly more likely to offer every policy,
but especially wage subsidies. Tax reductions and deferrals are the most common types of policies
benefiting firms in low income countries with 5% of firms having access to them. The second most
commonly accessed type of support in low income countries is access to finance, which is received
with a probability of 2%. Similarly, the likelihood of receiving access to finance, tax support, and
wage subsidies significantly increases with the size of the firm, whereas there are no statistically
significant differences across sizes for monetary transfers and payments deferrals.
One key difference in the composition of support policies utilized are between formal and
informal firms (Table 1). As expected, for the countries where we obtained information from
informal firms, these are less likely to have utilized specific policy support, especially tax support,
since depending on the measure of informality, most of these firms are not tax registered. On the
other hand, informal firms have a probability of close to 5% and 3% of receiving monetary transfers
and wage subsidies, respectively. This is consistent with some views that suggest the use of cash
transfers to target informal firms, given the difficulties to effectively obtained information necessary
for the targeting of other support policies.
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Total 5.97 5.72 5.49 7.61 16.56
Low 0.65 0.84 2.34 5.27 0.53
Lower-Middle 3.71 3.95 4.63 6.15 3.55
Upper-Middle 3.18 5.14 5.13 5.43 18.45
High 13.26 11.16 7.79 13.22 36.78
Micro (0-4) 5.57 4.20 3.17 4.92 10.58
Small (5-19) 6.87 5.85 5.58 7.58 15.81
Medium (20-99) 5.08 6.05 6.75 8.49 18.90
Large (100+) 5.91 6.19 6.74 9.47 20.22
Formal 3.42 3.70 2.00 3.74 6.93
Informal 4.72 1.57 1.95 0.79 3.19
Agro and mining 6.79 4.90 6.26 7.24 17.05
Manuf 6.52 5.86 5.93 7.65 17.46
Const and untilities 5.32 4.10 4.42 6.65 14.15
Retail and wholesale 4.86 5.06 4.75 7.06 14.40
Transp and storage 6.74 5.74 6.18 7.10 16.61
Accom 7.40 8.44 7.86 13.33 25.21
Food prep and serv 8.28 9.01 5.88 9.81 22.02
Info and comm 6.76 7.69 5.37 8.53 17.56
Fin serv 5.39 5.54 6.95 6.91 15.53
Other serv 4.98 5.76 4.88 7.12 15.99
Demand shock 6.31 7.09 5.92 8.02 18.40
Production shock 6.30 5.67 6.92 7.43 16.61
Both 7.25 7.34 6.48 9.18 21.24
No shocks suffered 4.70 3.34 3.96 5.80 12.40
Non-Exporter 6.02 6.79 5.58 8.09 19.55
Exporter 6.80 6.84 6.17 9.26 20.19
Note: Average predicted means from separate Probits that control for country, size, sector, and timing
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4. The demand for policy support
While the previous section provided a granular view of the supply of policy support, this
section analyzes the most demanded policy instruments, and how the demand for policies varies
across country income groups, firm size, formality status, sector, exporting status, and transmission
channels, relying on the response to the question “What would be the most needed policies to
support this business over the COVID-19 crisis?”
Overall, access to finance (which includes deferral of credit payments, suspension of interest
payments, rollover of debt, access to new credit, and loans with subsidized rates) and tax reductions
and deferrals (which includes fiscal exemptions and reductions and tax deferrals) are the most
demanded policy instruments with close to 50% of businesses reporting these instruments as the
most needed interventions (Table 2). This is significantly larger than the share of firms reporting
other policy instruments as most needed, such as payment deferrals (24%), monetary transfer (30%),
and wage subsidies (24%).
Table 2 shows significant heterogeneity in terms of demand for policy instruments across income
groups. The demand for wage subsidies significantly increase with the income level of the country.
In contrast, the demand for monetary transfers, payments deferrals, and access to credit follow
an inverted U shape with a higher demand in middle income countries, whereas tax reductions
and deferral follows a U shape and is indeed the most demanded policy in low and high income
countries. There are also significant differences in terms of the demand for policy support across
firm size groups. Whereas the demand for tax reduction and deferrals and wage subsidies increase
with size, the inverse is observed for monetary transfer, which is more likely among micro and small
firms. Similarly, whereas the most demanded policy instruments for informal firms are monetary
transfers and access to credit (with 60% of probability of each being the most needed policies), the
most demanded interventions for formal firms are access to credit and tax support. There is little
heterogeneity in terms of demand for policy support across sectors, exporting status, or channels
through which the shock was transmitted, such as demand or production shocks.
Despite the heterogeneity observed across groups, we observe some common patterns. Access
to finance and tax reductions and deferrals is among the top priority across firms from different
groups, with the exception of informal firms. Moreover, the demand for wage subsidies tends to
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Total 30.04 23.54 49.46 46.73 23.89
Low 9.53 8.43 25.65 50.38 14.19
Lower-Middle 29.80 26.02 59.16 46.07 16.64
Upper-Middle 36.06 23.77 49.37 46.52 41.96
High 31.52 15.00 25.39 65.24 45.99
Micro (0-4) 34.17 25.20 47.37 41.74 17.16
Small (5-19) 30.73 23.98 50.60 46.55 24.76
Medium (20-99) 26.11 21.33 50.96 49.58 27.06
Large (100+) 24.25 21.92 48.42 53.76 31.00
Formal 43.63 27.01 55.27 44.92 22.84
Informal 59.12 29.21 60.57 26.46 18.85
Agro and mining 33.57 18.85 52.11 37.53 21.02
Manuf 30.00 22.94 49.85 46.40 24.77
Const and untilities 29.12 19.99 51.47 46.51 21.82
Retail and wholesale 28.22 25.09 48.97 48.75 22.37
Transp and storage 30.75 20.82 49.50 46.75 25.57
Accom 31.32 22.41 47.17 48.57 31.55
Food prep and serv 33.49 31.48 49.44 45.88 23.62
Info and comm 29.82 24.83 47.79 52.06 22.11
Fin serv 24.78 20.92 48.69 50.10 21.85
Other serv 30.62 26.76 47.69 46.27 26.13
Demand shock 28.15 22.72 42.86 48.69 22.39
Production shock 26.81 24.71 52.39 46.33 21.39
Both 29.72 24.94 48.81 48.86 25.62
No shocks suffered 27.26 22.08 46.39 46.82 20.28
Non-Exporter 25.35 23.04 49.86 48.84 23.98
Exporter 25.34 21.97 47.71 50.22 27.40
Note: Average predicted means from separate Probits that control for country, size, sector, and timing
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5. Mismatch between demand for and supply of public support
Building on the previous sections, this section compares access to support with the firms stated
preferences, that is, the potential mismatch between the demand for public policy and the access to
these policies. Several elements can explain differences between policies demanded and received.
First, some policies may not be available in the country due to fiscal constraints or preferences by the
authorities. Second, firms may be discouraged from trying to access public support if application
processes are too cumbersome or expensive, or if access is driven by opaque criteria and political
connections. Third, there are less constraints to indicate policies that are preferred than policies that
are received, which involves clear trade-offs in terms of budget.10
Our results show that, among firms in low income countries, tax support is at the same time
the most preferred and most commonly received types of support policies (see Table 1 and Ta-
ble 2).11 Instead, when analyzing the responses of firms in lower-middle income countries, there is
some alignment with tax deductions and deferrals, but a clear mismatch in the main intervention
demanded and offered: access to credit is the most preferred policy, but tax support is the main
mechanism of support offered, although only to 6% of businesses.
For upper middle income countries there is some alignment for wage subsidies, which at the
same time rank high in terms of preferences among the firms but also are very commonly used.
However, we identify a mismatch for tax deductions and access to credit, which appear to rank
higher in terms of firms preferences but low in terms of utilization or access. A similar picture
emerges for high income countries where there is a large mismatch for the demand for tax deferrals
and access to these benefits, while there is a better alignment between the preference for wage
subsidies and its utilization.
To investigate further the mismatch between the demand for policy and the public support
received we implemented a decomposition exercise to understand what variables have higher
explanation power to explain the likelihood for demanding or receiving the support. First, we ran a
probit model for each type of policy instrument, including tax support, wage subsidies, payment
deferral, and access to credit controlling for size group, sector of activity, shock reported by the firm
(e.g. supply, demand, or both), and country fixed effects. We then ran a Shapley decomposition
to estimate the relative contribution of each regressor variable, grouped by size, sector, and type
of the shock. Figure 2 shows the results of this decomposition exercise, which are normalized to 1,
excluding the contribution of country fixed effects. 12
10In the BPS questionnaire, we asked firms to indicate up to three preferred policies.
11In this typology tax support encompasses both, tax exemption or reductions and tax deferrals.
12Absolute values of Pseudo R-squared vary by regression. Shapley values do not point the direction of the effect, but
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Preferred Policy Received policy
Access to credit
The mismatch between the demand for policies and policies received is particularly larger for
payment deferrals and access to credit. Overall, the results for received policies are consistent
across the different instruments. Most of the variation on the likelihood to receive a public support
associated with tax, wage subsidies, payment deferral, or access to credit, is explained by variation in
size, followed by sector, and shock suffered. These results are also consistent with the fact that larger
firms are more likely to receive support related to any of these instruments. A similar pattern is
observed for demand for policy associated with tax support or wage subsidies. For both instruments,
larger firms are more likely to report them as most needed policy. Yet, an inverted relationship is
observed for access to credit and payment deferrals, where variation in the type of shock tend to
have higher explanatory power for the demand for those instruments, followed by sector and size.
This discrepancy is particularly relevant for access to credit.
6. Targeting (mistargeting) of beneficiaries
While the literature on social protection and transfers has focused extensively on the importance
of targeting (see for example Hanna and Olken, 2018), evidence on private sector policies is more
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targeting of loans during the pandemic and its role in extending liquidity support for small versus
larger firm. The importance of targeting loans towards firms that critically need liquidity is also
highlighted in Cororaton and Rosen (2020) who examine the characteristics of firm that have
benefited from the United States’ Paycheck Protection Program (PPP).13 Funds disbursed through
the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act’s PPP did not flow to areas more
adversely affected by the economic effects of the pandemic, as measured by declines in hours worked
or business shutdowns, but most likely to less hard hit businesses and locations (Granja et al., 2020).
By comparison, the roll-out of a similar program in Italy appears to have been effective in reaching
the smaller firms and those in more adversely affected areas (De Marco, 2020). In Portugal, policies
related to debt moratorium, government credit lines, tax deferral and subsidized paid furlough
was accessed disproportionately by lower productivity firms as these were the hardest hit by the
crisis (Kozeniauskas et al., 2020). In China, although labor informality limited the extent of support
to smaller firms, the regressive tax structure of social insurance contributions, and the greater
labor intensity of small firms and sectors affected by COVID-19, still allowed tax breaks to deliver
substantial benefits to vulnerable firms (Cui et al., 2020).14
In this section, we explore the relationship between the type andmagnitude of shock experienced
by firms and their access to public support. While many of the support policies were designed
as universal, and any firm regardless of how impacted they have been could apply for support,
it is important to measure whether support has benefited firms that did not need it - mistargeting.
Specifically, we describe mistargeting as support that is going to firms that are not experiencing the
pandemic shock. First, we use the information available on shocks, and distinguish between firms
that do not experience a demand shock (i.e. whether demand has decreased) or a supply shock
(i.e. closed premises or labor or input shortages), from those that experience at least one them.
Second, we differentiate between firms that experience negative sales growth during the period and
those that don’t. Given that data was collected in most countries near the peak of the pandemic
and sales referred to the level in previous 30 days, there was little or no time for policies to have
immediate impact on our sales data (we explore the issue of policy effectiveness in more detail in
the last section). As a result, our sales variable is more likely to represent the size of the demand
shock experienced by the firm and an indication of the need of the firm for policy support.
Overall, we observe that firms that experience a larger shock in terms of sales are more likely
to get support. Some of the sectors most affected by the pandemic such as accommodation or
food preparation are also the ones with a higher likelihood of receiving policy support. Figure 3
confirms this result for all sectors plotting the correlation between average sector drop in sales and
the probability of accessing policy. The negative slope is consistent with effective targeting.
13Among the set of eligible firms, beneficiaries tended to have more employees, have fewer investment opportunities
and cash holdings.
14Targeting firms for support is problematic even during normal times (Grover and Imbruno, forthcoming) and the
crisis accentuated this challenge further. In the United States, it has been found to be related to the significant heterogeneity
across banks in terms of their capacity to disburse PPP funds (Granja et al., 2020) or the lack of awareness among small
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Note: For each sector in each country we compute the fraction of businesses with access to public support and the
average change in sales. The figure is the binned scatterplot of this relationship after removing country fixed effects.
However, our results also show that a significant number of firms that did not experience any
shock or sales drop as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic received public support. Figure 4 shows
that while there is no significant difference in the probability of receiving public support for firms
experiencing different types of shocks (26% for firms facing demand shocks only, 27% for firms
facing supply shocks only and 29% for firms facing both); there is a non-negligible positive likelihood
of near 20% of receiving public support for firms that declared not having experienced any shock.
Also, the probability of firms that experience no change or increase in sales of receiving government
support is 19%, not far from the 27% for firms that experience a reduction sales. In addition, we
also find evidence of firms in need of support that do not receive it. Controlling for firm size, sector,
country and severity of the crisis, the average drop on sales for those firms that receive support is
-49% compared to an also large -43% for the group that does not receive any support.
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The data suggest two main sources of mistargeting. A first source is related to access to support.
Apedo-Amah et al. (2020) shows how smaller firms have been the most affected by the pandemic,
but they have also been the less likely to receive any support. Figure 5 shows that while for those
firms that do not experience a drop in sales it is hard to find differences in the probability of access,
around 20%; for those that experienced the shocks, large firms have a much larger probability of
getting support.15 This may be driven by barriers to access policy support,16 which are likely to be
more binding for smaller firms (see next section), but also raise some potential political economy
issues (Besley, 2007) on how support may be implemented.
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A second source of potential mistargeting has to do with government capacity and the ability
of public agencies to target beneficiaries. Figure 6 shows the probability of mistargeting - this is
the probability of providing support to a firm that did not experience a negative shock relative to
a firm that did experience a negative shock - across different countries; divided by their level of
income (left panel) or the of their governance (right panel).17 In order to control for the availability
of support and a more universal approach folowed in soem countries, we use the share of firms
that receive support in a country as an additional control. The results suggest that low-income
countries are more likely to experience mistargeting. Figure A4 confirms this result, since the drop in
sales in low-income countries is larger for the group without any support (-43% vs -36%), while in
high-income countries supported firms experience much larger drops in sales (-34%) than those
15Figure A5 shows the analogous figure using whether the firms experienced drop in sales or not, with the same
conclusions.
16We refer here both to information barriers as well as fixed costs to apply.
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that did not get support (-21%). One channel through which this mistargeting may occur is via
low implementation capacity and lack of good governance. The right panel in Figure 6 shows that
mistargeting is decreasing in the quality of governance.18
































Prediction of a probit regression of mistarget controlling for weeks after peak, income classification, and average
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Prediction of a probit regression of mistarget controlling for weeks after peak and mean access to support by country
Summing up, while those firms that experience a more negative impact of the pandemic are more
likely to receive support, there is some evidence that in the immediate aftermath of the pandemic
crisis, governments have also supported a significant number of firms that did not experience any
negative shock. This mistargeting is consistent with the fact that many policies were implemented
very quickly, and targeting was not a big concern or too costly in the mind of policy makers, who
mostly worried about the costs of inaction. But it is also explained by barriers to access and lack of
implementation capacity. Going forward, as the crisis continues and puts pressure on limited fiscal
resources, better and more careful targeting of beneficiaries and monitoring the access to policy
support is critical.
7. Barriers to accessing public support: lack of awareness
It is important to understand why a large number of firms have been unable to access policy
support measures announced and implemented in response to the crisis thus far. The majority of
firms refers to lack of awareness as main reason for not receiving government support. There are,
however, important differences across countries at different levels of per capita income. Controlling
for other observable characteristics, there is an inverse relationship between the share of firms
that report the lack of awareness for being unable to access government support and the income
classification of countries. This share ranges from 74% in low-income countries, 52% in lower
middle-income countries, 35% in upper middle-income countries to 12% in high-income countries
(Figure 7). In high-income countries, 45% of firms cite ineligibility while 41% cite difficulty in
18The governance effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service
and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and
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applying as the reason for not receiving government support thus far.




























 Low  Lower-Middle  Upper-Middle  High
I was not aware Too difficult to apply
I am not eligible I have applied but not received it
Margins after multinomial logit controlling for firm size, subsector, weeks after peak,
and income classification, fixed effects
The lack of awareness is somewhat lower in larger firms, but is the main reason for firms being
unable to access government support programs in each size category – 58% of micro firms, 54%
of small firms, 52% of medium-sized firms and 48% of large firms (see Supplemental appendix).
Strikingly, there is little evidence to suggest that awareness of government support programs has
increased since the peak of the crisis. Controlling for firm size, sector and country, approximately
56% of firms report the lack of awareness for being unable to access government support 1 week
after the peak crisis but this remained unchanged even 16 weeks after the crisis, albeit with some
fluctuations (see Supplemental appendix).
8. Policy interventions, expectations, and uncertainty
One of themost important effect of the COVID-19 crisis is that it was unexpected and significantly
altered firms expectations and uncertainty (Lukas Buchheim and Link, 2020; Altig et al., 2020;
Stephany et al., 2020). This issue is particularly relevant because it is informative for current and
future policy decisions that need to understand the likely forward-looking scenarios facing by
businesses going through a shock with large negative magnitude. For this reason, this section
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8.1 Policy interventions and expectations
The survey shows that across the board firms are expecting to sell less. In low income countries
firms expect a decline in sales of about a third over the six months after the survey (compared to
the same time period last year), and about a fifth to a quarter in lower middle income countries.19
In addition, between a third to half of firms expect to fall in arrears in the coming six months or are
already in arrears.
There is no robust and clear relationship between overall government support and the expec-
tations about future revenues at firm-level. The data suggests that there are few differences in
terms of revenues expectations between firms that received government support and those who did
not. Averaging across countries, firms without government support report an expected drop of 16
percent, while firms with government support expect a decline of 14 percent (Figure 8), but this
difference falls within the confidence interval. When controlling for observable characteristics such
as size, sector and country, firms that have received government support expect lower sales than
those who did not receive support, but these differences fall within the confidence intervals and are
statistically insignificant. Since sales are to a large extent driven by demand and given that many
policies are focused on covering acute cash shortfalls, we can expect government support to only
play a small role in increasing sales at least in the short term.





























Expected change in sales in next 6 months. Conditional estimates are based on a linear regression controlling for firm size, subsector,




























Uncertainty about sales. Conditional estimates are based on a linear regression controlling for firm size,
subsector, country, weeks after peak, accesing support fixed effects, and change in sales
Did not receive public support Received public support
There is a stronger relationship between government support and expectations around insolvency.
19These figures are higher than seen in high income countries. For example, the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’
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Using the predicted likelihood of whether a firm has access to support programs as a measure of
the probability that a firm can access public support, Figure 9 shows that firms that are more likely
to access government support are also those who report to be less likely in arrears or expect to fall
in arrears. This relationship is robust to controlling for the change in sales experienced by the firm
during the previous 30 days, indicating that having access to government support could play a key
role in helping prevent firms from insolvency even when facing higher drops in sales.
Figure 9: Probability of expecting to fall in arrears, expectations and uncertainty about sales growth,
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8.2 Policy interventions and uncertainty
Public policies can also play an important role in reducing the uncertainty faced by firms. This is a
potentially important channel that could influence recovery because high degrees of uncertainty are
likely to adversely affect firm investments and and incentives to innovate, by reducing the appetite for
entrepreneurial risk taking (see e.g., Bloom et al. (2007)) and limiting jobs growth and reallocation.
The survey provides some suggestive evidence that public policies could reduce uncertainty and
improve growth expectations. The right panel in Figure 9 shows a negative correlation between
the predicted probability that firms have access to public support programs and their uncertainty,
measured as the average standard deviation of the firms’ sales prediction based on (Altig et al.,
2019). This cross-sectional correlation though may be driven by a lot of different factors, and as
shown by Figure 8 when we control for size, country, sector and timing of the survey (relative to
the peak of the crisis), and the size of the experienced drop in sales, we find that uncertainty is not
any different between firms that received support versus those that did not.20 While public policies
may play an important role in reducing uncertainty towards the future it is possible that the large
uncertainty associated with duration of the pandemic is at play during the COVID-19 crisis, which
could explain our results. Applying to some of these public programs is costly and often complex,
therefore firms that are more uncertain about the future could be more willing to incur these costs.
When digging further and breaking down the different types of policies, we confirm the results
that uncertainty tend to be higher across firms receiving different types of support. However, these
differences are not statistically significant as point estimates fall within the confidence intervals.21
9. Preliminary evidence on the effectiveness of policies
Despite the uniqueness of the current crisis, the impact of policy responses in past crises provides
an important starting point to discuss the potential effectiveness of policies in the context of COVID-
19. Fiscal stimulus in the form of temporary tax incentives for business investment has received some
attention in the context of previous downturns (House and Shapiro (2008); Zwick (forthcoming)).
In the aftermath of the December 2004 tsunami, Sri Lankan firms that received grants recovered
profit levels substantially faster than those that did not (De Mel et al., 2012). Similarly, in Mexico,
firms that were offered wage subsidies conditional on retaining workers in the aftermath of the
global financial crisis, outperformed those that did not receive such benefits (Bruhn, 2020).
Evidence on the effectiveness of policies during COVID-19 has so far beenmixed. Cui et al. (2020)
and Chen et al. (2020) show that payroll tax mitigation and deferral of social insurance contributions
in China bolstered the ability of firms to weather the economic downturn. However, Guerrieri et al.
(2020) warn that in an economy where supply-side shocks directly influence aggregate demand and
output, standard fiscal stimulus may be less effective than usual because the Keynesian multiplier
feedback is muted due to shut-down of some sectors. Instead, monetary policy can have a magnified
effects, by preventing firm exits and alleviating short-term liquidity constraints. Furthermore,
studies have shown that financial support policies during COVID-19 have not been entirely effective
20This pattern is identical across countries with different income level, as well as different sizes and sectors as shown
in our online appendix.
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in alleviating SMEs’ cash constraints or encouraging the reopening of small businesses, potentially
due to difficulties in accessing policy-oriented loans and misallocation of credit. This has been true
in China (Chen et al., 2020) as well as United States’ PPP program (Granja et al., 2020; Chetty et al.,
2020). During the current crisis, traditional macroeconomic tools – stimulating aggregate demand
or providing liquidity to businesses – may have diminished capacity to restore employment when
activity is muted due to health concerns (Chetty et al., 2020).22
To begin exploring the effectiveness of policies in mitigating the adverse micro-level impacts of
COVID-19, we first focus on the employment response. Figure 10 shows the elasticity of laying off
workers to the change in sales for firms which received public support (red line and dots) versus
those that did not (blue line and dots). The results suggest that public support was successful in
reducing the number of workers laid off in response to a drop in sales. In the same figure, in the right
panel, we show that these results are driven by one specific type of policy, i.e. wage subsidies.23 We
also find that these results are driven by the impact of policies implemented in upper-middle and
higher income countries24 which is where the implementation of various forms of wage subsidies
policies was more frequent.
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Note: Binned scatterplots. Computation use weights equal to the inverse of the number of observations in each country.
22To help firms adjust and recover from the crisis, complementary investments may be needed to upgrade their capa-
bilities and to mend broken supply chains. Some successful examples of firm upgrading programs include management
consulting and technical skills training (Bloom et al. (2013); Iacovone et al. (2019); Anderson et al. (2018)), while supplier
development and export promotion programs help alleviate information and networking frictions in accessing markets
(Arráiz et al. (2013); Atkin et al. (2017)).
23To confirm that these differences are statistically significant we estimated at the firm level the conditional elasticity
(controlling for country, size, sector, and timing of the survey) of the share of workers laid off to change in sales and we
find that this elasticity is significantly smaller (less negative) than the elasticity of firms that do not benefit from policy
support at the 5 percent confidence interval.
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Assessing rigorously the impact of policies is complex based on our cross-sectional data and the
fact that a firm has access to policy support cannot be considered exogenous. Given our available
information is not easy to identify an instrument that would work for different types of policies. For
this reason, we present here some descriptive evidence based on simple OLS regressions but try
to compare firms that are as comparable as possible. Specifically, we compare firms that applied
and received policy support with those that also applied but did not receive it. Additionally, we
always control for country, sector, size and time fixed effects, to make sure that we are narrowing
our comparison to firms that are as similar as possible. We take these results as indicative evidence
about the possible effect of policies while realizing we are not identifying precisely their causal
impact as our results may be still be affected by a selection bias.
We focus on four firm-level outcomes of interest, some are outcomes that we expect could be
directly affected by the policies (i.e. likelihood of laying of workers, expected future sales growth,
likelihood of falling into arrears), while the remaining one could be at the same time affected by
policy but also operate as mechanism that have in turn influences future firm-level outcomes (i.e.
probability of investing in digital technology and solutions). The results are presented in Table 3
where we separate our analysis for different groups of policies (each policy is separately analyzed
in different columns). We observe that certain group of policies appear to be more effective than
others. Specifically, monetary transfers and access to credit which may be relaxing short-term
credit-constraints and liquidity problem are correlated with higher future expected sales growth,
as well as with higher probability of investing in digital solutions. Wage subsidies, in line with
our prior and its stated objectives, is negatively correlated with the probability that firms laying
off workers, while does not seem to significantly influence future sales or likelihood of falling into
arrears in the coming months. Tax support25 only appear to be positively correlated with future
expected sales growth, while it does not appear to influence future likelihood of falling into arrears,
and accordingly does not appear to be successfully correlated with reducing the likelihood that
liquidity constraints turns into solvency problems. Finally, payments deferral26 seems to be the least
effective of all the policies with some marginal effect and positive correlation with the likelihood of
expanding the use of digital platform.27
25Tax support includes fiscal exemptions, reductions as well as tax deferrals.
26This only refers to deferral of rent, mortgage, or utilities.
27The interested reader will find a more detailed and granular breakdown of individual policies in Table A1 from the






















VETTED AND REAL-TIME PAPERS











Lays off workers (pr.) -0.059 0.070 -0.028 -0.013 -0.094∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.039) (0.029) (0.030) (0.020)
Expects to fall in arrears (pr.) -0.050 -0.047 0.004 -0.064 -0.018
(0.049) (0.061) (0.046) (0.044) (0.039)
Expected sales growth (pp) 11.462∗∗∗ 6.908 8.193∗∗∗ 9.001∗∗∗ 2.711
(2.275) (3.953) (2.257) (2.657) (1.479)
Inc. invest. digital sol (pr.) 0.153∗∗∗ 0.081 0.113∗∗∗ 0.006 0.026
(0.035) (0.042) (0.028) (0.031) (0.024)
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
10. Conclusion
Governments around the world responded to the deep economic impact of COVID-19 by rolling
out more than 1,600 policy initiatives to support small and medium-sized businesses. While some
learning from previous crises have proven useful in the initial response phase, policymakers and
development practitioners have been faced with an acute lack of data and evidence on how to design
and implement support policies.This lack of evidence is especially acute in developing countries.
This paper addresses this gap by providing novel evidence using recently collected firm-level data
covering more than 120,000 firms across 60 (mostly developing) countries.
The paper’s results show that there are significant gaps to be addressed in order to improve
the reach, targeting, and effectiveness of policy support. Smaller firms, especially those owned by
women in sectors such hospitality, are facing some of the largest declines in sales and the most limited
access to policy support – raising concerns about widening inequality. Similarly, the likelihood of
receiving support for firms in poor countries is several times less than for similar firms in high-
income countries. While governments appear to have prioritized minimizing exclusion concerns
over strict targeting in the earlier stages of the pandemic, this has resulted in a large number of firms
benefiting from public assistance without having experienced any adverse COVID-19 shock – an
issue that will demand more attention as fiscal space becomes more constrained. Lastly, there is an
indicative evidence that some types of policies (i.e. liquidity injections direct or through credit and
wage subsidies) have been successful in mitigating liquidity constraints and reducing layoffs – but
much more rigorous analysis will be needed to provide more precise guidance to policymakers.
Going forward we see four main avenues for future research. First, understanding better how
firms manage to receive public support and the extent to which connections may explain access to
public resources. Second, our results so far present some novel associations but we limited ourselves
to mainly present conditional correlation. Future research, relying on additional data collection
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receiving public support on subsequent firms results. Third, some of the policies being implemented
may have important spillovers effects especially when targeted firms play an important role in supply
chains and production, which will be an important area for future work to identify the systemic
effects of policies being enacted. Finally, going forward it will be important to address the issue of
policy misallocation and the risks that policies being enacted may inhibit prospects for recovery and
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ONLINE APPENDIX: Supplementary Material
Figure A1: Size of fiscal stimulus.
Country income groups are defined according to the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators definition.
Figure A2: Policy responses by income groups.
Country income groups are defined according to the World Bank’s
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Note: Binned scatterplots. Computation use weights equal to the inverse of the number of observations in each country.
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Lays off workers (pr.) -0.059 0.070 -0.019 -0.021 -0.088∗∗ 0.034 -0.031 -0.094∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.039) (0.027) (0.052) (0.033) (0.054) (0.025) (0.020)
Expects to fall in arrears (pr.) -0.050 -0.047 -0.035 0.037 0.021 -0.039 -0.106∗ -0.018
(0.049) (0.061) (0.052) (0.065) (0.078) (0.058) (0.046) (0.039)
Expected sales growth (pp) 11.462∗∗∗ 6.908 7.542∗∗ 12.053∗∗ 4.216 8.270∗ 9.238∗∗∗ 2.711
(2.275) (3.953) (2.655) (3.888) (3.495) (3.589) (2.758) (1.479)
Inc. invest. digital sol (pr.) 0.153∗∗∗ 0.081 0.165∗∗∗ 0.108∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.033 0.017 0.026
(0.035) (0.042) (0.032) (0.050) (0.047) (0.050) (0.029) (0.024)
Standard errors in parentheses
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We find UK “local lockdowns” of cities and small regions, focused on 
limiting how many people a household can interact with and in what 
settings, are effective in turning the tide on rising positive COVID-19 
cases. Yet, by focusing on household mixing within the home, these local 
lockdowns have not inflicted the large declines in consumption observed 
in March 2020 when the first virus wave and first national lockdown 
occurred. Our study harnesses a new source of real-time, transaction-
level consumption data that we show to be highly correlated with official 
statistics. The effectiveness of local lockdowns are evaluated applying a 
difference-in-difference approach which exploits nearby localities not 
subject to local lockdowns as comparison groups. Our findings indicate 
that policymakers may be able to contain virus outbreaks without killing 
local economies. However, the ultimate effectiveness of local lockdowns 
is expected to be highly dependent on co-ordination between regions and 
an effective system of testing.
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1 Introduction
How can COVID-19 cases be contained without causing damage to the economy? This
question dominates the thinking of policymakers, who face a seemingly uncomfortable
trade-off between limiting virus transmission in the economy via reducing social contact,
and maintaining economic activity which relies on social contact for the production and
consumption of goods and services.
The first wave of COVID-19 in early 2020 saw most nations adopt stringent restrictions
on social contact in almost all settings in order to contain the spread of the virus.
These restrictions severely hindered the means of production and consumption in the
economy, leading to large drops in output from a combination of the virus and such
restrictions. However, recent improvements in testing and tracing leading to identification
of clusters of cases in high-infection areas have facilitated a more targeted, localised
approach to applying restrictions to social contact, known as “local lockdowns”. This
approach to limiting the spread of COVID-19 was identified early-on in the pandemic
as a beneficial strategy.1 In some countries – such as in the UK – governments have
legal powers to implement such local measures, but this has been a source of political
tension between local and national authorities.2 The centralized UK approach offers a
particularly interesting contrast to the US, where the policy response has limited national
co-ordination – and none in regards to lockdowns.
In this paper, we are the first academics to use a new source of real-time and highly
granular European consumption data. We combine these with data on coronavirus cases
to analyse the impact of local lockdowns on both COVID-19 cases and local consumption.
Using a difference-in-difference methodology, we estimate the impact of local lockdowns
imposed in the late summer of 2020 on a series of UK cities, examining their ability to
1See https://medium.com/@tomaspueyo/coronavirus-the-hammer-and-the-dance-be9337092b56
2The legal power of the government in the UK to impose local restrictions contrasts with other nations,
such as the US and Spain, where such measures can only be implemented by local governments.
Nonetheless, both approaches have resulted in local resistance to such measures due to concerns of
the adverse effects on local economies – with a standoff between local and national governments over
locking down Madrid, anti-lockdown protests in London, Van Morrison releasing protest songs over the
Northern Ireland local lockdown and some mayors and local governments demanding responsibilities
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contain of COVID-19 cases and how consumer spending responded.
Our study makes two main contributions. First, we introduce a new source of
real-time, transaction-level consumption data – Fable Data – that can be used for economic
research and to inform policymaking. These data contain transaction-by-transaction
spending data, updated daily, for large representative samples of UK bank accounts and
credit cards, with individual-level identifiers and geocode identifiers. We show these data
are a highly correlated, leading indicator of official Bank of England statistics – data that
are only available in aggregated form and with many months lag – in contrast to Fable
Data which are available in real-time and disaggregated (correlation coefficient of 0.91
January 2018 - June 2020). These data are applicable to a broad variety of questions
in the analysis of individual consumption behavior. They present a new opportunity
for researchers to measure consumption in complementary and arguably more reliable
ways than using data from consumption surveys, which has become less reliable in recent
decades and has prompted a variety of initiatives aimed at improving the measurement of
consumption (see Browning et al., 2014; Landais and Spinnewijn, 2020). These data show
the UK’s economic recovery in spending April to August 2020 had stalled in September
and October.
Second, we advance understanding of the economic costs of mitigation strategies to
contain the second wave of COVID-19. This user-case is economically important and
policy-relevant to the time of writing, as policymakers around the world are grappling with
how to both contain second or third waves of virus outbreaks and also to keep economic
recoveries going. Local lockdowns are also a source of tensions between national and
local governments and thus our research may help to inform such disputes. The UK local
lockdowns we study apply to cities or small regions. They restrict how many individuals
people can mix with, in what settings (e.g. restaurants) and under what requirements
(e.g. outside, wearing masks). A key policy design was trying to enable people to keep
consuming in COVID-19 secure settings while limiting their interactions in less secure
settings (e.g. households visiting each others’ homes). We show that UK local lockdowns
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turn the tide on rising COVID-19 cases though there is heterogeneity in such results.3
We do not find evidence such local lockdowns resulted in large spending declines:
observing little, if any, declines. We use a difference-in-difference design that compares
the evolution of daily consumption in an area subject to a local lockdown compared to
a similar, nearby locality not subject to such restrictions. By using daily data we can
precisely estimate our results relative to the timing of local lockdowns being announced.
Our difference-in-difference approach is designed to be interpreted as descriptive not
causal.4 These data show – both for treatment and control localities – large drops in
consumption when the March 2020 first virus wave and national lockdown occurred. We
conclude there are little, if any, declines in spending from the local lockdowns: certainly
not of the magnitude of the March decline. Estimates for the time-path of cases, in
contrast, show that while COVID-19 cases typically continue to rise following the onset
of a local lockdown (as measures take time to have effect) they then start to stabilize:
indicating the local lockdowns had some short-term success.
While our evidence indicates some initial successes from local lockdowns, in late
September and October 2020 the UK (along with many European countries) experienced
a rapid, nationwide rise in COVID-19 cases (the cause of which is not yet clear). This
has led to more restrictive regional measures being introduced in mid-October including
shutting down businesses and before second and third national lockdowns were imposed
in November 2020 and January 2021. The COVID-19 positive case rates accompanying
these more recent lockdowns were far higher than the rates in the local lockdowns we
examine in this paper.
Our study contributes to a burgeoning literature understanding the economic effects
of COVID-19. A variety of early studies showed how the onset of COVID-19 dramatically
changed consumption behavior. The first study to do so was Baker et al. (2020) using US
3https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-52934822
4We typically observe common pre-trends between control and treatment groups, however, we do observe
noticeable increases in the number of positive COVID-19 cases for the treatment groups just before and
after local lockdowns. The nature of local lockdowns explain this behavior – a key component is to
increase testing capacity and thus the number of positive cases will be expected to rise. However, some
areas subject to local lockdowns had rises that appear too large and sharp to be driven by differential
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fintech data and following this Opportunity Insights (Chetty et al., 2020a,b) produced
a dashboard using multiple data sources to track regional US consumption behavior
alongside other economic indicators.5 Beyond the US similar exercises have been carried
out to understand household consumption in the early stages of the pandemic – showing
remarkably consistent results (Andersen et al., 2020; Bounie et al., 2020; Bourquin et al.,
2020; Campos-Vazquez and Esquivel, 2020; Carvalho et al., 2020; Chen et al., 2020;
Chronopoulos et al., 2020; Horvath et al., 2020; Surico et al., 2020; Watanabe et al., 2020).
Analysis of JP Morgan Chase data (Cox et al., 2020; Farrell et al., 2020) has described in
detail how household balance sheets have changed as a result of the COVID-19 recession
and how households have responded to fiscal stimulus. A variety of studies have examined
the effects of the first set of lockdowns on economic behavior and evaluating the degree to
which there are trade-offs between policy interventions attempting to contain the virus
and economic damage (Aum et al., 2020; Beach et al., 2020; Barro et al., 2020; Coibion
et al., 2020; Correia et al., 2020; Cui et al., 2020; Dave et al., 2020; Friedson et al., 2020;
Hacioglu et al., 2020; Glover et al., 2020; Goolsbee et al., 2020; Goolsbee and Syverson,
2020; Guerrieri et al., 2020; Hall et al., 2020; Lilley et al., 2020; Miles et al., 2020; Jones
et al., 2020; Toxvaerd, 2020; Wang, 2020).
2 Data
2.1 Consumption Data
We combine data on cases of COVID-19 identified by the UK’s testing framework with
consumption data provided by Fable Data Limited.6 Fable data record hundreds of
millions of transactions on consumer and SME spending across Europe from 2016 onwards.7
Fable’s transaction data are anonymized and available in real-time: our research access
is with a one working day lag. Fable sources data from a variety of banks and credit
5https://tracktherecovery.org
6Daily COVID-19 case data by Local Authority District is available at https://coronavirus.data.
gov.uk/. More information on Fable Data is available at www.fabledata.com.
7Commercial sensitivities mean we do not disclose the exact number of accounts and transactions
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card companies: accounts cover both spending on credit cards and inflows and outflows
on current (checking) accounts. Data is at the account-level and hence we can follow
spending behavior on an individual account over time.8 Fable data is similar to recently-
available data sets from financial aggregators and service providers, but does not have
some of the limitations of other datasets and uses anonymised customer data.9
For each spending transaction we observe a standard classification merchant category
code for the spending type. Fable also produces its own categorizations of spending,
utilizing the more granular information it has available from transaction strings. These
data also differentiate between online and store-based transactions.
For each UK account we observe the postcode sector of the cardholder’s address. In
the UK, postcode sectors are very granular geographies: There are over 11,000 postcode
sectors in the UK with each sector containing approximately 3,000 addresses. Where a
transaction can be linked to a particular store, the full address of that store is available.
Where a transaction is of a listed firm, Fable tags merchants to their parent groups and
stock market tickers.
For this study we focus on transactions denominated in British pounds sterling on
UK-based credit card accounts held by consumers.10 The median and mean transaction
values are £15 and £39 respectively.
Transaction-level spending data is highly volatile – even with such large volumes of
transactions – and we observe strong movements at high frequency due to seasonality and
day of week effects. We therefore follow an approach to smooth the transaction volumes
over time as used by Opportunity Insights on similar US data (Chetty et al., 2020b,a):
aggregating spending by day at the level of geography of interest, taking a seven day
moving average and dividing by the previous year’s value.11 Finally, we normalize the
8In cases where one individual has multiple accounts, we cannot link multiple accounts in the data to
the individual but can aggregate to a geographic region.
9Baker (2018) provides validation and application of US financial aggregator data. Financial aggregator
data for the UK is widely shared for research purposes by MoneyDashBoard, UK-based a fintech
(Chronopoulos et al., 2020; Bourquin et al., 2020; Surico et al., 2020). Bourquin et al. (2020) analyse
the characteristics of MoneyDashBoard users.
10We drop 113 individual credit card transactions over £50k as such outliers are unlikely to be consumer
transactions and may distort results for very small geographic regions.
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series setting an index to 1 using the mean value 8 - 28 January 2020. We also construct
daily series using a 14 and 28 day moving averages in a analogous fashion.
2.2 Comparison with Official Statistics
Fable data have many useful features, such as timeliness (it is available the next working
day whereas official statistics are typically available only with a lag of several months),
geographic granularity (being available at a lower level than official statistics) and, transaction-
level (enabling more flexible analysis than aggregated official statistics). These data can
therefore potentially be used to construct leading indicators for policymakers and enable
researchers to answer a broader set of research questions than was previously possible
using prior data sources.
However, while these features are potentially valuable, their usefulness depends in part
on how this data series relates to comprehensive, official data. To explore this, Figure
A1, Panel A compares the time series of Fable Data UK annual changes in monthly
credit card spending to the Bank of England series and shows they are highly correlated:
correlations 0.91 (January 2018 to July 2020), 0.90 (January 2019 to July 2020) and 0.98
(January 2020 to July 2020). Bank of England data is only published in aggregated form
monthly and with a lag (e.g. July’s data was published at the start of September).
Figure A1, Panel B shows Fable data measures for 7, 14, 28 day moving averages
– which can be calculated daily in real-time – compared to the monthly series (which
requires waiting until month end). These daily moving averages show the sharp drop in
consumption in March 2020 far earlier than the monthly series. We thus conclude that
we can use these data as a reliable real-time predictor of official data and as a reasonable
proxy for measuring credit card spending.
On aggregate we observe the sharp fall in UK credit card spending near the time
of the spike in Covid-19 cases and national lockdown announcement on 23 March 2020
and then a fairly steady recovery May - August. Components of the national lockdown
were ended in June and July but we do not observe rapid boost after these was lifted
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phase of the pandemic. In September and October 2020, we observe these data to show
that the recovery in spending since April 2020 has stalled and has started to decline.
In a companion paper (Gathergood et al., 2020) we use these same data to show the
heterogeneous impacts of the COVID-19 crisis across UK regions and urban geographies:
splits that are not possible using official statistics.12
3 Local Lockdowns
We use public data released by the UK government which details the areas affected by
local lockdowns, including the dates of introduction and cessation of lockdown measures.
Each week Public Health England publishes a COVID-19 Surveillance Report that includes
‘The Watchlist’ showing the incidence (and trend) of COVID-19 in local government areas
(lower tier local authorities), whether household mixing is prohibited and lists areas on
the watchlist.13 Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales have comparable data that we
gather.14
Areas are added to the Watchlist considering a variety of metrics using professional
judgment of UK public health officials according to the UK Government’s COVID-19
Contain Framework’.15 Areas on the Watchlist fit into one of three categories:
• Concern Areas - Local area is taking targeted actions to reduce COVID-19’s
prevalence (e.g. additional testing in care homes and increased community engagement
with high risk groups).
• Enhanced Support Areas - More detailed plan agreed with the national team
and with additional resources being provided to support the local team to control
COVID-19 (e.g. epidemiological expertise, additional mobile testing capacity).
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• Intervention Areas (‘Local Lockdowns’) - Divergence from the measures in
place in the rest of England because of the significance of COVID-19’s spread,
with a detailed action plan in place, and local resources augmented with a national
support to control COVID-19.
For this research we focus on local lockdowns. By September 2020, approximately
one in four people in the UK were subject to a local lockdown. A key feature of such
lockdowns is imposing restrictions on household mixing (e.g. preventing a tea party in
someone’s house) but permitting visits to more COVID-19 secure settings (e.g. having
tea outdoor at a restaurant with strict hygiene and social distancing standards) in order
to encourage consumers to keep spending while also trying to contain the virus. Across
the local lockdowns there was variation in the how much household mixing was restricted
(e.g. in Caerphilly residents were not supposed to leave nor new people come in).16 This
contrasts with the March 2020 lockdown where there was a stay at home order not only
preventing household mixing but also closing all non-essential shops and banning public
activities (e.g. sports).
There were also nationwide (including in areas subject to local lockdowns) government
financial incentives to encourage consumers to spend for much of the period of time we
study. The most notable of these were cuts to sales taxes (Value Added Tax, VAT) on
food, accommodation and attractions from 20% to 5% from July 2020 until January 2021
and ‘Eat Out to Help Out’ scheme offering a 50% discount (up to £10 per person on
food and non-alcoholic drink) for eating out Mondays, Tuesdays and Wednesdays during
August 2020.
4 Methodology
We use a difference-in-difference methodology to estimate the relationship between local
lockdowns and daily consumption. The use and challenges of difference-in-differences
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(2020). Our estimates provide a description of the evolution of COVID-19 cases and
consumer spending pre- and post-lockdown on lockdown affected cities and comparison
areas. We do not interpret our estimates as showing causal relationships - our comparison
cities are not perfect counterfactuals for the evolution of COVID-19 cases or consumer
spending in the absence of a lockdown.
We isolate the date local lockdowns were announced for each locality. There was
great uncertainty in both where and when such lockdowns would be introduced and the
precise restrictions that they would require - as reported in news reports at the time. Some
anticipatory behavior is possible given the data on covid cases was regularly published and
reported on but as the threshold for intervention was low areas often suddenly appeared
subject to local lockdowns - most notably in the case of Manchester where the mayor
and city council were taken by surprise.17 Table A1 lists the timing of local lockdown
announcements, the local authorities affected and the control group localities to compare
against. Where there are multiple localities in the same area subject to a lockdown
announcement on the same day we aggregate data (e.g. South and North Lankarkshire
to Lanarkshire) into a single ‘local authority group’. For some areas subject to local
lockdowns (e.g. Belfast) no suitable control group city exists.
We display descriptive results for thirteen pairs of treatment and control localities –
but primarily focus on the Manchester lockdown as that has a large sample, Liverpool
offers a good control, the announcement was sudden and unexpected (being announced
9.15pm on a Thursday to coming into effect at midnight) and the case is particularly
informative for considering the effects of a London lockdown.18 The other areas studied
that were subject to local lockdowns are: Aberdeen, Birmingham, Bolton, Caerphilly,
Glasgow, Greater Glasgow, Lanarkshire, Leeds, Leicester, Newcastle, Preston andWolverhampton.
For consumption measures, we allocate spending based on cardholder’s address except
for considering large store chains where we estimate results based on store location. For
COVID-19 cases allocation is as provided based on case reporting localities.
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in-differences approach uses a parsimonious regression estimation approach, such as that
presented in (Equation 1). The outcome of interest Yg,t is offline credit card spending
measured as changes in an index of yearly changes in 7 day moving average of spending.
The unit of observation is a day (t) for each local authority group (g) either subject to
the local lockdown or the control group to compare it to.
Yg,t = α + β Treatg + δt Treatg ∗ Aftert + γt + εg,t (1)
To explain our methodology we draw upon the example of Manchester. Manchester
is the treated group (Treatg = 1) subject to the local lockdown and we use a ‘similar
area’ – Liverpool – as a control group (Treatg = 0). These areas were chosen as cities of
comparable size, in the same part of the country and showing similar pre-trends. Aftert
is an indicator equal to one if the time period is after the local lockdown announcement.
(Treatg ∗ Aftert) is the interaction of the above two terms: it is an indicator equal
to one if the time period is after the local lockdown announcement and the area is in
the treated group. The difference-in-difference estimation approach allows for these areas
to have different time-invariant relationships with consumption (α for Liverpool and
α + β for Manchester) and γt is a series of daily dummies (with t = −1 omitted) to
control for any common time-varying factors (e.g. national changes in COVID-19 cases,
economic policies). δt provides an estimate for the relationship between local lockdown
and consumption.
To better understand the local lockdowns we modify Equation 1 to estimate a dynamic
specification creating weekly dummies (AfterW,g) for the weeks preceding (W ∈ {−3,−2,
−1, 0}) and following (W ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}) the lockdown announcement where the omitted
weekly dummy (W = 0) is the seven days preceding the local lockdown announcement
(t = −7 to t = −1) and we use data up to four weeks pre- and post-lockdown (where
available). We focus on a short time window given the volatile period we study the control
groups are likely to become less suitable comparisons over time - including the subsequent
government introduction of a system of tiered lockdowns in the autumn meaning no
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observations by their 2019 resident population and cluster standard errors by region (with
one observation per treatment group per day).19
Yg,t = α + β Treatg +
∑
W 6=0
δk (Treatg ∗ AfterW,g,t) + γt + εg,t (2)
We regard our estimation approach as providing informative, descriptive real-time
evidence to inform policymakers. For these to be interpreted as causal effects for the effect
of local lockdown on local spending would require a ‘common trends’ assumption that,
for example, in the absence the Manchester local lockdown, consumption in Manchester
would have followed the common trend to that in Liverpool. Such an assumption is
unlikely to hold in these data - particularly over longer time horizons there may be
spillovers between areas and other government measures being introduced - hence we
interpret our short-term results as helpful descriptive evidence which might strongly
suggest a causal relationship, due to what is known more generally about virus transmission
and the efficacy of social distancing measures.
5 Results
5.1 COVID-19 Cases
We first examine the effects of local lockdowns on COVID-19 cases. The descriptive
results are displayed in Figure 1. Vertical dotted lines display the timing of the national
lockdown in March 2020 (affecting both treatment and control groups) and the local
lockdown (day 0 when it was announced) that only affects the (yellow) treatment areas
not the (black) control localities.
There are clear pre-lockdown differences in case data between lockdown areas and
comparison areas, with lockdowns being introduced following a sharp increase in the case
rate in each of the city graphs shown. The higher pre-lockdown case rate in lockdown
areas may partially reflect a policy choice by health authorities whereby more tests are
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purposefully carried out in areas the government is considering introducing local lockdown
restrictions. This is consistent with what we observe in COVID-19 positive cases as a
percent of tests, however, such data are only available weekly and at a higher level of
geographic region (upper rather than lower tier local authority) that does not align to
areas subject to local lockdowns.
We observe cases continue to rise after the lockdown announcement – as would be
expected given the disease’s incubation period – but typically find that following the
lockdown announcement the rise in cases ceases, case numbers peak and then level-off
or decline. This therefore indicates that local lockdowns can be effective at containing
COVID-19 outbreaks. However, while this is generally the case the results are heterogeneous
with some exceptions to this – most notably Bolton and Glasgow where cases continued
to rise after local lockdowns were imposed.
We estimate the relationship between local lockdowns and the evolution of cases using
a difference-in-difference regression model. While our estimates should be interpreted
as descriptive, we limit the sample for lockdown cases for which the pre-lockdown data
indicates that the comparison geography appears to be a relatively suitable control for the
treatment locality.20 This leads us to drop Bolton and Leicester as there were far sharper
rises in COVID-19 incidences before the lockdown than for their control groups. We
also drop Aberdeen and Caerphilly as we have a relatively small number of transactions
for these areas. Thus we have a remaining sample of six local lockdowns to study:
Manchester, Birmingham, Glasgow, Greater Glasgow, Newcastle and Preston.
The dynamic regression results in Table 1 quantifies the relationship between local
lockdowns and COVID-19 cases. In each case, the coefficient on the local lockdown
dummy the first week post-lockdown is positive, and in most cases remains positive after
two weeks, consistent with local lockdowns being imposed as cases rise towards a spike.
The coefficients at subsequent time horizons fall, in the case of Manchester becoming
negative in period one month after the imposition of the local lockdown.
20Roth (2018) highlights the limitations of relying on common pre-trends tests as evidence for common
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Figure 1: COVID-19 Cases in Lockdown Cities (yellow) vs Comparison Cities
(black)
Manchester
A. Aberdeen B. Birmingham C. Bolton
D. Caerphilly E. Glasgow F. Greater Glasgow
G. Lanarkshire H. Leicester I. Preston
J. Leeds K. Newcastle L. Wolverhampton
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Table 1: Dynamic Difference-in-Difference Estimate on COVID-19 cases per 100,000
residents (7 day moving average)
Dependent variable:
COVID-19 cases per 100,000 residents
Manchester Preston Glasgow G. GlasgowBirmingham Newcastle
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treat*After-3 −2.015∗∗∗ −4.104∗∗∗−1.171∗∗∗ −2.874∗∗∗ −4.129∗∗∗ −4.381∗∗∗
(0.141) (0.434) (0.254) (0.350) (0.656) (0.399)
Treat*After-2 −1.475∗∗∗ −3.866∗∗∗−0.927∗∗∗ −2.868∗∗∗ −4.836∗∗∗ −5.223∗∗∗
(0.117) (0.429) (0.245) (0.348) (0.636) (0.373)
Treat*After-1 −0.850∗∗∗ −2.566∗∗∗ −0.866∗∗ −2.434∗∗∗ −3.795∗∗∗ −2.714∗∗∗
(0.156) (0.646) (0.247) (0.381) (0.640) (0.629)
Treat*After1 0.393∗∗ 0.343 3.439∗∗∗ 1.194∗∗ 0.560 4.801∗∗∗
(0.119) (0.521) (0.596) (0.359) (0.652) (0.963)
Treat*After2 1.102∗∗∗ −1.054∗ 4.251∗∗∗ −0.470 4.867∗∗∗ 6.700∗∗∗
(0.163) (0.507) (0.262) (0.419) (1.179) (0.583)
Treat*After3 0.710∗∗ −1.023∗ 4.345∗∗∗ 1.530∗∗∗ −7.994 3.446∗∗∗
(0.261) (0.497) (0.455) (0.406) (6.084) (0.466)
Treat*After4 −0.496∗∗∗ −0.442 11.720∗∗∗ 0.777 −87.443∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.604) (1.092) (0.431) (13.297)
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
OLS regression as specified in Equation 2 with fixed effects for areas
and days. Areas are weighted by their 2019 resident population.
Standard errors clustered at area level. Each column is for different
area subject to local lockdown (with its nearby control area).
Daily data for 4 weeks pre and post local lockdown(3 weeks post
for Newcastle). Outcome is 7 day moving average of COVID cases per
100,000 residents in area from Public Health England and Scotland.
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5.2 Consumption
Figure 2 summarizes credit card spending for the Manchester local lockdown compared to
the Liverpool control group. Each panel displays different spending measures (using 7 day
moving averages): A. all credit card spending, B. offline credit card spending C. food and
beverage credit card spending D. credit card spending in large store chains. Our findings
are consistent across these measures. A broader set of treatment and control groups pairs
are displayed for the same credit card spending measures in Figure 3 (offline) and Annex
Figures A2 (all), A3 (food and beverage) and A4 (large store chains, 14 day moving
average) - due to smaller sample sizes in some of these areas the series are more volatile
but show consistent results.
We highlight three features from these data. First, the treatment and control regions
have similarly-timed and sized declines in spending in March 2020. The declines in
consumption are economically large though we caveat that there is no control group
unaffected by the virus or national lockdown to estimate the causal effects. Second, the
treatment and control regions typically have similar trends in consumption in the lead up
to the local lockdown being announced. These two features provide supportive evidence
that our controls provide reasonable comparisons for the treatment areas.
Third, we observe little, if any, spending declines following the local lockdowns. While
there is heterogeneity in results with differences in signs and statistical significance across
pairs, a consistent feature is that we can rule out there being any economically large
declines of the magnitude clearly observed (nationally or for these localities) in March
2020.
This descriptive analysis therefore indicates that local lockdowns are not having the
large negative effect on consumption that the first wave of the virus and national lockdown
did. Our dynamic regression results displayed in Table 2 also show this, however, we
caveat it as in some weeks, in some lockdowns spending is lower. For example in
Manchester, it is no more so than the difference observed pre-lockdown and certainly
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Figure 2: Credit Card Spending in Manchester (yellow) and Liverpool (black)
A. Overall
B. Offline
C. Food and beverage
D. Large store chains
Notes: Fable Data. Credit card spending measures use a 7 day moving average de-seasoned by
taking ratio of the 7 day moving average a year prior. The series is then indexed to its moving
average 8 - 28 January 2020. Panels A,B,C assign based on account-holder location. Panel D
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Figure 3: Credit Card Spending in Lockdown Cities (yellow) vs Comparison
Cities (black)
A. Aberdeen B. Birmingham C. Bolton
D. Caerphilly E. Glasgow F. Greater Glasgow
G. Lanarkshire H. Leicester I. Preston
J. Leeds K. Newcastle L. Wolverhampton
Notes: Fable Data. Offline credit card spending is a 7 day moving average de-seasoned by taking
ratio of the 7 day moving average a year prior. The series is then indexed to its moving average
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Table 2: Dynamic Difference-in-Difference Estimate on Offline credit card spending (7
day moving average)
Dependent variable:
Offline credit card spending
Manchester Preston Glasgow G. Glasgow Birmingham Newcastle
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treat*After-3 −0.031∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ −0.062 −0.023 0.024 0.061∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.025) (0.032) (0.043) (0.017) (0.012)
Treat*After-2 −0.015 0.020 0.072 −0.052 0.009 0.032∗∗
(0.009) (0.018) (0.042) (0.044) (0.017) (0.010)
Treat*After-1 0.003 −0.090∗∗∗ 0.023 −0.048 0.012 −0.029∗
(0.007) (0.023) (0.043) (0.064) (0.014) (0.011)
Treat*After1 −0.049∗∗∗ −0.005 0.145∗∗∗ 0.076 −0.019 −0.027∗∗
(0.010) (0.017) (0.026) (0.049) (0.022) (0.009)
Treat*After2 −0.018 0.146∗∗∗ 0.032 0.038 −0.059∗ 0.001
(0.011) (0.031) (0.027) (0.046) (0.028) (0.017)
Treat*After3 −0.028∗∗∗ 0.056 0.154∗∗∗ −0.073 0.060∗ 0.092∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.029) (0.029) (0.045) (0.029) (0.013)
Treat*After4 −0.054∗∗∗ −0.090∗ 0.111∗∗∗ −0.107 0.034∗
(0.011) (0.034) (0.026) (0.055) (0.015)
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
OLS regression as specified in Equation 2 with fixed effects for areas
and days. Areas are weighted by their 2019 resident population.
Standard errors clustered at area level. Each column is
for different area subject to local lockdown (with its nearby
control area). Daily data for 4 weeks pre and post local lockdown
(3 weeks post for Newcastle). Outcome is Fable Data daily
series index for 7 day moving average of offline consumer credit
card spending. Outcome is de-seasoned by taking ratio of 7 day
moving average a year prior and indexed (=1)to its moving
average 8-28 January 2020. Omitted category is week (days -7
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6 Conclusions
We introduce a new real-time source of consumption data that we demonstrate is a highly
correlated, leading indicator of official statistics, is also available at transaction level and
can be disaggregated to produce daily measures across geographies.
Our analysis studies how consumer spending responds to UK local lockdowns using a
difference-in-difference approach, comparing nearby cities or small areas. We do not find
large spending declines in response to these local lockdowns. Instead we find little (if any)
decline in local spending. To help interpret these estimates we observe that they are far
smaller than the credit card spending declines observed nationally or for these localities
during the combination of the first virus wave and national lockdown in March 2020.
Using the same difference-in-difference methodology we find that these local lockdowns
typically appear to turn the tide on rising COVID-19 positive cases.
We thus conclude that it appears possible for policymakers to use such local lockdowns
restricting household mixing to contain COVID-19 outbreaks without killing local economies.
However, we caveat this by noting that the effectiveness of such measures to mitigate the
virus itself are expected to be highly dependent on an effective system of testing to isolate
which regions to lockdown and contain infected individuals. It is also expected to depend
upon co-ordination across regions by governments to ensure outbreaks in one area are
contained and do not spillover into other areas.
While our evidence indicates some initial successes from local lockdowns, the UK
(along with many European countries) experienced a rapid, nationwide rise in COVID-19
cases in late September and October following the end of the summer holidays, reopening
of schools and universities (though the cause of the wave’s sudden rise is not yet clear)
indicating that its system of nationwide containment is not isolating cases early enough
to be effective.
In Autumn and Winter 2020 a series of rapid COVID-19 outbreaks across the UK
(and also other European countries) have since resulted in government imposing new,
more restrictive systems of local and national lockdowns that includes forced business
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implemented to November 2020 had unequal effects across UK regions. Whether measures
being imposed in 2021 result in changes to consumption more like the first national
lockdown or the local lockdowns we study here will have profoundly different implications
for the UK economy’s prospects and other countries facing virus outbreaks.
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Annex
Table A1: Local lockdown announcement dates, areas & controls
Announcement Date Local Lockdown Control
29/6 Leicester Coventry
Leicester, Oadby and Wigston Coventry
30/7 Manchester Liverpool
Manchester, Bury, Oldham, Rochdale, Salford, Liverpool, Halton, Knowsley,
Salford, Stockport, Tameside, Trafford, St. Helens, Sefton, Wirral
Blackburn with Darwen, Bradford, Calderdale,
Rossendale, Pendle, Hyndburn, Burnley
5/8 Aberdeen Dundee




Glasgow City, East Renfrewshire, Edinburgh City, West Lothian
West Dunbartonshire
7/9 Greater Glasgow (T) Greater Glasgow (C)
Renfrewshire, East Dunbartonshire Iverclyde, North Ayrshire





Birmingham, Sandwell, Solihull Nottingham
11/9 Lanarkshire (T) Lanarkshire (C)




16/9 Rhondda Cynon Taf
Rhondda Cynon Taf
17/9 Newcastle Middlesbrough
Newcastle upon Tyne, Gateshead, Sunderland, Northumberland, Middlesbrough, Redcar and Cleveland,
South Tyneside, North Tyneside, County Durham Stockton-on-Tees, Darlington
18/9 Liverpool
Liverpool, Halton, Knowsley,




Chorley, Flyde, Lancaster, Ribble Valley
South Ribble, West Lancashire, Wyre
18/9 Warrington
Warrington
18/9 Oadby and Wigston
Oadby and Wigston
21/9 South Wales (1)
Blaenau Gwent, Bridgend, Merthyr Tydfil, Newport
21/9 Northern Ireland
Rest of Northern Ireland











27/9 South Wales (2)
Neath Port Talbot, Torfaen, Vale of Glamorgan
29/9 North Wales
Conwy, Denbighshire, Flintshire, Wrexham
Notes: Lower tier local authorities listed. This does not include areas below the local authority
level (e.g. Blaby, Charnwood, Carmarthenshire) where parts were locked down. ‘Control’ lists
lower tier local authorities chosen as control groups: blank where not used for analysis because
region is small and/or no suitable control area exists. Bolton announced and immediately
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Figure A1: UK Credit Card Spending 2018 - 2020
A. Fable & Bank of England Monthly Data, 2018 - 2020
B. Fable Daily Data, 2020
(7, 14, 28 day moving averages and monthly)
Notes: Bank of England monthly data is derived from LPMVZQH (monthly gross credit card
lending to individuals). Fable Data monthly series is indexed to January 2020. Fable Data
7,14,28 day moving averages are the daily moving average de-seasoned by taking ratio of the
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Figure A2: Overall credit card spending in areas subject to local lockdown
(yellow) compared to control areas not locked down (black), 7 day moving
average
A. Aberdeen B. Birmingham C. Bolton
D. Caerphilly E. Glasgow F. Greater Glasgow
G. Lanarkshire H. Leicester I. Preston
J. Leeds K. Newcastle L. Wolverhampton
Notes: Fable Data. Overall credit card spending is a 7 day moving average de-seasoned by taking
ratio of the 7 day moving average a year prior. The series is then indexed to its moving average
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Figure A3: Food and beverage credit card spending in areas subject to local
lockdown (yellow) compared to control areas not locked down (black)
A. Aberdeen B. Birmingham C. Bolton
D. Caerphilly E. Glasgow F. Greater Glasgow
G. Lanarkshire H. Leicester I. Preston
J. Leeds K. Newcastle L. Wolverhampton
Notes: Fable Data. Food and beverage categorization is based on Fable Data categorization using
merchant category codes and transaction labels. Credit card spending is a 7 day moving average
de-seasoned by taking ratio of the 7 day moving average a year prior. The series is then indexed
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Figure A4: Credit card spending in large store chains areas subject to local
lockdown (yellow) compared to control areas not locked down (black), 14 day
moving average
A. Aberdeen B. Birmingham C. Bolton
D. Caerphilly E. Glasgow F. Greater Glasgow
G. Lanarkshire H. Leicester I. Preston
J. Leeds K. Newcastle L. Wolverhampton
Notes: Fable Data. Store spending based on transactions tagged to large retail store chain
locations. Credit card spending is a 14 day moving average de-seasoned by taking ratio of the
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Empirical work described in this paper explains the daily evolution of 
the reproduction rate, R, and mobility for a large sample of countries, in 
terms of containment and public health policies. This is with a view to 
providing insight into the appropriate policy stance as countries prepare 
for a potentially protracted period characterised by new infection 
waves. While a comprehensive package of containment measures may 
be necessary when the virus is widespread and can have a large effect 
on reducing R, they also have effect on mobility and, by extension, 
economic activity. A wide-ranging package of public health policies – 
with an emphasis on comprehensive testing, tracing and isolation, but 
also including mask-wearing and policies directed at vulnerable groups, 
especially those in care homes – offer the best approach to avoiding a full 
lockdown while containing the spread of the virus. Such policies may, 
however, need to be complemented by selective containment measures 
(such as restricting large public events and international travel or 
localised lockdowns) both to contain local outbreaks and because 
implementing some of the recommended public health policies may be 
difficult to achieve or have unacceptable social costs.
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Walking the tightrope:  
Avoiding a lockdown while containing the virus 
1.  Introduction and main findings 
In most OECD countries, a combination of public health and containment measures, often involving a shutdown of 
major parts of the economy, was successful in reducing the spread of the new coronavirus (SARS-Cov-2) and 
associated diseases (Covid-19, used henceforth) in the first half of 2020. Having lifted many restrictions, the dilemma 
many policy-makers are now facing is how to deal with subsequent waves of infection without inflicting damage to 
economic activity on the scale that was so apparent from measures deployed in response to the first wave. The 
present study attempts to inform these decisions by examining country experiences during the period to mid-August 
at a daily frequency, with a focus on how the reproduction number, R, (representing the spread of the virus), and 
mobility (as a proxy for economic activity), respond to policy measures. The study makes use of a set of Covid-19 
policy trackers maintained by the Oxford Blavatnik School of Government (Hale et al., 2020) as well as some 
complementary indicators developed specifically for this project. 
Since the onset of the pandemic, parameterised epidemiological models (the so-called SIR models; Susceptible, 
Infected and Recovered) have been a popular tool to analyse disease dynamics (Anderson et al., 2020; Atkeson, 2020; 
Stock, 2020). These models can be used to shed light on the impact of physical distancing and other public health 
measures in containing a second wave of infections (Ferguson et al., 2020; Matrajt and Leung, 2020; Davies et al., 
2020; Hornstein, 2020). SIR models rely on several parameters (for instance to quantify the impact of physical 
distancing on R), so their insights are only as good as these parameters are accurate. So far, however, most modellers 
have relied on past (mostly flu) epidemics to calibrate important parameters, while the current pandemic likely differs 
in important ways. 
This study contributes to a burgeoning literature that seeks to quantify the impact of government interventions on 
disease progression and on mobility employing reduced-form econometric estimates for the Covid-19 pandemic itself. 
This literature has already shown that stricter lockdown policies go in tandem with a reduction in Covid-19-related 
deaths (Conyon et al., 2020). It has found strong evidence that banning mass gatherings is one of the most effective 
ways of taming the spread of the virus (Ahammer et al., 2020; Hunter et al., 2020; Weber, 2020). Similarly, air travel 
restrictions are found to be effective, especially those imposed on international flights and at the early stages of the 
pandemic (Hubert, 2020; Keita, 2020, Leffler et al., 2020). Stay-at-home requirements and workplace closures can 
also curb the propagation of the disease (Deb et al., 2020a; Hunter et al., 2020; Weber, 2020), as can the use of face 
masks (Hatzius et al., 2020; Leffler et al., 2020; Mitze et al., 2020). Nevertheless, the recent empirical literature has 
said little about the importance of testing and contact tracing policies, despite their prominence in SIR models, and 
the protection of the elderly population.  
The findings of this paper are consistent with much of the above literature. Containment policies can successfully 
reduce the spread of the virus, but most -- in particular stay-at-home requirements, workplace closures and school 
closures -- have a substantial impact on reducing mobility and by implication economic activity. Most importantly, 
unlike earlier empirical studies, the results strongly support the view that testing, combined with effective contact 
tracing are key components of the post-lockdown strategy, especially at relatively low level of infections (OECD, 
2020a). This corroborates a recent outbreak modelling study (Hellewell et al., 2020), which found that contact tracing 
and isolation would only contain outbreaks of Covid-19 if very high levels of contact tracing were achieved. This is also 
consistent with the view that testing and tracing is most effective in a low-infection environment, because contact 
tracing becomes increasingly difficult with higher levels of new daily infections (OECD, 2020a). Furthermore, 
estimation results suggest that mask-wearing and the protection of the elderly population in general, and those in 
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Scenario analysis, based on empirical results in the paper, suggests that avoiding further lockdowns will require a 
wide-ranging package of public health polices, including a comprehensive regime of test, trace and isolation, mask-
wearing mandates, isolation of those who are most vulnerable, and policies targeted at care homes. Moreover, unlike 
containment measures, these public health policies should have little adverse impact on mobility or economic activity. 
These findings are in line with and complement Acemoglu et al. (2020), who show in a multi-group SIR framework 
that the trade-off between mortality rates from the virus and economic damages can be attenuated if interventions 
are targeted on the most vulnerable individuals. 
Public health policies may, however, need to be complemented by extending some containment measures, such as 
restrictions on large public gatherings or international travel, for which the aforementioned trade-off is most 
favourable. This is also because the most stringent and effective form of public health measures may have other costs, 
or be otherwise difficult to implement fully: many countries have struggled to roll-out comprehensive testing regimes; 
contact tracing becomes more difficult at higher levels of infections; banning visits to care homes is likely to cause 
distress for residents near end-of-life or suffering from dementia; and discriminating against certain groups, such as 
the elderly, who may be more vulnerable may also be difficult. 
The remainder of the paper is organised around two equations estimated for a large sample of countries on daily data 
up to mid-August: the first explains the evolution of the reproduction rate, R, and the second explains mobility, as a 
proxy for economic activity. In the next section, various data issues underlying the empirical work are discussed (with 
further details on construction of R provided in Annex A). The policy implications of the estimated equations are then 
illustrated with a number of stylised policy scenarios, starting from the first outbreak of the virus, through full 
lockdown and, most importantly, exploring alternative strategies that would help keep the virus at bay. 
2.  Stylised facts about the reproduction rate, mobility and containment, testing and other 
public health policies 
2.1.  The reproduction rate  
Estimates of the reproduction number, R, are constructed separately for each country using an approach adapted 
from the epidemiological literature and daily series on confirmed infections and deaths from the European Centre for 
Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) (see Annex A for a detailed explanation). The median R estimate for a 
worldwide sample of approximately 70 countries fell from around 3 in February to around 1 in early May and has 
remained stable since (Figure 1, Panel A). This, however, hides considerable cross-country variation, with R nearing 
1.5 in October in European countries, before a further set of major lockdown measures was implemented (Figure 1, 
Panel B). 
Figure 1. Median and interquartile range for effective reproduction rate (R) 
 
Note: The chart summarises trends in R for a selection of worldwide (Panel A) or European (Panel B) countries for which R can be computed over 
the full sample period.	
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2.2.  Containment policies and mobility 
Many of the containment measures introduced by governments have had the objective of physical distancing. In the 
absence of a precise measure of physical distancing, high-frequency data on mobility provide a reasonable proxy. 
Such data are made available by Google, based on the movement of people with Android-based smartphones and 
with ‘location history’ turned on in their settings. The data are available for more than 130 countries at a daily 
frequency. The series measure the change in mobility from a same-day-of-the-week average in January and early 
February.1 In many countries that imposed lockdowns, mobility fell by as much as 70% in late March and April, relative 
to the pre-lockdown period. There is a manifest link between mobility and GDP at a quarterly frequency (Figure 2) 
and mobility is used as a focus in the current analysis because good quality indicators of economic activity at a higher 
frequency with broad country coverage are not readily available. 





Source:	 Google	 LLC,	 Google	 COVID-19	 Community	 Mobility	 Reports,	 https://www.google.com/covid19/mobility;	 OECD	
Economic	Outlook	No.	106	and	107	databases;	and	OECD	calculations.	
The empirical analysis here relies on a set of variables representing containment measures maintained by 
the Oxford Blavatnik School of Government (Hale et al., 2020), which in their original form are scored 
according to the degree of stringency or comprehensiveness with which they are applied. Eight categories 
of containment measures are distinguished (  
 
1 The mobility data are available for six location categories (grocery and pharmacies, parks, residential, retail and recreation, transit 
station and workplaces). This study works with a mobility index that is a linear combination of those six categories, giving greater 
weights to workplaces and transit stations. However, the six measures are highly correlated and a different weighting would have 
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Figure 3, Table 1), being variously scored 0 to 2, 0 to 3, or 0 to 4.2 For the purposes of estimation, the cardinal value 
of these scores are ignored (as there is no reason, for example, to expect a policy with a stringency value of 3 to have 
treble the effect of a policy with a value of 1) and instead the same policy at different levels of stringency are included 
as distinct dummy variables (taking the value of zero or one). Subsequently, if the estimation does not deliver the 
expected ordinal ranking in coefficients (so that a more stringent application of a policy has a greater effect), the same 
coefficient may be imposed across different levels of stringency by combining policy variables.3  
  
 
2 The scoring of measures refers to their design, not necessarily how they have been applied. This represents a potential weakness 
as the variables do not capture how enforcement and abidance by regulations has varied across countries. 
3 Multicollinearity, implying problems in being able to separately identify coefficients on different explanatory variables, might be 
an obvious concern given that containment measures were often introduced simultaneously or very close together. However, the 
estimation here mitigates this problem by having a large country sample, daily frequency of observations and by distinguishing the 
stringency of such measures. Consequently, the correlations between containment measures variables used in the regressions are 
mostly far from unity. A possible exception is that there appears to be a degree of multicollinearity between variables representing 
school closure, workplace closure and stay-at-home requirements, which means some caution is required in interpreting specific 
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Figure 3. Percentage of countries at different stringency levels for containment policies according to the Oxford 
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Table 1. Scoring of different stringency levels of containment policies according to the Oxford Covid-19 Government 
Response Tracker 
 
Note:	Not shown in the table, but “No measures” or “No restrictions” are always scored 0.	
Source:	Hale et al. (2020).	
2.3.  Test, trace and isolation policies 
Evidence for a large cross-section of countries suggests a negative correlation between the number of tests and 
mortality rates (Liang et al., 2020). Testing can break the chain of transmission and prevent the local outbreak of new 
infections, but to be effective requires the scale of testing to be ramped up quickly, a high accuracy of testing and the 
ability to carry out testing swiftly, which many countries struggled with during the first wave of Covid-19 (OECD, 
2020a).  
It has been argued that repeated mass testing coupled with the isolation of the infected would eradicate the virus 
without reliance on contact tracing (Taipale, Romer and Linnarsson, 2020). China has demonstrated the potential for 
mass testing in the city of Wuhan in May, with up to 1.5 million tests being processed in a single day (New York Times, 
2020a). In early November 2020, Slovakia tested two-thirds of the country’s population using rapid antigen tests 
(Euronews, 2020). Antigen tests provide results more quickly (within 30 minutes) compared to conventional PCR tests. 
While they are less accurate and miss some of the asymptomatic cases, experts argue these cases are likely to be less 
infectious (New York Times, 2020b). 
Unless testing can be carried out quickly and on a truly mass scale, testing also needs to be accompanied by tracing 
the persons who have been in contact with the infected person. The effectiveness of testing and tracing crucially 
depends on the coverage of the contact persons. Its success also hinges on the speed with which the tests are carried 
out and the contact persons identified, tested and isolated if tested positive (Hellewell et al. 2020). Scenario analysis 
shows that a high level of testing in tandem with widespread and timely contact tracing and isolation may prevent a 
Containment measure Scoring of degree of stringency
School closures 1: Recommend closing
2: Require closing (only some levels or categories, eg just high school, or just public schools)
3: Require closing all levels
Workplace closures 1: Recommend closing (or work from home)
2: Require closing (or work from home) for some sectors or categories of workers
3: Require closing (or work from home) all-but-essential workplaces (e.g. grocery stores, doctors)
Cancel public events 1: Recommend cancelling
2: Require cancelling
Restrictions on gatherings 1: Restrictions on very large gatherings (above 1000 people)
2: Restrictions on gatherings between 101-1000 people
3: Restrictions on gatherings between 11-100 people
4: Restrictions on gatherings of 10 people or less
Close public transport 1: Recommend closing (or significantly reduce volume/route/means of transport available)
2: Require closing (or prohibit most citizens from using it)
Stay at home requirements 1: Recommend not leaving house
2: Require not leaving house with exceptions for daily exercise, grocery shopping, and ‘essential’ trips
3: Require not leaving house with minimal exceptions (e.g. only once a week, or one person at a time)
Restrictions on internal movement 1: Recommend not to travel between regions/cities
2: Internal movement restrictions in place
International travel controls 1: Screening
2: Quarantine arrivals from high-risk regions
3: Ban on arrivals from some regions
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subsequent surge in infection rates (Panovska-Griffiths et al. 2020). Scaling-up contact tracing is difficult, but not 
impossible. ECDC (2020c) recommends: the use of well-trained non-public-health staff and volunteers; repurposing 
existing resources such as call centres; and using new technologies such as contact management software and mobile 
apps. Widespread testing and contact tracing is considered by many as a crucial part of policy packages during the de-
confinement phase (Aleta et al., 2020; ECDC, 2020c). 
To capture the effect of track-and-contact-trace policies, the policy indicators from the Blavatnik School of 
Government at the University of Oxford (Hale et al., 2020) are used, which in their original form are also scored 
according to the comprehensiveness of the testing or tracing regime (Table 2). They suggest there was a substantial 
improvement in the number of countries increasing the extent of their test and trace policies in the 2-3 months from 
March, but further increases since then have been modest (Figure 4). However, for the estimation work reported 
here, the cardinal values of these scores are again ignored and instead different dummy variables are used to 
represent test-and-trace variables at different degrees of comprehensiveness. An additional variable, constructed by 
the authors and described below, considers the importance of specific testing in care homes (Table 3). However, an 
important limitation of these indicators is that none cover issues of timing which can be key to a successful strategy: 
tests need to be done quickly and with a minimum delay before the results are available and then contacts need to 
be traced quickly. On the other hand, many issues relating to testing, including timing, may be easier when the level 
of infections is lower, and this can be readily tested in the empirical framework. 
Table 2. Scoring of the Oxford testing and contract tracing policy variables 
 
Note:	(1)	Testing variable relates to policies testing for infection (PCR test), not to policies testing for immunity (antibody tests).	
Source:	Hale et al. (2020). 
  
H2 Testing policy1: Who can be tested?
0: No testing policy
1: Only those who both (a) have symptoms AND (b) meet specific criteria (e.g. key workers, admiitted to hospital, came 
into contact with a known case, returned from overseas)
2: Testing of anyone showing COVID-19 symptoms
3: Open public testing (e.g. "drive through" testing available to asymptomatic people).
H3 Contact tracing: Are governments doing contact tracing?
0: No contact tracing
1: Limited contact tracing - not done for all cases
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Figure 4. Percentage of countries at different stringency levels for testing and contact tracing policies according to 
the Oxford Covid-19 Government Response Tracker 
 
Source:	Authors’	calculations	based	on	Hale	et	al.	(2020).	
2.4.  Shielding the elderly 
The elderly population is especially vulnerable to Covid-19 with much higher mortality rates than other demographic 
groups. A particular concern is that mortality rates have been very high in care/elderly/retirement homes (henceforth 
referred to as ‘care homes’) in some OECD countries (ECDC, 2020b; Gandal et al. 2020). Evidence, concerning 
experience in care homes with managing influenza outbreaks as well as the current pandemic, suggests that improving 
hygiene, including regular hand sanitising and disinfection at the establishment level (Koshkouei et al., 2020), as well 
as limiting the migration of staff across different care homes help to reduce infection rates substantially (Koshkouei 
et al., 2020; Chen et al., 2020), although the latter may be difficult given widespread staff shortages.  
Empirical evidence is less clear-cut for testing staff and residents, and limiting visitors, even though these measures 
could be part of any infection management. Testing in care homes is particularly appealing, especially if testing 
capacities are limited. Testing should target potential super-spreaders (e.g. healthcare professionals) or groups of 
people who may find it difficult or impossible to comply with physical distancing, such as the elderly in packed care 
homes where several people live in the same room (OECD, 2020a). Some argue that these high-risk groups should be 
regularly tested even in the absence of symptoms (Grassly et al., 2020).  
The current empirical work tests for the effectiveness of three types of government policies using variables 
constructed by the authors: firstly, recommendations to persuade the elderly to stay at home; secondly, restricting 
visits to care homes; and thirdly, testing of residents and/or staff of care homes (Table 3). Measures to specifically 
protect the elderly were relatively rare in mid-March, but have become more common across countries since then 
(see Table 4 for OECD countries).4 
 
4 These variables as well as the mask wearing variable are constructed using text search in three Covid-19-related databases: the 
COVID-19 Government Measures Dataset, run by the Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS); a database on government responses 
to the coronavirus compiled by the CoronaNet Research Project; and the CCCSL dataset of the Complexity Science Hub Vienna. 
These record press and government statements with regard to public policy interventions to reduce the spread of Covid19, 
obtained from media, government communications and press releases from the United Nations and other international 
organisations. For every variable, a search is carried out for one or several keywords and the results are evaluated and coded. A 
potential shortcoming of this approach is that government policies not discussed publicly, or not communicated actively, might 
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2.5.  Mask-wearing 
Evidence increasingly suggests that face masks can provide a potentially powerful protection against the transmission 
of SARS-CoV-2, which travels through droplets dispersed in the air (He et al., 2020, Lau et al 2020). This is especially 
true in closed and densely packed spaces and because a considerable share of infected people show no symptoms 
but have a high viral load. Meta-analysis of a large number of non-clinical trials of various coronaviruses indicates that 
mask wearing reduces significantly the infection rate, especially for masks of the N95 type (Chu et al. 2020; 
Schünemann et al., 2020), but even cloth masks are found to block infection (Mills et al. 2020). More direct evidence 
for SARS-CoV-2 comes from small-scale clinical trials, which confirm the desirability of mask wearing in public (Raina 
et al., 2020).5  
Measuring the health-effects of mask-wearing at the regional or country-level, based on public policy 
pronouncements, is difficult because they might depend on the take-up rate and correct use (covering both mouth 
and nose) and it is difficult to account for the greater tendency to wear face masks, regardless of policy 
pronouncements, in some (mostly Asian) countries prior to the current virus outbreak. Nevertheless, recent studies 
provide empirical support for the beneficial effects of mask wearing. For instance, in a large cross-sectional dataset, 
public mask wearing was found to be negatively related to mortality (Leffler et al., 2020). Another country-level study 
sheds light on the negative correlation between mask wearing and infections for U.S. counties and two different cross-
sectional datasets (Hatzius et al., 2020). Finally, Mitze et al. (2020) conclude that mask wearing successfully lowered 
infection rates in German regions adopting compulsory mask wearing policies. Countries have been mandating mask 
wearing more forcefully. While few countries had mandatory mask wearing in closed public spaces in mid-March, a 
majority of OECD countries had adopted such measures by end-July (Table 4). 
In the current empirical framework, mask wearing is investigated using variables constructed by the authors, which 
denote whether there is an obligation to wear masks in shops, public transport or more generally in closed spaces 
(Table 3). 






5 There is also mounting anecdotal evidence in favour of mask wearing: a sick traveller wearing a mask not infecting fellow 
passengers; sick hairdressers not contaminating mask-wearing clients; and Starbucks employees in Korea wearing a mask not 
catching Covid-19 while customers were infected by a super-spreader individual (Bai, 2020). 
Public health measure Scoring of degree of stringency
Protection of the elderly
Testing in care homes 1: Testing of residents and/or staff in care homes, regional level
2: Testing of residents and/or staff in care homes, national level
Restricting visits to care homes 1: Ban on visits, regional level
2: Ban on visits, national level
Keeping the elderly at home 1: Government recommendation to stay at home
Mask wearing
Compulsory mask wearing indoors 1: Mandatory at the local level
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2.6.  Induced cautious behaviour and towards achieving herd immunity 
In addition to the variables representing policy responses, the regression analysis also includes different measures of 
the death rate from the virus as explanatory variables.6 Both the national and global daily death rates are included to 
proxy for general awareness of the virus prompting more cautious behaviour, for example voluntary physical 
distancing and increased hand-washing. The importance of these variables is that they proxy for changes in behaviour 
that are likely to be engendered regardless of government-mandated restrictions. In the case of the United States, for 
instance, Goolsbee and Syverson (2020) found that visits to businesses declined by up to 60% because of the 
pandemic, but that legal restrictions explained only 7 percentage points of this drop. Individual choices were far more 
important and seemed tied to fears of infection as differences in consumer traffic across counties were highly 
influenced by reported Covid-19 deaths. 
Total national deaths attributed to the virus expressed as a share of the population are also separately included, as a 
proxy for the share of the population that has been infected, with the expectation of a negative coefficient; as the 
share of the population that has been infected rises (and presumably becomes immune), the speed with which the 
virus spreads will be reduced.  
  
 
6 A possible concern with using death rates as proxies on the right-hand side of the equation is that the left-hand side variable 
(reproduction rate) is already partly estimated based on deaths. This potential problem is attenuated by differences in timing, 
however. While timing can only be addressed imperfectly because the raw data on deaths are smoothed, the idea is that the 
reproduction rate for day t is based on infections confirmed on day t+12 and on deaths recorded on day t+22. These leads are 
incorporated to account for average delays between infections and case detection, as well as average delays between infection 
and deaths, in the epidemiological literature (see Annex A). In any case, the coefficients on the policy variables of interest are 
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3.  Empirical evidence on the impact of policies on the reproduction rate and mobility 
This section describes the estimated effects of containment measures, testing policies, and other public health 
measures on both the reproduction rate, R (Table 5), and mobility (Table 6), which underlie the policy scenarios 
presented in the subsequent section. 
3.1.  The reproduction rate 
The (exponential of the) constant in the equations shown in Table 5 can be used to infer an average initial 
reproduction rate, R0, which is relevant at the start of an epidemic and applies to a population previously free of 
infection and before any containment or other public health policies have been implemented. R0 is not purely a 
feature of the virus – it depends on the conditions in which the virus emerges, for instance in terms of population 
density, social norms, etc. R0 would thus be expected to vary across countries, which is captured in estimation through 
the inclusion of country fixed effects.7  
An important feature of the estimated equation explaining R is that the preferred functional form for the dependent 
variable is logarithmic; a formal test decisively rejects a linear form in favour of a logarithmic one.8 This implies that 
any policy intervention will have a larger effect when R is initially high than when it is low, and underlines the merit 
of early policy interventions.  
3.1.1.  Confinement policies 
In estimation, the coefficients on five containment policies -- workplace closures, restrictions on gatherings, stay-at-
home requirements, international travel controls and school closures -- are found to have a statistically significant 
effect in reducing R (Table 5). The coefficient on school closures has the largest effect of any containment policies, 
but there is a degree of collinearity between school closures, stay-at-home requirements and workplace closures 
arising because such containment policies have often been imposed at the same time.  
Further testing suggests that while the sum of the coefficients on these three containment variables is a robust 
indication of the effect of a combined package, the coefficient on any one of them is less reliable as it is sensitive to 
the exclusion of other variables (and for this reason the combined effect of these three policies is summarised in 
Figure 5 and referred to as a ‘Typical lockdown’, rather than showing each of them individually). Similarly, the absence 
of any role for the closure of public events in the equation is likely related to its overlap with restrictions on the size 
 
7 The estimated equation includes a full set of country fixed effects to account for fixed country characteristics that could affect 
virus transmission. There are many such factors, including population density, general social habits, climate, etc. One possibility 
would be to attempt to include these factors individually, but some factors (such as social habits) are difficult to quantify and failure 
to account for some important ones could result in omitted-variable bias. Some differences across countries which have been 
associated with variations in mortality from Covid-19 in the epidemiological literature, such as prevalence of certain conditions or 
diseases (obesity, diabetes, cardiovascular diseases, etc.), would not necessarily be expected to affect virus, transmission itself, 
which is the dependent variable here. At the same time, estimation of the reproduction number relies in part on death counts, and 
there could also be an indirect link between mortality and virus transmission, for instance if a lot of transmission happens in health 
settings where more serious cases end up. In any case, the country fixed effects would also absorb cross-country differences in 
determinants of mortality. 
8 Testing the appropriate functional form of the dependent variable is not as straightforward as testing for the functional form of 
explanatory variables because the competing models cannot be nested within a general model. The test is therefore conducted by 
first transforming the dependent variable by dividing by its geometric mean to make the two competing models (log and linear) 
comparable. A formal test of model equivalence can be performed with the BoxCox statistic by comparing the relative goodness-
of-fit of the two models. The test decisively favours the logarithmic form for R over different country samples. Conversely, when a 
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of gatherings, which is included. The combined effect of applying all containment polices suggests that from an initial 
R0 value of about 3, a complete package of containment measures would nearly halve the reproduction number.9 
An interesting finding is that the impact differs substantially across countries: workplace closures have a considerably 
larger negative effect on R in high-income countries as compared to other countries.10 One possible reason may be 
that workplace closures can be enforced more effectively in high-income countries while workers, more likely to be 
covered by social insurance, may be less tempted to circumvent them. This finding is mirrored in the mobility 
equation: workplace closures have a larger impact in advanced economies. Conversely, while stay-at-home 
requirements are found to reduce R to a greater extent in advanced economies than in less developed countries, this 
is not the case for mobility. The lower effectiveness of stay-at-home requirements in less advanced economies may 
be attributable to larger household sizes and smaller living spaces (Table B.3 in Annex B).   
An important feature of these results is that the full R reduction is often achieved well before the maximum level of 
stringency is reached: for example a stringency score of 2 on the workplace closure variable reduces R, but it is not 
possible to detect any additional effect on R from a further increase in the degree of stringency. The combined 
effect of applying all containment polices suggests that from an initial R0 value of about 3, a complete package of 
containment measures would nearly halve the reproduction number (Figure 5).11   
 
9 The OECD Economics Department compiled an alternative dataset of containment policies covering five areas: stay-at-home 
requirements, workplace closures, school closures, cancellation of public events and travel restrictions (Bulman and Koirala, 2020). 
While these indicators overlap with the Oxford measures, their definitions and coding differ. All policies are scored from 0 to 5, 
except cancelling of public events, which ranges from 0 to 3. Equations for R based on the OECD indicators include 74 countries 
and yield results broadly consistent with those based on the Oxford indicators: containment measures as a whole reduce R 
substantially, even though the impacts of specific containment policies differ from the Oxford-based results. The estimated effects 
of public health policies do not change as well as the finding that test and trace policies are very effective in a low-infection 
environment (Table B.1 in Annex B). The OECD trackers of containment policies were discontinued as of October 2020. 
10 The sample is divided into two groups of countries: those whose GDP per capita was greater than USD 25 500 in 2018 in 
Purchasing Power Parity terms, and countries with lower per capita income levels.  
11 Note that given the log specification of R the effectiveness of policies in terms of their absolute effect on R is non-linear and 
weakens at lower initial values of R. In addition, as described in the scenario analysis below, the effect on R from a full package of 
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and,	 as	 discussed	 in	 the	 main	 text,	 because	 multi-collinearity	 means	 that	 the	 sum	 of	 the	 coefficients	 on	 these	 three	
containment	variables	are	more	reliable	than	any	of	the	individual	coefficients.	
Source:	Authors’	calculations.	
3.1.2.  Test and trace policies 
Results suggest that test and trace policies can reduce the spread of the virus (Table 5). The most 
comprehensive form of test and trace policies are more than 2½ times as effective in reducing R than 
more limited forms. Test and trace polices are most effective when the infection rate is not too high 
(which in estimation is taken to be less than 10 new daily cases per million population, a rate which was 
well exceeded by many countries in March and April), a rather unsurprising finding given the difficulties 
of tracking down all contact persons in a timely manner if the system is overwhelmed with new cases. 
Overall, the effect of the most effective test and trace regime in an environment of low daily infection, is 
estimated to have a greater effect on reducing R than any other public health interventions and is 2-3 
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Figure 5). Variant regressions show that isolating the contacts of people who are sick or tested positive with the virus 
has a non-trivial effect on R and enhances substantially the effectiveness of test and trace policies (Table B.5 in Annex 
B). 
3.1.3.  Protecting the elderly 
The empirical analysis provides strong evidence that policies can play an important role in shielding the 
elderly population. Stepping up the testing of residents and staff in long-term care facilities is found to 
correlate negatively with the transmission of the virus. Restricting visitor access to these establishments 
goes in tandem with lower reproduction rates. Furthermore, general stay-at-home recommendations for 
the elderly appears to be associated with less infections (Table 5). The combined effect of these polices 
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Figure 5).  
3.1.4.  Mask wearing 
Results show a sizeable and fairly robust negative effect on R from the introduction of mandatory mask wearing in all 
closed public spaces (Table 5), although other results (not reported) suggest that extending mask wearing obligations 
to the outdoors does not appear to add much to reducing the reproduction rate. 
3.1.5.  Awareness of the virus and towards herd immunity 
The death rate variables are statistically significant with the expected negative sign and their magnitudes imply they 
can play an important role in the evolution of R. 
The daily death rates are postulated to induce more cautionary behaviour. The global daily death rate has fluctuated 
around 0.5 per million during the period considered which, from an initial value of R0 of 3, would be expected to 
reduce R by about 0.6. The national daily death rate varies substantially, both across countries and over time, but for 
some OECD countries it was running at around 15 per million going into the lockdown in March, and this would reduce 
R by a further 0.6. 
The total national death rate (i.e. based on cumulative deaths) also varies substantially across countries and has been 
increasing relentlessly through time in most countries. It is used here to proxy the profile of the number of people 
that have already been infected (and so are subsequently immune), so helping to reduce R. In a number of major 
OECD countries (including the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy and France) the total death rate currently exceeds 400 per 
million, at which level R would be reduced from 3 to 2.5.12 
  
 
12 The estimated coefficient on the total national death rate implies a herd-immunity threshold of about 1 600 deaths per million 
population (or 0.16%), since the estimated equation predicts that R would fall below one above this level of cumulative deaths. 
For an estimated average R0 of 3.0, a standard epidemiological relationship predicts herd immunity once (1 – 1 / 3) = 67% of the 
population has been infected (assuming persistent immunity). Both findings are consistent with current estimates of the infection 
fatality rate (IFR) for Covid-19, which is heavily stratified by age but ranges from 0.1% to 0.4% at the population level (Oke and 
Heneghan, 2020). Indeed, this IFR range corresponds to a population-fatality rate of 0.07% to 0.27% (= 67% * [0.1% to 0.4%]) for 
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    Constant  1.0947**
Containment policies
    Stay-at-home requirement (>=1) -0.0536**
    Workplace closures (=1) -0.0614**
    Workplace closures (>=2) -0.0767**
    School closures (>=2) -0.1773**
    Restrictions on gatherings (=2) -0.0393**
    Restrictions on gatherings (>=3) -0.0883**
    International travel controls (>=1) -0.0629**
Test and Trace policies
    Test=1 or 2, T race =1 or 2 -0.1110**
    Test=3, Trace=1 -0.1364**
    Test=3, Trace=2 -0.2185**
    All Test & Trace combinations when deaths < 10 per million -0.0613**
Policies protecting the elderly
    Testing in care homes (=2) -0.0540**
    Restricting visits to care homes (>=1) -0.1840**
    Recommending elderly to stay at home -0.1022**
Other non-containment policies
    Mandatory mask wearing indoors -0.1370**
Death rates (per million population)
    Daily national -0.0358**
    Daily global -0.3637**
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3.1.6.  The policy drivers of mobility 
Putting in place containment and isolation policies hinders the free daily movement of people. Empirical results13 
suggest that seven of the eight categories of containment policies have a negative effect on mobility (Table 6).14 Unlike 
in the equation for R, there is a clearer ranking in coefficients, so that the more stringent application of a particular 
policy tends to reduce mobility by more. For example: the most severe form of workplace closure (score of 3) has nine 
times the effect on mobility of the mildest form (score of 1). These findings suggest that moving to the more stringent 
forms of workplace closure, stay-at-home requirements and school closure has large negative effects on mobility and 
hence economic activity, although it is difficult to detect any corresponding benefit from further reductions in R.15 
For policies such as the cancellation of public events and travel restrictions, the most limited application of the policy 
has no significant effect on mobility. Applying all containment policies in their most severe forms would reduce 
mobility by more than half relative to normal, with 50% of this reduction accounted for by workplace closures and 
stay-at-home requirements.  
Alternative estimations explore the effect of mask-wearing on mobility. The positive coefficient estimates suggest 
that mandating mask wearing in public transports and shops raises mobility. Similarly, more extensive testing and the 
isolation of contact persons are found to encourage mobility (Table B.6 in Annex B), possibly by reducing concerns 
about infection. 
The national daily death rate from the virus is again included to proxy general awareness of the virus and its effect in 
voluntarily reducing mobility due to an increase in natural caution. A national daily death rate running at around 15 
per million – similar to the rate experienced by some major OECD countries going into the lockdown in March – would 
reduce mobility by 10%, independently of any government-mandated polices. 
  
 
13 For the estimated equation explaining mobility, unlike that for R, the preferred functional form for the dependent variable is 
linear, not logarithmic, which makes it more straightforward to evaluate the effect of policies. The specification includes a full set 
of country fixed effects to account for invariant country characteristics, although their inclusion is much less critical here given that 
mobility is a relative measure constructed so that it equals one in normal times in each country. 
14 The failure to detect any effect from restrictions on gatherings is likely related to its close correlation with the policy to cancel 
public events.  
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4.  Scenario analysis 
As reported in the previous section, equations estimated for a large sample of countries find well-determined effects 
from containment policies on R and mobility, as well as strongly significant effects from a range of health policies on 
R. However, another important feature of both equations is that the prevalence of the virus is found to alter behaviour 
regardless of government-mandated policies: mobility is reduced and the general population is more ready to adopt 
physical distancing and other measures which reduce R. In order to draw out the policy implications of these 
estimations, a number of stylised scenarios are constructed using the estimated equations to follow the evolution of 
R and mobility from the first outbreak of the virus, through full lockdown, followed by a number of alternative exit 
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At the first outbreak of the virus, for the typical country, the initial reproduction number R0 is estimated to be about 
3 and, before the impact of the virus is felt on the economy, mobility is normal (represented by the red triangle at the 
top right-hand-side corner of Figure 6). Even before the implementation of government-mandated measures, 
awareness of the seriousness of the virus (represented by the daily death rate) is likely to reduce mobility and foster 
more cautious behaviour, leading to a fall in R, although it remains well above 1.0 (the red triangle-labelled “Pre-
lockdown + natural caution” in Figure 6, which is calibrated on the daily death rates of a number of major OECD 
economies just prior to lockdown). 
Once the number of daily infections is high (here proxied by the high national daily death rate), the implementation 
of a wide range of containment measures will be essential to contain the spread of the virus. In the scenarios 
considered here, the implementation of full lockdown (FLD) measures, accompanied by a limited test-and-trace 
regime, reduces R to close to 1.0, but at the cost of a sharp fall in mobility (represented by the blue squares in Figure 6). 
The degree of stringency with which lockdown measures are applied will determine the extent of the fall in mobility, 
with two scenarios considered here: the first assumes that containment policies are applied with a degree of 
stringency which is typical of that followed by countries in March/April (corresponding to the median country); the 
second assumes all containment policies to be applied to their maximum possible degree of stringency. Mobility falls 
by more than 40% in the former case and by more than 60% in the latter, however the estimation results suggest 
there is little additional benefit in terms of lowering R from maximising the degree of stringency of containment 
policies (particularly with regard to workplace closures or stay-at-home requirements). 
Even in the absence of further policy changes, the reproduction number will evolve during lockdown as the number 
of infections/deaths change the fall in the daily death rate may tend to lower natural caution and so lead to some 
increase in R and mobility; on the other hand, as the total number of individuals that have already been infected and 
are immune rises then this will tend to lower R. The estimation results and particular calibrations used in constructing 
these scenarios suggest these two effects roughly cancel each other out. 
A number of strategies for avoiding a full lockdown are considered (represented by the green circles in Figure 6). The 
basic issue facing policy-makers is how to prevent the need for the full set of containment policies while bringing or 
keeping R under control. The estimation results (Table 5) suggest that the implementation of a comprehensive test 
and trace policy together with a package of other public health measures would more than compensate for the 
removal of lockdown policies, so that their successful implementation would see a return to near normality of 
mobility, with R remaining below 1 (as represented by the green circle labelled “No LD + full health measures” in 
Figure 6). 
An even more decisive reduction in R below 1 might be achieved, if comprehensive public health measures were 
accompanied by maintaining some containment policies (here assuming that restrictions on large public events, large 
public gatherings and international travel remain), although it would come at some cost to mobility (Partial LD + full 
health measures” in Figure 6).  
In practice, as the experience of several countries is showing, implementing a full range of public health policies and 
a comprehensive test and trace regime may be difficult, especially once the daily infection rate has begun to rise. 
Variant scenarios with “limited health measures” assume only a limited test-and-trace regime together with 
mandating mask-wearing in indoor public places, but no other public health policies targeted at the elderly or care 
homes. Such a combination of policies accompanied by a full relaxation of lockdown measures might see mobility 
initially return to just below normal levels (assuming the daily death rate has previously been reduced by lockdown), 
but R will likely increase well above 1.0 (represented by the scenario labelled “No LD + limited health measures” in 
Figure 6). However, this situation would not be a stable equilibrium, as with R above 1.0 there would be a subsequent 
pick-up in infections and deaths, which in turn would further reduce mobility, regardless of further government action. 
A limited set of health measures accompanied by maintaining the same limited containment policies, would come at 
a more immediate cost to mobility, but bring R down by more, although in the scenario considered here it would still 
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Figure 6. Stylised scenarios: from the first outbreak of the virus, through lockdown and exit 
 
Note:	The points represent scenarios, each of which are generated from consistent combinations of the equations for R and mobility using 
assumptions for the explanatory variables that are summarised in Table 7. The red triangles denote the situation at the start of the virus outbreak, 
blue squares the situation following full lock-down policies, and the green circles represent various exit scenarios. 
Source:	Authors.	
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R0 - - - - - - 0 0 0 3.00 1.00
Natural caution - - - - - - 5.0 0.8 50 1.81 0.97
Lockdown
Full lockdown (FLD) - √ - - - - 5.0 0.8 50 1.02 0.56
Severe FLD - √ - - - - 5.0 0.8 50 1.02 0.35
Exit from lockdown
Partial LD & full health measures √ - √ √ √ √ 1.0 0.7 300 0.73 0.84
Partial LD & limited health measures - √ √ - - - 1.0 0.7 300 1.22 0.84
No LD & full health measures √ - √ √ √ √ 1.0 0.7 300 0.85 0.99
No LD & limited health measures - √ √ - - - 1.0 0.7 300 1.42 0.99
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4.1.  Which lockdown policies should stay in place longest? 
The policy scenarios suggest that a prudent strategy would likely consist of imposing some lockdown policies, at least 
until it is clear that R remains decisively below 1. This raises the question as to whether the estimations help to inform 
this choice by suggesting policies with a better trade-off in terms of the benefit from virus control relative to the cost 
in terms of mobility foregone. There are, however, some reasons for caution in interpreting the results in this way. 
Firstly, as previously noted, there is evidence of collinearity between some containment policies -- notably school 
closures, workplace closures and stay-at-home requirements -- which suggests particular caution in interpreting the 
estimated coefficients relating to these policies. Secondly, while most containment policies have, at some level of 
stringency, an effect on R and mobility which is statistically significantly different from zero, the difference between 
policies, particularly as regards the effect on R, is often not statistically significant. 
Bearing these limitations in mind, the containment policies which appear the most obvious candidates for extension 
are: 
● Restrictions on international travel, including obligations to quarantine all arrivals from selected countries, 
would reduce R significantly and may have only a small effect on mobility (although this may be because the 
mobility measure does not capture international mobility accurately). 
● Restrictions on gatherings has a substantial effect on reducing R, whereas the cancellation of public events 
(which would seem to be inevitably linked) has a relatively small effect on mobility. Such policies may be 
particularly effective because such large public gatherings may otherwise represent a risk of being so-called 
‘superspreader’ events. 
In both cases, such measures might have serious adverse effects on particular sectors of the economy (notably, 
entertainment and travel) which might warrant some targeted support. However, their effect on wider economic 
activity may be more limited than that of other containment measures.  
The estimation results also suggest that resort to the most stringent form of workplace closures, school closures and 
stay-at home requirements at the national level are likely to have a relatively large adverse effect on mobility (and by 
extension economic activity) relative to the reduction in R achieved. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
Recent optimistic news about the availability of a number of vaccines against the coronavirus needs to be tempered 
by the realisation that, even in the countries that are in the vanguard, it is likely to be the middle of next year before 
a large share of the population has been vaccinated. In the meantime, governments around the world will be trying 
to calibrate policy interventions so as to keep the spread of the disease under control without crippling economic 
activity.  
This study uses country experience during the first phase of the pandemic to estimate the impact of different 
government interventions on both the reproduction rate of the virus, R, and on mobility, as a proxy for economic 
activity. The empirical results then inform a number of scenarios where the epidemic/economic trade-off of different 
policy packages is assessed: 
• When the daily infection rate is high, a comprehensive combination of containment policies is needed to 
reduce the spread of the virus, although these are likely to severely reduce mobility and economic activity. 
• Once the daily infection rate has been lowered, test-and-trace policies represent a better alternative for 
controlling the virus, because they have no significant adverse impact on mobility or economic activity. 
Testing is found to be more effective in reducing R if accompanied by comprehensive contact tracing. Specific 
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• Other public health policies can also contribute to restraining the spread of the virus, including: mandating 
mask-wearing in public indoor environments; restricting visits to care homes; and stay-at-home 
recommendations for the elderly population. 
Even with a comprehensive test-and-trace regime and supporting public health policies, there may be a need to 
resort to selective containment measures. These should prioritise restrictions on large gatherings and international 
travel. Where there are localised outbreaks of the virus, then targeted lockdown measures are appropriate. 
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 Estimation of effective reproduction number (R) 
The estimation of effective reproduction numbers relies on code developed by Systrom (2020), who extends the static 
Bayesian approach of Bettencourt and Ribeiro (2008) to estimate a time-varying 𝑅! for US states. The code is adapted 
slightly to apply it to countries instead of US states and to combine information from both confirmed cases and deaths. 
The basic idea is to estimate 𝑅! as a function of how many new cases appear each day using Bayes’ Theorem. New 
information from each day’s case count is used to adjust expectations of what 𝑅! is, getting closer to the true value 
as more daily data become available. 





where 𝑃(𝑘!|𝑅!) is the likelihood of seeing 𝑘! new cases on a given day given 𝑅!, 𝑃(𝑅!) is the prior belief about the 
value of 𝑅! without today’s data and 𝑃(𝑘!) is the probability of seeing this many cases in general. Obtaining the 
likelihood function 𝑃(𝑘!|𝑅!) starts from the Poisson distribution for the probability of seeing 𝑘! new cases given an 





The average arrival rate of new cases (𝜆) relates to the effective reproduction number of an infectious disease in the 
following manner [see Bettencourt and Ribeiro (2008) for the derivation]: 
𝜆 = 𝑘!#%𝑒&((!#%) [3] 
where 𝛾 is the reciprocal of the serial interval (i.e. the average number of days over which an infected person will 
contaminate others). Based on the epidemiological literature, a serial interval of seven days is assumed here 
(Anderson et al., 2020 and Salje et al., 2020). Given this assumption and an observation for cases on the previous day 
(𝑘!"#), equation [3] can be substituted into equation [2] to obtain 𝑃(𝑘!|𝑅!). 
Except for the first day, where an independent prior is needed, the prior probability in equation [1], 𝑃(𝑅!), is based 
on yesterday's posterior estimate, 𝑃(𝑅!"#). The distribution of 𝑅! is assumed to be a Gaussian centred on 𝑅!"#, so 
𝑃(𝑅!|𝑅!"#) = 𝒩(𝑅!"#, 𝜎), where 𝜎 is a Gaussian noise parameter reflecting the belief that the value of 𝑅! likely 
changes from day to day. The higher 𝜎, the more noise and the more the value of 𝑅! is expected to drift each day. 
Applying noise on noise iteratively means that there is a natural decay of distant posteriors.  
The denominator of Bayes’ rule in equation [1] is given by: 
𝑃(𝑘!) = , 𝑃(𝑘!|𝑅!) ∙ 𝑃(𝑅!)
(!
 [4] 
It is the sum of the distribution of the numerator over all possible values of 𝑅! (assumed to theoretically range from 






























The procedure just described is applied separately to the worldwide daily dataset of new cases and new deaths. The 
idea is that both series contain some information about the progression of the epidemic and a better estimate can 
likely be obtained by combining this information. The series for daily new cases and new deaths are sourced from the 
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC). To reduce noise, the raw series are filtered using a 7-day 
centred rolling Gaussian window before estimation. 
Nationally reported statistics on Covid-19 cases and deaths can be affected by measurement errors, while differences 
in coding and reporting practices pose challenges when used for international comparisons. A possible alternative 
would be to look at all-cause (excess) mortality, which takes into account the possible underreporting of Covid-19 
deaths (OECD, 2020b). However, this measure would reflect indirect effects, possibly positive (e.g. fewer road 
fatalities) or negative (e.g. increased mortality caused by foregone treatment).  
As this study focuses on dynamics of the epidemic per se, excess mortality has not been considered as a convenient 
outcome variable. In addition, use of excess mortality would severely limit the estimation sample. Measures of excess 
deaths are currently available for only about 25 countries and only at the weekly or monthly frequency. For some 
countries, the data cover only selected major cities. Timeliness is another issue, in some countries the data are only 
made available with a lag of several weeks or even months. Working with the available excess deaths data at the 
weekly frequency would therefore mean shrinking the sample coverage substantially in both the country and time 
dimensions. Finally, to the extent that new infections have skewed toward younger age groups over the Northern 
Hemisphere summer, as reported by many countries, excess deaths may no longer be an accurate reflection of the 
number of new infections. The same issue applies to R measures based on deaths. This is one reason why the R 
measure used in the main analysis is an average of two R independent estimates, one based on new cases and one 
based on new deaths. 
When both the case-based and death-based 𝑅! can be calculated for a given country and day, the final 𝑅!  estimate 
is an average of the two, except that a 10-day lead is applied to the death estimate to reflect the time window between 
case detection and death, consistent with Anderson et al. (2020) and Salje et al. (2020). The average time lag between 
infection and case detection is taken into account in the regression model itself by leading the 𝑅! series as dependent 
variable by 12 days relative to the right-hand side variables (e.g. government interventions). This means that the 
regressions assume an average of 12 days between infection and case confirmation, and 22 days (12 days + 10-day 
lead for deaths) between infection and death. For some countries and time periods where deaths are too low to 
calculate a death-based 𝑅!, only the case-based estimate can be computed. In such cases, the final 𝑅! estimate is 
based on new cases only. This is also true of the most recent ten days of the sample period given the lead applied to 
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 Auxiliary regression results 






Baseline regression from Table 5
OECD indicators
Dependent variable: ln(R)
    Constant  1.0947**     Constant 0.9441**
Containment policies
    Stay-at-home requirement (>=1) -0.0536**     Stay-at-home requirement (=1) -0.0257**
    Stay-at-home requirement (>=2) -0.1083**
    Workplace closures (=1) -0.0614**     Workplace closures (>=1) -0.0263**
    Workplace closures (>=2) -0.0767**
    School closures (>=2) -0.1773**     School closures (>=2) -0.1346**
    Restrictions on gatherings (=2) -0.0393**     Restrictions on gatherings (>=2) -0.2167**
    Restrictions on gatherings (>=3) -0.0883**
    International travel controls (>=1) -0.0629**
Test and Trace policies
    Test=1 or 2, Trace =1 or 2 -0.1110**
    Test=3, Trace=1 -0.1364**
    Test=3, Trace=2 -0.2185**
    All Test & Trace combinations when deaths < 
10 per million
-0.0613** -0.1279**
Policies protecting the elderly
    Testing in care homes (=2) -0.0540**     Testing in care homes (=2) -0.0267*
    Restricting visits to care homes (>=1) -0.1840**     Restricting visits to care homes (>=1) -0.1146**
    Recommending elderly to stay at home -0.1022**     Recommending elderly to stay at home -0.1451**
Other non-containment policies
    Mandatory mask wearing indoors -0.1370**     Mandatory mask wearing indoors -0.1047**
Death rates (per million population)
    Daily national -0.0358**     Daily national -0.0295**
    Daily global -0.3637**     Daily global -0.3732**
    Total national -0.0007**     Total national -0.0006**
Adjusted R-squared 0.597 0.642
Daily observations 17624 8984
Countries covered 147 74
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Baseline regression from Table 6
OECD indicators
Dependent variable: Mobility
    Constant 1.0241** 0.9454**
Containment policies
    Stay-at-home requirement (=1) -0.0240** -0.0165**
    Stay-at-home requirement (=2) -0.0668** -0.0406**
    Stay-at-home requirement (=3) -0.1252** -0.0749**
    Stay-at-home requirement (=4) -0.0777**
    Stay-at-home requirement (=5) -0.1733**
    Workplace closures (=1) -0.0216** 0.0117**
    Workplace closures (=2) -0.0491** -0.0404**
    Workplace closures (=3) -0.1980** -0.0531**
    Workplace closures (>=4) -0.1120**
    School closures (=2) -0.0237** -0.0744**
    School closures (=3) -0.1098** -0.1413**
    School closures (=4) -0.1450**
    School closures (=5) -0.2188**
    Cancel public events (=2) -0.0369**
    Cancel public events (=3) -0.0562**
    Restrictions on internal movement (=2) -0.0220**
    International travel controls (=4) -0.0554**
   Close public transport (=1) -0.0439**
   Close public transport (=2) -0.0650**
Death rate (per million population)
    Daily national -0.0066** -0.0092**
Adjusted R-squared 0.759 0.633
Daily observations 22741 12122
Countries covered 128 68
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Table B.4. The drivers of mobility, advanced vs emerging and developing countries 
Baseline, Table 5 Variant 1 Variant 2
Dependent variable: ln(R)
    Constant  1.0947** 1.0361** 1.0312**
Containment policies
    Stay-at-home requirement (>=1) -0.0536** -0.0570** -0.0150*
    Stay-at-home requirement (>=1) in advanced economies -0.1182**
    Workplace closures (=1) -0.0614** 0.0249* 0.0122
    Workplace closures (=1) in advanced economies -0.2134** -0.1765**
    Workplace closures (>=2) -0.0767** 0.0125 -0.0104
    Workplace closures (>=2) in advanced economies -0.2474** -0.1762**
    School closures (>=2) -0.1773** -0.1636** -0.1580**
    Restrictions on gatherings (=2) -0.0393** -0.0463** -0.0461**
    Restrictions on gatherings (>=3) -0.0883** -0.0809** -0.0803**
    International travel controls (>=1) -0.0629** -0.0447** -0.0527**
Test and Trace policies
    Test=1 or 2, Trace =1 or 2 -0.1110** -0.1248** -0.1233**
    Test=3, Trace=1 -0.1364** -0.1281** -0.1240**
    Test=3, Trace=2 -0.2185** -0.2330** -0.2317**
    All Test & Trace combinations when deaths < 10 per million -0.0613** -0.0552** -0.0550**
Policies protecting the elderly
    Testing in care homes (=2) -0.0540** -0.0390** -0.0438**
    Restricting visits to care homes (>=1) -0.1840** -0.1402** -0.1324**
    Recommending elderly to stay at home -0.1022** -0.0906** -0.0893**
Other non-containment policies
    Mandatory mask wearing indoors -0.1370** -0.1501** -0.1494**
Death rates (per million population)
    Daily national -0.0358** -0.0338** -0.0329**
    Daily global -0.3637** -0.3669** -0.3749**
    Total national -0.0007** -0.0006** -0.0006**
Adjusted R-squared 0.597 0.598 0.6
Daily observations 17624 17624 17624
Countries covered 147 147 147































Baseline, Table 6 Variant 1 Variant 2
Dependent variable: Mobility
    Constant 1.0241** 1.0237** 1.0236**
Containment policies
    Stay-at-home requirement (=1) -0.0240** -0.0228** -0.0207**
    Stay-at-home requirement (=2) -0.0668** -0.0668** -0.0664**
    Stay-at-home requirement (=3) -0.1252** -0.1265** -0.1257**
    Stay-at-home requirement (>=1) in advanced economies -0.0060
    Workplace closures (=1) -0.0216** -0.0233** -0.0239**
    Workplace closures (=2) -0.0491** -0.0416** -0.042**
    Workplace closures (=3) -0.1980** -0.1896** -0.1903**
    Workplace closures (=1) in advanced economies -0.0021 -0.0001
    Workplace closures (>=2) in advanced economies -0.0306** -0.0286**
    School closures (=2) -0.0237** -0.0217** -0.0217**
    School closures (=3) -0.1098** -0.1085** -0.1086**
    Cancel public events (=2) -0.0369** -0.0358** -0.0358**
    Restrictions on internal movement (=2) -0.0220** -0.0226** -0.0229**
    International travel controls (=4) -0.0554** -0.0572** -0.0571**
   Close public transport (=1) -0.0439** -0.0443** -0.0443**
   Close public transport (=2) -0.0650** -0.0688** -0.0684**
Death rate (per million population)
    Daily national -0.0066** -0.0060** -0.0061**
Adjusted R-squared 0.759 0.759 0.759
Daily observations 22741 22741 22741
Countries covered 128 128 128
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Table B.6. The drivers of mobility: testing, isolating and mask wearing 
Baseline, Table 5 Variant 1 Variant 2 Variant 3
Dependent variable: ln(R)
    Constant  1.0947** 1.0553** 1.0545** 1.0447**
Containment policies
    Stay-at-home requirement (>=1) -0.0536** -0.0501** -0.0506** -0.0486**
    Workplace closures (=1) -0.0614** -0.0668** -0.0677** -0.0767**
    Workplace closures (>=2) -0.0767** -0.0736** -0.0742** -0.0778**
    School closures (>=2) -0.1773** -0.1615** -0.1615** -0.1615**
    Restrictions on gatherings (=2) -0.0393** -0.0397** -0.0404** -0.0448**
    Restrictions on gatherings (>=3) -0.0883** -0.0844** -0.0849** -0.0860**
    International travel controls (>=1) -0.0629** -0.0439** -0.0432** -0.0430**
Test and Trace policies
    Test=1 or 2, Trace =1 or 2 -0.1110** -0.0768** -0.0778** -0.0855**
    Test=3, Trace=1 -0.1364** -0.1015** -0.1034** -0.0998**
    Test=3, Trace=2 -0.2185** -0.1778** -0.1800** -0.1806**
    All Test & Trace combinations when deaths < 10 per million -0.0613** -0.0608** -0.0608** -0.0243**
   Isolating contact persons -0.2015** -0.2093** -0.1442**
   Isolating the sick -0.0186**
    All Test & Trace combinations with isolation of contact 
persons when deaths < 10 per million -0.1338**
Policies protecting the elderly
    Testing in care homes (=2) -0.0540** -0.0588** -0.0558** -0.0543**
    Restricting visits to care homes (>=1) -0.1840** -0.1869** -0.1884** -0.1865**
    Recommending elderly to stay at home -0.1022** -0.1010** -0.1025** -0.1022**
Other non-containment policies
    Mandatory mask wearing indoors -0.1370** -0.1133** -0.1131** -0.1103**
Death rates (per million population)
    Daily national -0.0358** -0.0379** -0.0378** -0.0374**
    Daily global -0.3637** -0.3358** -0.3373** -0.3385**
    Total national -0.0007** -0.0007** -0.0007** -0.0007**
Adjusted R-squared 0.597 0.599 0.599 0.603
Daily observations 17624 17624 17624 17624
Countries covered 147 147 147 147

































    Constant 1.0241** 1.0214** 1.0075** 1.0184** 1.0177**
Containment policies
    Stay-at-home requirement (=1) -0.0240** -0.0239** -0.0267** -0.0264** -0.0322**
    Stay-at-home requirement (=2) -0.0668** -0.0659** -0.0688** -0.0665** -0.0785**
    Stay-at-home requirement (=3) -0.1252** -0.1258** -0.1308** -0.1301** -0.1329**
    Workplace closures (=1) -0.0216** -0.0207** -0.0327** -0.034** -0.0342**
    Workplace closures (=2) -0.0491** -0.0506** -0.0604** -0.0587** -0.062**
    Workplace closures (=3) -0.1980** -0.1972** -0.2019** -0.2009** -0.1986**
    School closures (=2) -0.0237** -0.0261** -0.0315** -0.0247** -0.0333**
    School closures (=3) -0.1098** -0.1116** -0.1104** -0.0992** -0.1025**
    Cancel public events (=2) -0.0369** -0.0379** -0.0410** -0.0397** -0.0397**
    Restrictions on internal movement (=2) -0.0220** -0.0215** -0.0180** -0.0215** -0.0222**
    International travel controls (=4) -0.0554** -0.0554** -0.0576** -0.0537** -0.0504**
   Close public transport (=1) -0.0439** -0.0469** -0.0511** -0.0496** -0.0441**
   Close public transport (=2) -0.0650** -0.0655** -0.0703** -0.0646** -0.0632**
   Isolating contact persons 0.0322** 0.0221**
    Test=1 or 2, Trace =1 or 2 0.0276**
    Test=3, Trace=1 0.0430**
    Test=3, Trace=2 0.0732**
    Mandatory mask wearing indoors 0.0605**
    Mandatory mask wearing in public transports 0.0592**
    Mandatory mask wearing in shops 0.0644**
Death rate (per million population)
    Daily national -0.0066** -0.0066** -0.0066** -0.0071** -0.0060**
Adjusted R-squared 0.759 0.758 0.763 0.762 0.766
Daily observations 22741 22383 22190 22383 22249
Countries covered 128 126 126 126 125
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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1 Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic dramatically reduced people’s mobility. This was due in part to the lockdown
measures that governments adopted to reduce personal contacts, including travel restrictions, school and
business closures, and stay-at-home orders. Mobility also declined because people voluntarily reduced social
interactions out of fear of contracting the virus. The literature has documented these effects using a broad
range of aggregate mobility indicators provided by private companies such as Google, Apple, and SafeGraph
(Chetty et al., 2020; Glaeser et al., 2020; Goolsbee and Syverson, 2020; Maloney and Taskin, 2020).
This paper innovates relatively to the existing studies by showing that mobility patterns differed con-
siderably across gender and age groups. Our analysis is based on novel and confidential mobility indicators
provided by Vodafone for Italy, Portugal, and Spain at the provincial level. These data offer the unique
advantage of disaggregating mobility information across gender and age groups, making it possible to un-
cover important heterogeneous reactions to the pandemic and lockdown measures. This paper makes several
contributions.
First, the analysis contributes to the growing evidence about the disproportionate impact of the COVID-
19 crisis on women. This literature finds that some home production that in normal times can be outsourced
had to be performed within the household during the pandemic. And this burden fell disproportionately
on women. Hupkau and Petrangolo (2020), for example, find that in UK households women took on a
larger share of increased childcare needs, even though fathers became the primary childcare providers in
an important share of households. Alon et al. (2020) show that, contrary to past recessions, the current
crisis led to a stronger increase in female unemployment in the US. This is because women are more likely
to care for children when schools are closed and because they are employed in sectors more severely hit by
the pandemic, such as restaurants and personal care. Survey data also suggest that women face an unequal
burden in caring for children when schools are closed and are at a higher risk of facing a reduction in working
hours (Adams et al., 2020; Sevilla and Smith, 2020). In this paper we document that the disproportional
impact of the crisis on women is also visible in mobility patterns and examine the causes of this differential.
In this regard, this paper also contributes to the literature on the determinants of labor force participa-
tion. School closures and other lockdown measures reduce mobility in different ways across gender and thus
have a differential effect on labor supply. Previous studies have found that exogenous changes in the length of
school schedule impact female labor force participation (Berthelon et al., 2015). We provide high-frequency,
complementary evidence.
Second, this paper documents considerable heterogeneity in the impact of lockdowns across age groups.
These findings are quite relevant for the ongoing debate on the distribution of costs and benefits across
generations (Belot et al., 2020; Glover et al., 2020). While lockdowns protect mainly older people that are
more likely to develop serious medical conditions from COVID-19, they impose economic costs especially on
working age people that rely on labor income to support consumption.
Third, the heterogeneous impact of lockdowns across age can shed light on the scarring effects from the
crisis. For instance, a given reduction in aggregate mobility has different long-term effects if it is concentrated
on the young. Oreopoulos et al. (2012) find that individuals entering the labor force during a recession suffer
from substantial and persistent loss of earning; they also document that graduates who can switch quickly
to better firms suffer less. So a forced reduction in mobility has a particularly adverse and persistent effect
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Fourth, heterogeneous effects across gender and age raise important methodological considerations.
Lumping all groups together in estimating the effects of containment measures as done in most studies
could lead to aggregation bias and mismeasurement problems.
Fifth, in presence of repeated infection waves in several countries (as we write, many countries are
experiencing a strong resurgence) and in the context of an already weak economic activity, authorities need
to consider more nuanced containment measures. To design these measures, authorities should consider the
heterogeneous effects on different groups. This perspective is particularly important because the health risks
posed by COVID-19 are very heterogeneous across age, being much more severe for people aged 65 and
above. Therefore, some researches have argued for targeted measures to isolate older people without unduly
limiting the mobility and employment opportunities of younger people (Acemoglu et al., 2020).
Studying the effect of containment measures on mobility is a difficult task because the adoption of
lockdowns is an endogenous policy decision. For example, governments are more likely to impose measures
when health risks are more acute. At that time people tend to also reduce mobility voluntarily because
they fear being infected or infecting others. This raises the risk of detecting a spurious correlation between
lockdowns and mobility. To address the endogeneity concern, we use a regression discontinuity (RD) design
that focuses on high-frequency changes in mobility around specific lockdown measures, thereby reducing
the risk that other factors may affect mobility at the same time. In addition, we estimate local projections
in which we control for pre-existing mobility trends and for the severity of the country’s epidemic. We
further strengthen the identification by excluding those provinces that experienced early or particularly
severe outbreaks. In this case, the analysis looks at the mobility patterns in provinces less affected by
COVID-19 for which the adoption of national lockdowns was largely an exogenous event.
The results from the RD design show that the adoption of stay-at-home orders in Italy, Portugal, and
Spain led to a sharper contraction in women’s mobility relative to men’s. Stay-at-home orders coincided in
most provinces with school closures. To isolate the impact of school closures on mobility, we narrow the
analysis to provinces in Northern Italy that imposed school closures before stay-at-home orders. We find
that school closures led already to a considerable gender differential in mobility, highlighting the uneven role
of women in caring for children.
The findings based on local projections corroborate the results of the RD analysis, showing that lock-
downs had a disproportionate effect on the mobility of women. The differential impact is statistically signifi-
cant and quantitatively relevant. Among people aged 24 to 45, a full lockdown—including all measures used
by governments during the pandemic—reduces the number of women leaving home by almost 26 percent,
against an impact on men of about 21 percent.
The local projections also allow to examine the effects of rising COVID-19 cases on mobility for a given
level of the stringency of lockdowns. This captures the extent to which people decide to voluntarily limit
social interactions when the fear of contracting the virus becomes more acute. Examining this aspect is
very important because much of the public debate on the need for lockdowns centers on whether people can
autonomously change behavior when infection risks arise. The analysis shows that both men and women
significantly reduce mobility when infections increase and they do so with equal intensity.
Regarding the differential effects across age, RD designs show that stay-at-home orders disproportion-
ately reduce the mobility of working age people, especially those below 45 years of age. Local projections
provide additional evidence that lockdowns have a larger impact on younger cohorts. These findings are
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people have access to personal savings and possibly retirement income. Furthermore, younger workers often
have less stable job contracts that are more likely to be terminated during a crisis. Survey based evidence
confirms that younger people have been more likely to suffer an income loss during the pandemic (Belot
et al., 2020; Montenovo et al., 2020). The fact that lockdowns impose a disproportionate economic burden
on the young—while protecting mostly the old given the higher health risks— calls for policy intervention
to ensure inter-generational fairness (Glover et al., 2020).
Using local projections, we also explore if people of different age respond differently to rising infections.
Because COVID-19 poses much greater risks for people aged 65 and above, it could be expected that these
people are more likely to isolate themselves when infections rise. On the contrary, the analysis shows that
younger people reduce mobility more strongly when infections increase. This is consistent with survey level
evidence presented by Bordalo et al. (2020) showing that younger people are more alarmed by the risk of
contracting COVID-19.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents background information on the COVID-19 crises
in Italy, Portugal, and Spain, and the relative containment measures. Section 3 describes the data provided
by Vodafone. Section 4 and 5 present the analysis of the mobility patterns by gender and age, respectively.
Section 6 examines the robustness of the results. Section 7 concludes.
2 The COVID-19 crises in Italy, Portugal, and Spain
In this section we describe the evolution of the COVID-19 crises in Italy, Portugal, and Spain and the
lockdown measures adopted at the local and national level.
Italy. Italy was among the first countries to be hit by COVID-19 after China. On January 31, the Italian
government declared a state of emergency and stopped flights from and to China. Apart from two Chinese
tourists who were promptly isolated, there was no confirmed case until February 21 when a patient with
anomalous pneumonia was diagnosed with COVID-19 in Codogno, Lombardy. Shortly after that, new cases
were discovered in other towns in Lombardy and Veneto. On February 22, a decree imposed the quarantine
of more than 50,000 people from 11 municipalities (comuni) in Northern Italy (so called zone rosse). In other
areas of Emilia-Romagna, Lombardy, and Veneto (zone gialle) schools, theatres, clubs, and cinemas were
closed and social and sports events were suspended. On March 4, all schools and universities across Italy
were closed for two weeks and all sporting events could be played only behind closed doors until April 3. As
the outbreaks continued and the number of deaths soared, on March 8, all 12 provinces in Lombardy and 14
provinces in Piedmont, Emilia-Romagna, Veneto, and Marche, were put under lockdown. Two days later,
the lockdown was extended to the whole country. Steep penalties were announced for violators, including the
possibility of three months of imprisonment. On March 11, the government prohibited almost all commercial
activities except for supermarkets and pharmacies. On March 21, all non-essential businesses and industries
were closed, and movement of people was restricted. In May, many restrictions were progressively eased.
Freedom of movement across regions and other European countries was restored on June 3.
Portugal. The first cases of COVID-19 in Portugal were recorded on March 2. On March 18, the entire
Portuguese territory entered in a State of Emergency, which lasted until May 2. During the Easter week
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(concelhos) with few exceptions, closing all airports to civil transportation. On May 4, restrictions started
to be eased and small stores reopened. On May 18, nurseries, the last two years of the secondary school,
restaurants, cafes, medium-sized stores and some museums reopened.
Spain. The first case of a patient with COVID-19 in Spain was a foreign tourist on January 31. Broader
diffusion began by mid-February and all 50 provinces had confirmed cases by mid-March. A lockdown was
imposed on March 14. Starting March 30, all non-essential workers were ordered to remain at home for
the next two weeks. COVID-19 spread rapidly and by March 25, the official death toll in Spain surpassed
that of China with most cases concentrated in Madrid. The number of deaths peaked in early April and
progressively declined until June 1 which was the first day without COVID-19 related deaths. The first local
lockdown was announced on March 7 for a small municipality. On March 12, the lockdown was extended
to four municipalites in Catalunya with 70,000 people affected. On March 14, the entire country entered
in the state of emergency and many nonessential activities were closed, such as restaurants and museums.
Citizens were still permitted to travel to work and buy essential items. The authorities in some autonomous
communities, including the Basque Country, Murcia, Balearic Islands, Catalunya, announced additional
emergency measures. On March 28, all non-essential workers were ordered to stay home from March 30 to
April 9. Progressive easing of the lockdown started at the beginning of May. On May 11, the opening of
small shops, of terraces at half capacity, and of places of worship at one-third capacity was allowed in 26
provinces and territories comprising about half of the population.
3 A unique dataset
We use anonymized and aggregated data on mobility provided by Vodafone through a confidential agreement.
By analysing connections of mobile phones to cell towers, Vodafone can create mobility indexes differentiated
across gender and age groups using the information that customers provide when signing up for post-paid
contracts.1 The age groups include four categories: people aged between 18 and 24, between 25 and 44,
between 45 and 64, and 65 and above.2 For Spain and Portugal, however, some daily observations are
missing, especially for the oldest and youngest age groups. In these cases, we linearly interpolate the series
to have a balanced panel throughout the sample period.
The mobility indicator used in the analysis captures the percentage of people in a given province and
demographic group that leaves home in a day. The home location of each customer is identified by monitoring
cell connections during the night. The top 3 cells that a phone connects to between 10pm and 5am are
considered as home cells. A customer is recorded as leaving home if the phone connects to a cell different
from the home cells. More details on the data construction are provided in Lourenco et al. (2020).
The mobility patterns detected by Vodafone are broadly in line with those according to Apple and
Google data.3 Figure 1 shows that all indicators correlate fairly closely at the national level. Correlations
1These indicators were prepared by Vodafone’s Big Data and Artificial Intelligence team. To protect the privacy of individuals
and minority groups, the data have been provided in anonymized form, reporting the average mobility for a given gender and age
group at the provincial (NUTS3) level when a minimum of 50 customers are available. Furthermore, the data sharing protocol
was subject to technical and organizational controls including an ethical assessment of the analysis prior to its implementation.
2In a few cases, the age information is inferred. For example, in Spain, the age group 18–24 is separated from family contracts
based on several factors, including the amount of data used. Furthermore, in Portugal customers’ age is based on the sequential
number of personal identification cards that allow to infer people’s age with an error of five years at most.
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between the Vodafone indicator and the Apple and Google indicators range between 93 and 99 percent for
Italy and Portugal and are 72 and 88 percent for Spain. The geographical disaggregation of the Vodafone
data allows to appreciate the heterogeneity across provinces. In all the three countries, the interdecile range
of the mobility indicator is as large as 20 percentage points. Yet, such dispersion remains broadly constant
over time.
Figure 1: Mobility Levels from Apple, Google, and Vodafone
(a) Italy (b) Portugal
(c) Spain
Notes: The lines denote the country-level mobility levels. In the case of Vodafone, the line corresponds to the cross-province
population-weighted average of the percent of people moving, using 2018 population levels as weights; and the shaded areas
denote the cross-province interquartile range (dark blue) and the cross-province interdecile range (light blue). In the case of
Google, the line corresponds to the average of country-level mobility indicators at retail, grocery, parks, transit, and workplace
locations, where mobility is defined relative to pre-crisis levels. And in the case of Apple, the line denotes the country-level
indicator of mobility, which is computed from the number of requests made to Apple Maps for directions.
The key advantage provided by the Vodafone data is the ability to differentiate mobility across gender
and age groups. This makes it possible to examine whether lockdowns have heterogeneous effects on people’s
mobility depending on gender and age. Figure 2 provides preliminary evidence in this regard. Panel 2a shows
for each country the correlation between the stringency of lockdowns during the period of analysis and the
average mobility differential between women and men. In all countries lockdowns have been associated with
a larger drop in women’ mobility relative to men’s. The other three panels in Figure 2 show the correlation
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and above. The charts suggest that lockdowns reduce more strongly the mobility of working age people
relative to people aged 65 and above. The rest of the analysis will test more formally for these patterns
using RD approaches and local projections.
Figure 2: Mobility and Lockdown Stringency
(a) Women-men differential (b) 18–24, differential with 65+
(c) 25–44, differential with 65+ (d) 45–64, differential with 65+
Notes: Panel (a) presents a binned scatter plot showing the mobility differential between women and men over the stringency
of lockdowns during the period of analysis. Panel (b) to (d) present similar scatter plots but considering the differential in
percentage points between people in different age groups relative to people aged 65 and above. Each dot denotes the cross-
province average at any given time. The mobility indicator is residualized with respect to days of the week fixed effects. The
lines denote the linear fit.
4 Heterogeneous effects on mobility across gender
In this section, we examine whether lockdowns have a different effect on the mobility of women and men.
Assessing the impact of lockdowns on mobility is a challenging task because the decision to deploy lockdowns
is not random. For example, governments are more likely to impose lockdowns when health risks become
more acute. At that time, people voluntarily reduce social interactions because they fear being infected
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overplay the impact of lockdowns on mobility. Policymakers may also impose lockdowns when mobility is
too high, thus leading to a spurious association between lockdowns and high mobility.
To alleviate these endogeneity concerns we use two empirical strategies. First, we employ RD designs
that focus on high-frequency changes in mobility around specific lockdown measures, thus reducing the risk
that other factors may affect mobility at the same time. Second, we use local projections that control for
lagged mobility and for the severity of the country’s epidemic based on the number of new infections. To
further strengthen identification, local projections are estimated using data from provinces that did not
experience severe outbreaks and thus for which the adoption of national lockdowns was mostly an exogenous
event. The use of local projections is also helpful to examine how people voluntarily reduce mobility in
response to rising infections.
4.1 Regression discontinuity
To test whether lockdowns have unequal effects across gender, we first use an RD approach in a similar spirit
to Davis (2008), Anderson (2014), and Chetty et al. (2020). With respect to a standard cross-sectional RD
setting, in this case the running variable is time and the treatment date is a particular temporal threshold,
making this approach akin to an event study exercise. As in more standard RD, endogeneity is addressed by
considering a narrow bandwidth (in this case a time window) around the introduction of the treatment. The
identification assumption is that, within this interval, unobserved confounding factors affecting the outcome
variable are likely to be similar. In our context, this means that no other factors affecting mobility should
change close to national stay-at-home orders.4
Figure 3 uses a bin scatter plot to present preliminary evidence that lockdowns are associated with a
discontinuity in the mobility of women relative to men. Each dot represents the average mobility levels of
men and women calculated using 20 equally sized bins around the introduction of national stay-at-home
orders. We start by considering people aged between 25–44 for whom the differential effect of lockdowns
across gender is the greatest, as we will later show. Mobility data are residualized with respect to province
and day-of-the week fixed effects. The figure shows that the introduction of stay-at-home orders led to a
sharp drop in the mobility of both men and women. The percentage of people living their homes in a day
declined by about 15 points. Yet, the impact on women was stronger, as their mobility declined by about 3
percentage points more than for men.
In most provinces, the adoption of stay-at-home orders coincided with or rapidly followed the decision to
close schools. Therefore, the gender gap in Figure 3 could be driven by women carrying a disproportionate
burden in caring for children when they are at home. To shed light on this aspect, we take advantage
of the fact that five regions in Northern Italy closed schools well in advance of the national stay-at-home
order.5 Using mobility data from provinces in Northern Italy, Figure 4a presents an RD exercise with two
discontinuities: the first is set on February 23, the day when local schools closed, and the second one on
March 9, when the national lockdown was implemented. The divergence in mobility between men and women
started already at the time of school closures. Men’s mobility declined very marginally when schools closed,
while women’s mobility saw a clear discontinuity. This corroborates the hypothesis that women carry uneven
4Of course, the number of contagions surged in the weeks leading to the stay-at-home orders, which were imposed because
of this surge. However, the identifying assumption is that there was no discontinuity in the number of cases in the day of the
orders. To test if this assumption is valid, we did an RD on cases at the time of lockdowns. There is no clear discontinuity.
5Schools in Northern Italy closed on February 23. On March 4, the Italian government closed all schools and universities
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Figure 3: Impact of Stay-at-Home Orders on Mobility, by Gender
(Age group 25–44, percentage of people moving)
Notes: The chart shows the percentage of men and women moving divided into 20 equal-sized bins. The series are residualized
with respect to province and day-of-the-week fixed effects.
responsibilities in looking after the children when schools are closed.
Figure 4b provides additional evidence about the importance of school closures by examining the mobility
gender gap across all provinces in Northern Italy. The heat map reports the difference between the mobility
of men and women through time, with darker colors representing a decline in women’s mobility relative to
men’s. The mobility of men and women was similar before February 23. When schools closed, the heat map
shows darker colors across all provinces, reflecting a disproportionate reduction in women’s mobility. The
adoption of stay-at-home orders led to a further widening of the mobility gap.6
6Figure 4b provides also an additional insight. The provinces in figure 4b are listed in order of decreasing frequency of
COVID-19 cases as a share of the province population on March 9. The absence of a clear vertical pattern indicates that the
effects of school closures and lockdowns on the difference in mobility across gender was not correlated with the local intensity























VETTED AND REAL-TIME PAPERS
Figure 4: Impact of School Closures and Stay-at-Home Orders in Northern Italy
(Age group 25–44, percentage of people moving)
(a) Average impact across provinces
(b) Impact across each provinces
Notes: Panel (a) reports a binned scatter plot where the percentage of people moving is divided into 20 equal-sized
bins. The series are residualized with respect to province and day-of-the-week fixed effects. Panel (b) reports the
difference between men and women mobility in Friuli-Venezia-Giulia, Emilia-Romagna, Lombardia, Piemonte, and
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The differences in drop in mobility across age groups further confirm that school closures impacted
disproportionately women’s mobility. The analysis presented so far has focused on people aged between 25
and 44. These cohorts are more likely to have young kids that require home supervision when schools are
closed.7 A natural test of our conjecture is to test if the mobility gap was different for other age ranges.
To analyze the impact of lockdowns on the gender gap across all age groups and to test for the statistical
significance of the discontinuity at the time of the lockdown, we follow Anderson (2014) and estimate this
local linear regression:
mobi,g,a,t = αp + τdow + βstayj,t + φwomeni + γdatej,t
+θstayj,t × datej,t + λwomeni,a × stayj,t + νdatej,t × womeni + εi,g,a,t (1)
where mobi,g,a,t is the mobility indicator provided by Vodafone capturing the percentage of people moving in
province i, of gender g and age group a = {[18, 24]; [25, 44]; [45, 64]; [65+]}, at time t; stayj,t is the treatment
variable for country j (with i ∈ j), equal to one when the national stay-at-home orders are in place; womeni,a
is a dummy variable equal to one when the dependent variable refers to the mobility of women; datej,t is
the number of days since the introduction of the stay-at-home order; and αp and τdow are province and day-
of-the-week fixed effects. The coefficient β captures the effect of the stay-at-home orders on men’s mobility,
while λ+ β traces the effect on women’s mobility. Standard errors are clustered at the province level. The
identification assumption is that the term stayj,t × datet should absorb any smooth relationship between
the datej,t and the error term εi,g,a,t in the days around the introduction of the lockdown (Anderson, 2014).
This means that no other factor affecting mobility should change close to the national stay-at-home orders.
Consistent with Figure 3, we estimate equation (1) using a relatively narrow window of 20 days around
the adoption of stay-at-home orders since our identification strategy aims at estimating β and λ + β by
considering the mobility drop close to the introduction of lockdowns.
Table 1 reports the results for the baseline model. Column (2) shows that the mobility of women aged 25–
44 declined by 3 percentage points more than men’s when stay-at-home orders were imposed which coincided
in most provinces with school closures. Column (1) and (3) present the results of the same specification
for the age groups 18–24 and 45–64: the gap between women and men mobility is still present, statistically
significant, but smaller, equal to 2.3 and 1.7 percentage points respectively. Finally, Column (4) shows that
lockdowns no longer have a disproportionate effect on the mobility of women in the age group 65+. These
results show that the mobility gender gap is the largest for people aged 25–44 that are more likely to have
young children. Therefore, they suggest that childcare needs largely explain the disproportionate impact of
lockdowns on women’s mobility.
4.2 Local projections
The RD approach used in the previous section shows that the adoption of specific lockdown measures reduced
the mobility of women more forcefully. We now check if similar results hold when using local projections
that exploit the entire variation in the stringency of lockdowns over the period of analysis.
To alleviate endogeneity concerns about lockdowns—namely that they are more likely imposed when
7In Italy, as in other countries, grandparents often play an important role in taking care of the kids while parents work. How-
ever, because COVID-19 affects disproportionately old people, social contacts between old and young people were discouraged.
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Table 1: RD Estimate of the Gender Gap by Age Group
18–24 25-44 45–64 65+
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Stay-at-home -19.60*** -12.95*** -12.52*** -11.76***
(0.59) (0.46) (0.41) (0.46)
Women × stay-at-home -2.31*** -3.24*** -1.74*** 1.55***
(0.50) (0.35) (0.34) (0.57)
Observations 13,909 14,102 14,151 13,102
R-squared 0.87 0.86 0.87 0.82
Notes: The table reports the coefficient on the stay-at-home variable and the
coefficient on the interaction between the gender dummy and the stay at home
variable. All regressions include the gender dummy, a variable for the number
of days since the introduction of the stay-at-home order, the interaction terms
of the latter with the stay-at-home variable and with the gender dummy, and
province and day-of-the-week fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at
the province level. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
the epidemic is worsening and when mobility is too high—the local projections control for the number of
COVID-19 infections and for lagged mobility levels to capture pre-existing trends. Furthermore, we rely on an
identification strategy that takes advantage of the disaggregation of the Vodafone mobility data at the NUTS-
3 level. Italy, Portugal, and Spain imposed lockdowns on a national scale in reaction to localized outbreaks.
For example, in Italy the government imposed a national lockdown in early March even though most of the
infections were concentrated in a few provinces in Lombardy. Therefore, the adoption of national lockdowns
was largely exogenous to the conditions prevailing in provinces with relatively low infections. Leveraging on
this observation, we exclude from the regression sample of each country the provinces that (i) registered the
first 100 (cumulative) cases, (ii) had the highest number of COVID-19 cases by the end of June 2020, and
(iii) that had more than five percent of the country’s total confirmed cases when the lockdown stringency
index reached its maximum.8 The regression thus examines the mobility response in the regions less affected
by the virus for which the national lockdown was an exogenous event triggered by conditions elsewhere in
the country.
Formally, to assess the differential impact of lockdowns on women’s mobility, we estimate the following


























where variable mobi,g,a,t+h denotes the percentage of people moving in province i, of gender g and age a, at
time t+ h, with h = {1, . . . , 20} being the horizon; ln∆casesi,t−p is the log of daily COVID-19 cases, which
8These criteria lead to the exclusion of Bergamo, Brescia, Lodi, Milan, Torino, and Rome in Italy; Barcelona and Madrid
in Spain; and Área Metropolitana do Lisboa, Área Metropolitana do Porto, Cávado, and Região de Aveiro, Tâmega e Sousa in
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is used to track the stage of the pandemic, with p being the lag length (set to a week to control for the
persistence of the variable); and lockj,t−p is an index measuring the stringency of lockdowns for country j
(with i ∈ j), which also enters the specification with p lags to account for persistence.9 The specification also
features lags of the dependent variable to control for pre-existing trends; province and gender fixed effects
to capture time-invariant characteristics specific to provinces, men, and women; and time-fixed effects to
control for those factors that are common to all provinces. Standard errors are clustered at the province
level.
To uncover the differential impact of lockdowns on women, we include an interaction term between the
lockdown stringency index and a gender dummy womeni,a, which is equal to one when the dependent variable
refers to the mobility of women. Thus, the coefficient δh0 isolates the impact of lockdowns on men’s mobility
and δh0 + γ
h
0 the one on women’s mobility. The regressions are estimated on a sample of 163 provinces in
Italy, Spain, and Portugal between January 1 and June 29, 2020.
Figure 5 shows the impact of a full lockdown that includes all measures used during the pandemic—
among which travel restrictions, school and business closures, and stay-at-home orders—on the mobility of
men and women aged 24 to 45. The responses in panel 5a show that a full lockdown leads to a very significant
decline in mobility for both men and women. Mobility starts to decline when the lockdown is introduced,
reaching the through after seven days. Mobility gradually resumes afterwards as the lockdown stringency
impulse dissipates, as shown in Figure A.1 of Appendix A.
Most importantly, panel 5a reveals that lockdowns have an uneven effect on mobility across gender,
impacting women more strongly. Women’s mobility falls by 26 percentage points seven days after the
introduction of lockdowns, while that of men declines by about 21 percentage points. Panel 5b shows that
the differential between the mobility of women and that of men is statistically significant until the lockdown
impulse weakens 15 days after the initial tightening.
These results corroborate the findings of the RD analysis that lockdowns tend to impact women dispro-
portionately. The RD analysis also showed that the gender differential is the largest for people aged 25–44,
probably because they are more likely to have young children that have to be supervised at home when
schools are closed. To check for the robustness of these findings, we re-estimate the local projections for
the age groups 18–24, 45–64, and 65+. Table 2 reports the largest mobility gap between women and men
in response to a full lockdown over the 20-day horizon of the local projections. We confirm that women’s
mobility falls the most relative to men’s for people aged 25–44, with a differential of 4.7 percentage points.
The gender gap declines to 3.6 percentage points for people aged 18–24 and to 3.7 percentage points for those
aged 45–64. For people in the age group 65+, the fall in women’s mobility is statistically indistinguishable
from the men’s one. These results are thus closely aligned with those of the RD analysis.
Besides capturing the impact of lockdowns, the local projection in equation (3) also measures how
mobility responds to an increase in COVID-19 infections holding constant the stringency of lockdowns. This
is an important issue because during the pandemic people voluntarily reduced exposure to each other as
they feared contracting the virus. For example, Aum et al. (2020), Goolsbee and Syverson (2020), and
Maloney and Taskin (2020) document that mobility was tightly correlated with the spread of COVID-19
9We use the lockdown stringency index provided by the University of Oxford’s Coronavirus Government Response Tracker.
This index is a simple average of nine sub-indicators capturing school closures, workplace closures, cancellations of public events,
gatherings restrictions, public transportation closures, stay-at-home requirements, restrictions on internal movement, controls
on international traveling, and public information campaigns, both at the subnational and national level. Since we want to
measure the impact of actual restrictions at the national level, we re-construct the index excluding public information campaigns
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Figure 5: Impact of a Full Lockdown on Mobility, by Gender
(Age group 25–44, percentage of people moving)
(a) Men vs Women (b) Women-men differential
Notes: The x-axes denote the number of days, the lines denote the point estimates, and the shaded areas correspond to 90
percent confidence intervals computed with standard errors clustered at the province level.
Table 2: Gender Gap at the Trough of the Estimated Response
18–24 25-44 45–64 65+
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lockdown stringency -27.07*** -20.60*** -19.75*** -15.19***
(1.80) (1.60) (1.57) (1.77)
Women × lockdown stringency -3.58*** -4.73*** -3.69*** 2.33
(0.95) (0.67) (0.73) (1.46)
Days after the shock 7 7 7 7
Observations 18,798 18,798 18,830 17,872
Provinces 163 163 163 157
R-squared 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.91
Notes: The table reports the coefficient on lockdown stringency and the coeffi-
cient on the interaction term between the gender dummy and lockdown strin-
gency at the trough of the estimated response. All regressions include the con-
temporaneous value and/or seven lags of the stringency index, the log of daily
cases, the interaction between a gender dummy and the stringency index, and
province, gender, and time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
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even after controlling for government lockdowns. In line with this literature, the specification in equation
(2) sheds light on the strength of voluntary social distancing by capturing the response of mobility to rising
COVID-19 infections for a given lockdown stringency.10 The interaction term between daily COVID-19
infections and the gender dummy reveals if the extent of voluntary social distancing differs between men and
women. Specifically, the coefficient βh0 measures the extent of voluntary social distancing for men, while the
coefficients βh0 + ψ
h
0 reflect the response of women.
Figure 6 shows how mobility responds to rising COVID-19 infections for a given lockdown stringency.
An increase in COVID-19 cases has a negative effect on the mobility of both men and women. A doubling
of daily COVID-19 cases leads to a contraction in mobility by about 0.3 percentage points 20 days after the
introduction of the lockdowns. The effect is similar across men and women. Panel 6b shows indeed that
there is no statistically difference across gender in how mobility responds to rising infections.
Figure 6: Impact of a Doubling of COVID-19 Cases on Mobility, by Gender
(Age group 25–44, percentage of people moving)
(a) Men vs Women (b) Women-men differential
Notes: The x-axes denote the number of days, the lines denote the point estimates, and the shaded areas correspond to 90
percent confidence intervals computed with standard errors clustered at the province level.
10Besides reacting to the spread of COVID-19, people may opt to voluntarily self distance also in response to other factors,
such as public health announcements, news about celebrities being infected, or even the adoption of government lockdowns. As
such, the analysis may underestimate the true extent of voluntary social distancing. Also, as shown by Adda (2016), higher
mobility might lead to faster spread of viral diseases, generating some reverse causality between the outcome variables and
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5 Heterogeneous effects on mobility across age groups
In this section, we examine if lockdowns have a different impact on mobility depending on people’s age. In
line with the analysis on the effects across gender, we first examine the data using an RD approach. We
then revisit the evidence using local projections which also allow us to examine if people respond differently
to rising infections depending on their age.
5.1 Regression discontinuity
We study the impact of stay-at-home orders on different age groups using the RD framework described in
section 4.1. Panel 7a shows graphical evidence of the impact of stay-at-home orders on the mobility of each
age group. Each dot captures the average mobility of both women and men in a given age group from 20
days before to 20 days after the adoption of stay-at-home orders. We see that lockdowns drastically reduced
people’s mobility across all age groups.
Yet, the mobility drop was significantly stronger for younger cohorts. This is more clearly illustrated
in panel 7b which shows the estimated mobility contraction for each age group using an RD specification
akin to 1, with the associated 90 percent confidence intervals. The percentage of people below 25 years of
age leaving home in a day declined by more than 20 points when stay-at-home orders were imposed. The
mobility drop becomes progressively smaller for older people, being equal to only 11 percentage points for
people aged 65 and above.
Figure 7: Impact of a Stay-at-Home Orders on Mobility, by Age
(Percentage of people moving)
(a) Regression discontinuity (b) Estimated impacts
Notes: Panel 7a presents a binned scatterplot where the people moving is divided in 20 equally sized bins. The series is
residualized with respect to province, gender day-of-the-week fixed effects. Panel 7b reports the estimates of the percentage
drop in people moving by age group. Standard errors are clustered at the province level. See also table 5.
These results show that lockdowns tend to disproportionally impact the mobility of younger cohorts.
This is not surprising if we consider that the mobility of people aged 65 and above—most of whom are
retirees—was already significantly lower prior to lockdowns, as illustrated in panel 7a. Younger people
have instead to leave their homes on a daily basis to reach their work places and bring children to schools.
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effects on their employment opportunities.
5.2 Local projections
We now assess the impact of lockdowns across age groups using local projections based on the same identi-
fication strategy discussed in Section 4.2. Thus, the local projections control for the number of COVID-19
infections, lagged mobility, and are estimated using data from provinces that did not experience early and/or
major outbreaks and thus for whom the adoption of national lockdowns was largely exogenous. Formally,





























The specification features interaction terms between the lockdown stringency index and age group dum-
mies agegroupai,g, with a = {1 = [18, 24]; 2 = [25, 44]; 3 = [45, 64]}, where the excluded category is the age
group 65+. Hence, the impact of lockdowns on the mobility of people aged 65+ at horizon h is captured




0 . The specification also includes
interaction terms between COVID-19 infections and age groups to test whether the strength of voluntary
social distancing differs across age. For a given level of lockdown stringency, the impact of rising COVID-19





Figure 8 shows the effects of lockdowns on the mobility of different age groups. As shown in panel
8a, mobility declines sharply across all age categories during the first ten days after the introduction of a
lockdown. Yet, the younger cohorts experience a considerably larger drop in mobility, reaching a trough of
30 percentage points nine days after the introduction of lockdowns for people aged 18–24.11
To illustrate the differences across age groups more clearly, panel 8b shows the mobility differential of
each age group relative to people aged 65+. The mobility differential of those aged 18–24 compared to people
65+ is the largest and becomes statistically significant since the beginning of the projection horizon. The
drop in mobility for the age groups 25–44 and 45–64 becomes statistically larger relative to people 65+ a few
days after the lockdown stringency impulse. These findings corroborate the results from the RD analysis in
the previous section, showing that lockdowns impact the mobility of younger cohorts disproportionally.
The local projections also shed light on whether the extent of voluntary social distancing differs across
age groups. Panel 9a shows that the youngest cohorts react most forcefully to a rise in infections. A doubling
of COVID-19 cases leads to a fall in mobility by about one percentage point after 20 days for people aged 18–
24. A rise in infections leads also to reduction in mobility for people aged 25–44 and 45–64, even though the
effect is more modest. Mobility remains instead broadly unchanged for people aged 65+, actually increasing
marginally towards the end of the projection horizon. Panel 9b confirms that mobility declines more for all
working-age groups relative to people 65+.
These results are somewhat surprising because people aged 65+ face much greater health risks from
COVID-19 and should thus be more prone to isolate themselves when infections increase. Two considerations
11The mobility dynamics reflect the underlying impulse to the lockdown stringency that dissipates after two weeks as illus-
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Figure 8: Impact of a Full Lockdown on Mobility, by Age Group
(Percentage of people moving)
(a) Age groups (b) Differential with 65+
Notes: The x-axes denote the number of days, the lines denote the point estimates, and the shaded areas correspond to 90
percent confidence intervals computed with standard errors clustered at the province level.
may explain our findings. First, the rise in infections reduces business activity in contact-intensive businesses,
such as bars and restaurants, as people fear becoming infected. This in turn reduces employment in those
sectors where many young people tend to work. Second, the larger response in the mobility of the young may
reflect their stronger concerns about the virus. This is consistent with the evidence presented in Bordalo
et al. (2020). Based on a survey of 1,500 Americans in May 2020, they find that perceptions about the health
risks posed by COVID-19 decline sharply with age. The fact that younger generations seem more sensitive
to the fear factor—measured as doubling COVID-19 cases—could also reflect that younger generations use
more media and social media which emphasize the danger.
Figure 9: Impact of a Doubling of COVID-19 Cases on Mobility, by Age Group
(Percentage of people moving)
(a) Age groups (b) Differential with respect to 65+
Notes: The x-axes denote the number of days, the lines denote the point estimates, and the shaded areas correspond to 90
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6 Robustness
In this section we test the robustness of our results along several dimensions. We start by re-examining in
Table 3 the impact of lockdowns on mobility across gender for peopled aged 25–44 based on the RD analysis.
Column (1) reports the differential impact between women and men from the baseline specification in section
4.1. It shows that lockdowns lead to a disproportionate decline in women’s mobility. These results are based
on a 20-day window before and after the adoption of stay-at-home orders. In column (2) we show that
similar results are obtained if we shrink the regression window to 10 days to further limit possible bias from
unobservable confounders. The results are also robust in column (3) to excluding the regions in Northern
Italy that introduced lockdown measures, such as school closures, before the national stay-at-home order, as
shown in Figure 4a and 4b. In columns (4) and (5) we exclude, one at a time, data for Portugal and Spain
for which the mobility series are interpolated. The differential impact on women’s mobility is confirmed
on these different samples. Finally, in column (6) we control for the moving average of daily COVID-19 at
the province level to reduce concerns of omitted confounders that may have a discontinuous effect on the
mobility. The inclusion of this control, beyond province and day of the week fixed effects does not alter the
results. Finally, since the mobility indicators is bounded between 0 and 100 percent, we verify in column (7)
that the results are robust to applying a logistic transformation.
Table 3: Robustness of the RD Results by Gender
Baseline 10-day Excl. North. Excluding Excluding Controlling Logistic
window Italy Portugal Spain for cases transformation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Stay at home -12.95*** -8.99*** -12.82*** -14.42*** -13.04*** -11.69*** -0.62***
(0.459) (0.424) (0.548) (0.440) (0.454) (0.469) (0.024)
Women × stay-at-home -3.24*** -3.07*** -3.07*** -3.58*** -3.79*** -3.25*** -0.13***
(0.353) (0.431) (0.442) (0.403) (0.149) (0.352) (0.018)
Observations 14,102 7,228 11,150 12,052 10,742 14,098 14,291
R-squared 0.86 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.92 0.86 0.87
Notes: The table reports the coefficients of an interaction term between the gender dummy and and stay-at-home variable.
All regressions include the gender dummy, a variable for the number of days since the introduction of the stay-at-home
order, the interaction terms of the latter with the stay-at-home variable and with the gender dummy, and province
and day-of-the-week fixed effects. Column (6) considers a 20-day window and controls for the moving average of daily
COVID-19 cases. Standard errors are clustered at the province level. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
We also verify if the results are robust across provinces with different characteristics. In Table 4 we
re-run the RD analysis splitting the sample depending on whether provinces are above or below the median
level of GDP per capita, population density, and population size. Furthermore, we split the sample based on
whether provinces as considered rural or not by the Eurostat. Across all these samples, lockdowns continue
to have a disproportionate effect on the mobility of women, thus confirming that the results are not driven
by provinces with peculiar characteristics.
Following a similar set of robustness tests, Table 5 and Table 6 corroborate the RD findings that lock-
downs have a stronger impact on the mobility of younger cohorts.
We also perform various robustness tests for findings of the local projections. As discussed in section 4.2,
the local projections are estimated on a sample that excludes provinces with early and/or large outbreaks.
While this approach mitigates endogeneity concerns regarding the introduction of lockdowns, it may affect
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Table 4: Robustness of the RD Results by Gender across Provinces
GDP pc GDP pc Pop. density Pop. density Population Population Rural Not rural
below median above median below median above median below median above median
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Stay-at-home -12.166*** -14.141*** -11.588*** -14.617*** -10.985*** -14.826*** -15.930*** -11.902***
(0.716) (0.512) (0.682) (0.538) (0.641) (0.588) (0.744) (0.534)
Women × stay at home -2.655*** -3.859*** -2.849*** -3.648*** -3.502*** -2.974*** -3.379*** -3.185***
(0.555) (0.415) (0.644) (0.253) (0.372) (0.595) (0.389) (0.462)
Observations 7,203 6,899 7,293 6,809 6,992 7,110 3,695 10,407
R-squared 0.861 0.880 0.817 0.915 0.876 0.838 0.881 0.852
NUTS3 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Days of week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table reports the coefficients of an interaction term between the gender dummy and and stay-at-home variable. All regressions include
the gender dummy, a variable for the number of days since the introduction of the stay-at-home order, the interaction terms of the latter with the
stay-at-home variable and with the gender dummy, and province and day-of-the-week fixed effects. Column (1) and (2) are estimated splitting the
sample above and below the median of GDP per capita in a given province for 2018. Column (3) and (4) splits the sample below and above the median
of population density as measured by the population per squared km in 2018. Column (5) and (6) reports results splitting the sample below and above
the median of population in 2018. Column (7) and (8) reports the coefficients estimated splitting the sample according to whether the province is
considered rural or not according to Eurostat. Standard errors are clustered at the province level. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
Table 5: Robustness of the RD Results by Age
Baseline 10-day Excl. North. Excluding Excluding Controlling Logistic
window Italy Portugal Spain for cases transformation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Stay-at-home -11.515*** -9.107*** -11.015*** -12.346*** -12.707*** -10.486*** -0.515***
(0.441) (0.429) (0.537) (0.459) (0.354) (0.425) (0.020)
18–24 × stay at home -9.238*** -6.992*** -8.932*** -10.854*** -9.333*** -9.124*** -0.412***
(0.505) (0.461) (0.630) (0.468) (0.464) (0.502) (0.020)
25–44 × stay at home -2.526*** -0.752* -3.031*** -3.127*** -1.354*** -2.453*** -0.122***
(0.445) (0.447) (0.550) (0.485) (0.244) (0.435) (0.021)
45–64 × stay at home -1.482*** 0.244 -2.361*** -1.957*** 0.708*** -1.421*** -0.063***
(0.489) (0.504) (0.597) (0.542) (0.196) (0.478) (0.023)
Observations 55,264 28,258 43,456 47,672 42,360 55,248 55,264
R-squared 0.852 0.847 0.838 0.834 0.919 0.857 0.864
Notes: The table reports the coefficients of an interaction term between the age groups dummies and the stay-at-home
variable. All regressions include the age group dummy, a variable for the number of days since the introduction of the
stay-at-home order, the interaction terms of the latter with the stay-at-home variable and with the age group dummy, and
province and day-of-the-week fixed effects. Column (6) considers a 20-day window and controls for the moving average of
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Table 6: Robustness of the RD results by Age across Provinces
GDP pc GDP pc Pop. density Pop. density Population Population Rural Not rural
below median above median below median above median below median above median
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Stay at home -9.866*** -13.328*** -9.876*** -13.186*** -11.278*** -11.730*** -13.559*** -13.559***
(0.649) (0.534) (0.725) (0.437) (0.656) (0.603) (0.661) (0.661)
18-24 × stay at home -8.307*** -10.188*** -8.359*** -10.327*** -8.069*** -10.405*** -10.039*** -10.039***
(0.779) (0.621) (0.829) (0.508) (0.668) (0.707) (0.693) (0.693)
25-44 × stay at home -3.463*** -1.666*** -2.937*** -2.293*** -0.950* -4.074*** -3.415*** -3.415***
(0.748) (0.434) (0.799) (0.352) (0.549) (0.648) (0.541) (0.541)
45-64 × stay at home -2.970*** -0.007 -2.978*** -0.087 -0.178 -2.764*** -1.550*** -1.550***
(0.778) (0.542) (0.891) (0.325) (0.608) (0.737) (0.538) (0.538)
Observations 27,914 27,350 28,115 27,149 27,089 28,175 14,659 14,659
R-squared 0.854 0.870 0.810 0.908 0.865 0.840 0.876 0.876
NUTS3 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Days of week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Gender FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table reports the coefficients of an interaction term between the age dummy and and stay-at-home variable. All regressions include the age
dummy, a variable for the number of days since the introduction of the stay-at-home order, the interaction terms of the latter with the stay-at-home
variable and with the gender dummy, and province, gender and day-of-the-week fixed effects. Column (1) and (2) are estimated splitting the sample
above and below the median of GDP per capita in a given province for 2018. Column (3) and (4) splits the sample below and above the median of
population density as measured by the population per squared km in 2018. Column (5) and (6) reports results splitting the sample below and above
the median of population in 2018. Column (7) and (8) reports the coefficients estimated splitting the sample according to whether the province is
considered rural or not according to Eurostat. Standard errors are clustered at the province level. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
impacted by the virus. Thus, we test if our findings are robust to the inclusion of those provinces. Figure
10 shows the coefficients on the interaction terms that capture the differential impact of lockdowns and
COVID-19 cases on mobility across gender and age groups. Panels 10a and 10b confirm that lockdowns hit
women’s mobility disproportionately and that voluntary social distancing was broadly similar across gender.
Panels 10c and 10d also corroborate the baseline results that lockdowns and voluntary social distancing took
a larger toll on younger cohorts. In terms of magnitudes, the estimated effects are virtually identical to those
in the baseline.
We also examine if the results are robust to excluding time fixed effects which are used to capture
movements in mobility that are common across provinces but are unrelated to the dynamics of lockdown
stringency and COVID-19 infections.12 One could argue that controlling for them in the local projections
may saturate the specification given the high-frequency of the data. We thus replace time fixed effects
with day-of-the-week fixed effects. Panels 11a and 11b of Figure 11 confirm the disproportional impact of
lockdowns on women’s mobility compared to men’s, as well as that rising infection do not generally have
a statistically significant different effect across gender. If anything, the women-men mobility differential in
response to lockdowns appear more persistent than with time fixed effects. Similarly, without time fixed
effects, panel 11c shows that lockdowns are still found to impact more strongly the mobility of younger
people. Finally, panel 11d shows that the baseline findings about the impact of rising COVID-19 cases on
the mobility of different age groups are robust to replacing time fixed effects with day-of-the-week fixed
effects.
Another possible concern with the local projections is that the results could be affected by the linear
interpolation of the missing observations for Portugal and Spain. Thus, we re-estimate the local projections
excluding one of these two countries at a time.13 Figure 12 presents the results of the impact of lockdowns
and voluntary social distancing when data for Portugal are excluded. Figure 13 repeats the exercise excluding
12Such movements could be caused by public announcements by the government, public health officials, and international
organizations, or by news about celebrities being infected.
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Figure 10: Impact of Lockdowns and COVID-19 Cases using Full Sample
(Percentage of people moving)
(a) Impact of a full lockdown,
women-men differential
(b) Impact of a doubling of COVID-19 cases,
women-men differential
(c) Impact of a full lockdown,
differential with respect to 65+
(d) Impact of a doubling of COVID-19 cases,
differential with respect to 65+
Notes: The x-axes denote the number of days, the lines denote the point estimates, and the shaded areas correspond to 90
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Figure 11: Impact of Lockdowns and COVID-19 Cases using Day-of-the-Week Fixed Effects
(Percentage of people moving)
(a) Impact of a full lockdown,
women-men differential
(b) Impact of a doubling of COVID-19 cases,
women-men differential
(c) Impact of a full lockdown,
differential with respect to 65+
(d) Impact of a doubling of COVID-19 cases,
differential with respect to 65+
Notes: The x-axes denote the number of days, the lines denote the point estimates, and the shaded areas correspond to 90
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Spain. In both cases, the results closely mimic those in the baseline analysis. The only difference is that an
increase in COVID-19 cases tends to have a larger impact on women’s mobility relative to men’s, especially
when Spain is excluded in panel 13b. Yet, the point estimates are quantitatively very small.
Figure 12: Impact of Lockdowns and COVID-19 Cases Excluding Portugal
(Percentage of people moving)
(a) Impact of a full lockdown,
women-men differential
(b) Impact of a doubling of COVID-19 cases,
women-men differential
(c) Impact of a full lockdown,
differential with respect to 65+
(d) Impact of a doubling of COVID-19 cases,
differential with respect to 65+
Notes: The x-axes denote the number of days, the lines denote the point estimates, and the shaded areas correspond to 90
percent confidence intervals computed with standard errors clustered at the province level.
As in the case of the RD analysis, we also verified that the results of the local projections are robust
to applying a logistic transformation to the mobility indicator and to splitting the sample depending on
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Figure 13: Impact of Lockdowns and COVID-19 Cases Excluding Spain
(Percentage of people moving)
(a) Impact of a full lockdown,
women-men differential
(b) Impact of a doubling of COVID-19 cases,
women-men differential
(c) Impact of a full lockdown,
differential with respect to 65+
(d) Impact of a doubling of COVID-19 cases,
differential with respect to 65+
Notes: The x-axes denote the number of days, the lines denote the point estimates, and the shaded areas correspond to 90
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7 Conclusions
We have used unique mobility indicators provided by Vodafone which differentiate by gender and age char-
acteristics to shed light on several key themes that have emerged during the COVID-19 pandemic.
First, the analysis provides novel evidence about the disproportionate impact of the crisis on women.
Lockdown measures reduce the mobility of women more than men’s. This seems largely due to women
carrying an uneven burden in caring for children when schools are closed. Stay-at-home orders have indeed
a larger impact on women’s mobility especially for those aged between 25 and 44 that are more likely to
have young children. Furthermore, evidence from a few regions in Northern Italy that closed schools before
adopting stay-at-home orders shows that the mobility gender gap opened already at the time of school
closures. In this respect, this paper contributes to the broader literature on the determinants of labor force
participation. Previous studies have found that (exogenous changes in the) length of school schedules impact
female labor force participation (Berthelon et al., 2015.) Our study provides complementary high-frequency
evidence.
These findings warn about a possible widening of gender inequality, as women may compromise their
employment opportunities if they have to stay at home to care for children. These concerns are further
heightened by the fact that women tend to be employed in contact-intensive sectors—such hospitality, per-
sonal care, and retail—that have been more severely impacted by the pandemic. Targeted policy intervention
is required to support women during the pandemic, for example by offering parental leave to both men and
women to encourage equal burden sharing in caring for children when schools are closed.
Second, the analysis contributes to the debate about the uneven effects of the crisis across age groups. By
containing the spread of the virus, lockdowns benefit especially people above 65 years of age because they face
much greater health risks from COVID-19. The economic costs of lockdowns fall instead disproportionately
on working age people. The analysis shows that lockdowns lead to a stronger reduction in the mobility of
younger people, for example by preventing them from reaching their work places and bringing children to
school.
Interestingly, the mobility of younger people responds more strongly also to rising infections, for a given
level of the stringency of lockdowns. Consistent with survey evidence, this could be because younger people
are more concerned about the virus despite being less likely to develop severe health conditions. Or it
may capture that rising infections reduce business activities in contact-intensive sectors, such as bars and
restaurants, leaving many young people that work in those sectors unemployed.
The disproportionate impact of lockdowns on the mobility of the young is particularly concerning because
young workers depend on labor income to sustain consumption while older people have access to larger
personal saving and often receive stable retirement income. Younger workers also tend to have less stable
job contracts that are more likely to be terminated during a crisis. These considerations highlight the need
for a social pact across generations to at least partially compensate younger workers for the economic losses
they face because of lockdowns. This is essential not only from a fairness standpoint but also to ensure
enough public support to deploy lockdown measures when needed.
Third, the results on the differential effects on age groups provide insights on the possible long-term effects
of the lockdown. The fact that younger generations reduced mobility more the older generations during the
lockdown suggests that the scarring effects could be long lasting. This effect would be compounding the
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This is a preliminary insight that should be investigated further in the future.
Fourth, the fact that different demographic groups react differently to stay-at-home orders, school clo-
sures, and COVID-19 cases can provide important inputs for the formulation of targeted policies in the
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Appendix A. Lockdown stringency dynamics
To better understand the dynamics uncovered by the local projections regarding how lockdowns affect
mobility, it is helpful to examine how the stringency of lockdowns evolves over the local projection horizon.
Panel A.1a shows that a lockdown tightening tends to gradually decline and dissipate after about two weeks.
These estimated dynamics reflect the way in which Italy, Portugal, and Spain have adjusted their lockdown
stringency during the sample of analysis. As illustrated in panel A.1b, countries have adjusted the stringency
of lockdowns rather frequently.
Figure A.1: Lockdown Stringency Dynamics
(a) Impact of a full lockdown on lockdown
stringency
(Percentage of people moving)
(b) Lockdown stringency
(Index)
Notes: In panel A.1a, the x-axis denotes the number of days, the line denotes the point estimates, and the shaded area
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We analyse the short-term impact of social distancing measures on the 
US labour market, using a panel threshold model with high frequency 
(weekly) data on unemployment across US states. We find that changes 
in the restrictiveness of mandated social distancing, as measured by 
the Oxford Stringency Index, exert a strong immediate impact on initial 
unemployment.  The unemployment rate is not immediate affected but 
follows within a very short time (two to four weeks). We also document 
a substantial asymmetry between tightening and easing: the impact 
of tightening restrictions is twice as large as that of easing them. The 
state of the endemic, proxied either by cases or fatalities, constitutes a 
marginal factor.
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1 Introduction 
The Covid-19 pandemic has led to unprecedented economic decline. Since February 2020, poli-
cymakers around the globe have introduced several emergency measures such as social distanc-
ing and the wearing of masks, restrictions to mobility and travel and shutting down large parts 
of the economy, including firms, workplaces and schools. The aim to slow down the spread of 
the virus (flatten the curve) led to the harsh restrictions (lockdown). During the summer of 2020, 
many restrictions were lifted or relaxed, only to be reinstated when infections surged again dur-
ing the autumn and winter. However, However, the lockdown has been associated with a deep 
economic recession. Following Barro et al. (2020), the losses in output and consumption at-
tributed to the current virus exceed those of the Spanish flu, even under conservative assump-
tions.  
The key question for policymakers is how to manage the trade-off between the spread of the 
virus and the severity of the lockdown measures. Dealing with this trade-off is a major challenge 
under pandemic conditions (Eichenbaum et al., 2020). 
The pandemic shifted both the supply and demand curve in the economy. On the supply side, 
infections and lockdowns worsened labour supply and productivity. On the demand side, layoffs 
and income losses (because of morbidity, quarantines, and unemployment) lowered household 
consumption and firms’ investment. For example, more than one half of participants surveyed 
reported substantial income and wealth losses. Large drops in consumption, especially in travel 
and clothing, are also involved (Coibion et al., 2020). The high uncertainty with respect to the 
path, duration and impact of the pandemic might create downward spirals that dampen busi-
ness and consumer confidence, with further job losses due to the anticipation of lower future 
demand. Higher credit default and non-performing loans might contribute to tighter lending 
standards. Guerrieri et al. (2020) argue that supply shocks associated with the Covid-19 pan-
demic are amplified by changes in aggregate demand, especially shutdowns, layoffs and the exit 
of firms. 
The appropriate design of policies is critical, as massive losses can be involved. However, empir-
ical evidence on the impact of policies is rather scarce. Several studies have discussed the impact 
of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPI) on the evolution of the pandemic, the latter meas-
ured by the growth rate of infections in OECD member states (Pozo et al., 2020) or the decline 
in the virus reproduction rates (Brauner et al., 2020). The interventions are found to be success-
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the contagion, to the order of 61 million Covid-19 cases in six major countries (China, South 
Korea, Italy, Iran, France, and the US).  
We provide new evidence on the short run impact of social distancing measures and the state 
of the endemic on the labour market, using high frequency labour market data from the US. 
The next section provides a summary of existing studies of the economic impact of social dis-
tancing. Section 3 presents the broad trends of the US labour market during the ‘great lock-
down’. Section 4 explains the index of restrictiveness used and section 5 presents the main re-
sults from our panel estimates allowing for asymmetric effects, using data for US states close to 
40 weekly data observations per state.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Studies of the economic impact of social distancing 
A large number of studies has already investigated the impact of the lockdown on the economy, 
although mostly from a model-specific angle concentrating on the early phase of the pandemic.  
Bodenstein et al. (2020) stress that the absence of social distancing may amplify the costs over 
longer time intervals. To lower the costs in economic terms, social distancing should be skewed 
towards non-essential industries and professions that can be performed from home. Due to in-
put-output linkages, however, even non-targeted industries can be affected. According to Get-
achev (2020), voluntary distancing is very important for both flattening the infection curve and 
limiting damage to the economy over the course of the endemic. Laeven (2020) emphasises that 
producers of intermediates tend to be more affected by the crisis if they sell le their output to 
industrial sectors restricted by social distancing.  
Based on costly disasters from the past, Ludvigson et al. (2020) estimate the costs of the pan-
demic for the US. While past disasters were mostly locally concentrated and rather short-lived, 
the Covid-19 shock is modelled as a sequence of large disasters in a VAR environment. Even 
under a conservative scenario, the pandemic will lead to cumulative losses in industrial produc-
tion of 20% and in employment in the services sector of 40%, i.e. more than 55 million jobs are 
expected to be lost over the next 12 months. Massive reallocations of labour are thus involved. 
Chudik et al. (2020) specify a threshold global VAR model to quantify the potentially nonlinear 
macroeconomic effects of Covid-19. The relationship between output growth and uncertainty, 
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tries. The Covid-19 shock is identified by the IMF forecast revisions of GDP growth. Results sug-
gest that the pandemic will cause a long-lasting decline in global output, although the effects 
tend to be unequal in different regions. While Asian countries are less affected, and boosted by 
the Chinese catch-up, the impacts are greater in the West. Due to strong interlinkages through 
trade flows, the findings call for a coordinated multi-country policy response to mitigate the 
effects of the pandemic. 
With respect to the labour market, the fact that the pandemic has exacerbated pre-existing in-
equalities has received most attention. Although employment losses have been widespread, 
they are substantially larger in lower-paying occupations and industries. Individuals from disad-
vantaged groups, i.e. Hispanics, younger workers, those with lower levels of education and 
women have suffered larger job losses and decreases in hiring rates (Cortes and Forsythe, 2020). 
This indicates that the economic burden of the corona crisis will mostly affect those people who 
are already in the most vulnerable financial situation (Gascon, 2020). Job losses tend to be less 
pronounced for employees who can work remotely (Montenovo et al., 2020). By looking at high 
frequency state-level data, Baek et al. (2020) argue that orders to people to stay at home unless 
their work is deemed essential accounted for a substantial, but minority share of the rise in 
unemployment claims. 
Pagano et al. (2020) and Capelle-Blancard and Desroziers (2020) examine the effects of the pan-
demic on the US stock market and highlight its differential impact on various sectors. Baker et 
al. (2020) show that uncertainty proxied by stock market volatility, newspaper-based uncer-
tainty and subjective uncertainty in busines expectation surveys rose sharply as the pandemic 
worsened. 
Kok (2020) reports a negative relationship between GDP growth and stringency policy measures 
in a panel of 106 developed and developing countries. As GDP information is available only quar-
terly and with considerable delay, the time series dimension of such an analysis is very short. 
(only 2-3 observations per country). The weekly data we use has 12 times more observations 
per regional unit. 
By using real-time information on vacancies and unemployment insurance claims, Forsythe et 
al. (2020) conclude that the US labour market deteriorated substantially but did so across the 
board, rather than more so in states with shutdown orders. Therefore, individual state policies 
and own epidemiological situations have had only a modest effect, see also Rojas et al. (2020). 
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to the impact of the nationwide shock. There has been a broad retreat across almost all indus-
tries, whether they are essential or not. Based on a survey of 5,800 small businesses, Bartik et 
al (2020) find large employment losses caused by the pandemic. 
Most of the existing studies concentrate on the initial phase of the pandemic (first wave) and 
the ensuing harsh lockdown. Our contribution includes data until the autumn of 2020, a time 
period during which many restrictions were first loosened and then tightened again. Moreover, 
we look separately at different measures, allowing us a more precise estimate of which 
measures had the biggest impact. 
Our analysis provides novel evidence on the impact of the lockdown on the US economy, in 
several respects. 
First of all, our sample spans a period of substantial reversal of measures, which were eased 
during the summer and then re-imposed or tightened again later during the year. 
Moreover, we use unemployment data per state to exploit the large differences in the path of 
the pandemic across US regions. 
Finally, we use a high frequency, namely weekly data. Unemployment (claims and rates) seem 
to be the only real economy data available at this frequency. 
A number of very high frequency indicators have been created recently to track output or GDP, 
even on a daily basis. We do not employ these indicators because we are interested in the size 
and speed of the impact of social-distancing measures on the labour market (rather than some 
synthetic measure of overall economic activity). 
As 36 weeks and 51 states (including the District of Columbia) are considered, empirical evidence 
can be based on more than 1,800 observations. 
The results point to a strong and quick impact of the lockdown on unemployment. From the 
variety of measures included in the Oxford index, school closures and stay-at-home regulations 
are most critical for the economy.  The reaction of unemployment to a changing social distancing 
restrictions is observed with a delay of only about two to four weeks. 
In addition, the evolution of unemployment is governed by substantial asymmetries. If the gov-
ernment switches to tighter regulations, the increase in unemployment is higher in absolute 
value than a decrease after a relaxation. Hence, the decline in unemployment towards the end 
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Controls representing the spread of the disease, such as the number of new infections and es-
pecially the number of deaths exert some impact, but their role is minor.  
 
3 Trends in US labour markets during the ‘great lockdown’  
The corona crisis led to a sudden increase in US unemployment. While the insured unemploy-
ment rate (IUR) was at record lows just before the outbreak of the crisis, it shot up to almost 
16% in April. Since then, unemployment has gradually fallen, but remains at more than double 
the pre-crisis value.  
The IUR is equal to the number of people receiving unemployment insurance as a percentage of 
the labour force and reported at a weekly frequency. The measured IUR does not comove im-
mediately one to one with the number of unemployment claims filed in the same week. This 
was particularly the case in the early phases of the crisis when the local unemployment offices 
were overwhelmed by the huge number of initial claims.  Figure 1 illustrates how initial unem-
ployment claims shot up immediately when major measures were taken, followed by a more 
gradual increase in the (insured) unemployment rate. 
Initial claims (IUC) might thus constitute a useful alternative measure of the state of the labour 
market (Cajner, 2020). Therefore, initial unemployment claims are also used for a robustness 
test. 
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Source: Own elaborations on BLS data. Left hand axis initial unemployment claims (total for US) in thou-
sands.  Right hand axis: average insured unemployment rate. 
 
In terms of both the IUR and IUC one finds a similar pattern throughout the US of course, marked 
by an initial sharp increase, followed by a gradual decline and then another uptick.  
Within this overall pattern, the magnitudes differ substantially across states. For instance, the 
largest increase in the unemployment rate, of almost 30 percentage points, can be observed for 
Washington, followed by California, Vermont and Florida. In contrast, the labour markets in Utah 
and Wyoming showed higher resilience, with an increase of around 6 percentage points. States 
with a high share of employment in the tourism sector like Nevada (25%, gaming industry) and 
Hawaii (20%) experienced an above-average increase in unemployment but they are not those 
with the largest employment losses. 
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Source: Own elaborations on BLS data. The line ‘Highest’ shows the value for the US State with the high-
est value for that week and similarly for ‘Lowest’. 
 
4 Measuring policy restrictions 
Several indicators are available to assess the scope of corona-related policies. The government 
response tracker developed by the Blavatnik School of Government, Oxford University, is the 
standard measure of policies to arrest the spread of the virus (Hale et al., 2020). It collects daily 
information on containment and closure practices, which is publicly available from various 
sources.1 The components of the Oxford index are rank scaled. Larger values represent a higher 
level of stringency of the respective policy but quantitative differences between two values can-
not be interpreted (Table 1). 
  
 
1 One alternative to the Oxford indicator is the Google mobility index. It includes several aspects of mo-
bility behaviour, such as visits to parks. For this paper, its value is very limited, as the series are strongly 
affected by seasonal patterns. Compared to Feb 2020, the Google index shows an increase in mobility at 
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Table 1: Components of the Oxford indices 
 Min/Max 
School closures 0/3 
Working place closures 0/3 
Cancellation of public events 0/2 
Restrictions on gatherings 0/4 
Close of public transport 0/2 
Stay at home requirements 0/3 
Restrictions on internal movements 0/2 
International travel controls 0/4 
Note: Dimensions of the Oxford stringency index. Min/Max column represents minimum and maximum 
values. Taken the closures of schools as an example, the values are 0 (no closure), 1 (closing recom-
mended), 2 (only some types of schools, such as high schools) and 3 (all schools). 
 
Table 2: Correlation between Oxford components 
 O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8 
O1 1        
O2 0.73 1       
O3 0.75 0.79 1      
O4 0.73 0.76 0.80 1     
O5 0.43 0.46 0.42 0.41 1    
O6 0.62 0.70 0.68 0.65 0.34 1   
O7 0.49 0.57 0.50 0.53 0.22 0.51 1  
O8 0.27 0.24 0.22 0.25 0.13 0.25 0.41 1 
Source: Own calculations based on Hale et al. (2020) 
 
Each individual component is rescaled between 0 and 100.  A composite indicator is constructed 
as the average of the individual components 
 
(1) 𝑂𝑋 = !
"
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Due to their construction the indices vary between 0 and 100. In principle, the individual series 
in the Oxford indicator can be aggregated in different ways. The advantage of (1) is that the 
simple average is easy to handle and allows for some averaging out of potential measurement 
errors on the individual components. With the exception of international travel controls, the 
correlation between the other components of the Oxford indicator is rather high, where the 
individual coefficients often exceed 0.6, see Table 2, indicating both substantial co-movement, 
but also considerable differences. Despite the fact that several restrictions have been gradually 
lifted, the stringency of the regulations is still at rather high levels. The standard deviation of the 
average indicator across US states oscillates between 10 and 15 points (compared to an indica-
tor level between 40 and 60 points). There is thus substantial cross-sectional variation that can 
be exploited in a panel setting. 
 
Figure 3: Oxford stringency index for the US economy, average and dispersion 
 
Note: Average of composite index (orange), minimum and maximum (blue and grey) across the US 
states. 
 
The US federal government has only limited direct control over the implementation of strategies 
to combat the crisis. Instead, many decisions are taken at the state, sometimes even at the local 
level. The overall policy response to the virus is shown in Figure 2, together with the maximum 
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the crisis and reached a peak in April. Since then, a slight downward trend is observed on aver-
age. Stricter policies have been applied in Alaska, Idaho, Kentucky, Maryland and New Mexico, 
while Arkansas, Iowa, North and South Dakota and Utah had relatively liberal regulations. The 
least-stringent states, mostly in the Mid-West, had Republican governors (Hale et al., 2020). 
 
5 Panel regressions with asymmetric effects 
Panel models with state fixed effects (α) are estimated for the 51 US states (including the District 
of Columbia) over the pandemic period, i.e., February to mid-October 2020. Unemployment 
rates and initial claims are available at a weekly frequency from the BLS.  Weekly Oxford indices 
are obtained by averaging daily values over the week. In total 51x36=1836 observations are 
available, implying a high number of degrees of freedom. To exclude potentially spurious regres-
sions due to trending behaviour in the variables, the equation is expressed in first differences 
(Δ). As the unemployment reaction might not be immediate, a delay of up to four weeks is al-
lowed. In addition, a threshold is introduced to capture an asymmetric unemployment response 
to the policy change. The slope parameters can be different, depending on whether policy is 
tightened or relaxed.  
The spread of the virus is widely perceived to have an independent impact on the economy 
because news of an increase in infections can cause higher uncertainty or caution in certain 
consumption expenditures (restaurant trips, travel, etc.), leading to an independent fall in la-
bour demand or a rise in unemployment (Baker et al. (2020), Coibon et al. (2020)).  In order to 
account for this separate effect, we introduced as control both the number of infections and 
deaths (relative to population) at the level of the individual states. 
Overall, the insured unemployment rate u is explained by the individual components of the Ox-
ford indicator and the composite index aggregate (and later individual components of the) Ox-
ford indicator O and corona-related controls for the spread of the disease i.e., resulting in the 
following equation: 
 
(2) 𝛥𝑢!" = 𝛼!,$ +∑ 𝛽$,%𝛥𝑂!,$,"&%'%() +∑ 𝛾$,%𝑑!,$,"&%𝛥𝑂!,$,"&%'%() ∑ 𝛿*,%𝛥𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑎!,*,"&%'%() + 𝜀!,$," 
 
The indices i and j denote the individual state and the number of the Oxford indicator (i=1...51; 
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is implemented through a binary variable d. It is equal to 1 if a policy becomes tighter and 0 
otherwise. Hence, the impact is equal to βjk+γjk if the policy j became stricter k periods ago. In 
case of no change or a policy relaxation, the coefficient is βjk. Corona controls (l=1,2) refer to the 
number of infections and deaths associated with the pandemic. The results are shown in Table 
3. To improve the readability of the results, only significant coefficients are shown. The starting 
point of the model evaluation is an over-parameterised structure with many insignificant varia-
bles, for instance due to multicollinearity. At each round of the subsequent iteration process, 
the least significant regressor is removed. The final specification includes only explanatories with 
t-values larger than 2. 
Exactly the same equation is estimated using the same procedure with initial unemployment 
claims as the dependent variable. The two panels of Table 3 contain the results: 
Table 3: Impact of NPIs on the labour market: Composite Oxford indicator 
Panel a: Impact on insured unemployment rate 
𝛥𝑢#% = −0.211			((.((*) + 0.013((.((,)𝛥𝑂%-! + 0.032((.((.)𝛥𝑂%-/ + 0.055((.((0)𝑑%-1𝛥𝑂%-1 + 0.065((.((.)𝑑%-*𝛥𝑂%-*	
+0.013
((.((,)
𝛥𝑑𝑒𝑎% − 0.027((.(!()𝛥𝑑𝑒𝑎%-! + 0.030((.(!()𝛥𝑑𝑒𝑎%-/ − 0.015((.((,)𝛥𝑑𝑒𝑎%-1	
𝑅2 = 0.264, 	 𝑆𝐸𝑅 = 1.378 
Panel b: Impact on initial unemployment claims 
𝛥𝑖𝑢𝑐#% = −0.062			((.(!!) + 0.015((.((/)𝑑%𝛥𝑂% + 0.056((.((/)𝑑!,%-!𝛥𝑂!,%-! − 0.020((.((/)𝑑!,%-/𝛥𝑂!,%-/	
−0.005
((.((!)
𝑑!,%-*𝛥𝑂!,%-* + 0.0002((.((((,)𝛥 𝑖𝑛𝑓 − 0.0002((.((((,)𝛥 𝑖𝑛𝑓%-! 	
𝑅2 = 0.527, 	 𝑆𝐸𝑅 = 0.352 
Note: Panel model with fixed effects for the 51 US states (including District of Columbia), weekly data 
from Feb 22 to Oct 10. IUC=Initial unemployment claims (logs). Standard errors in parentheses below 
regression coefficients. The constant is the average of state level fixed effects. O denotes the specific 
policy covered by the Oxford index, d is equal to 1 if a policy is tightened and 0 otherwise, inf is the number 
of new infections and dea the number of deaths. R2 adjusted coefficient of determination and SER the 
standard error of regression. 
 
The results point to a clear impact of the lockdown on the course of unemployment, which is 
rapid and asymmetric.  
In the case of the unemployment rate (panel a of table 3) the impact of a change in the Oxford 
restrictiveness indicator can be observed already after one week. If the policy is tightened (i.e. 























VETTED AND REAL-TIME PAPERS
 
a tightening is equal to 0.045, which would imply that a change in the aggregate Oxford index of 
one standard deviation (20 points) should be followed by a change in the unemployment rate 
of about 0.9 percentage point.  However, the sum of the coefficients on tightening is equal to 
0.11, implying that a tightening of the same amount leads to an increase in unemployment 
which is more than twice as large (2.2 percentage points of an increase in the Oxford Stringency 
Index of one standard deviation.  If one considers the initial jump from zero to 70 (the average 
degree of restrictiveness in March) the equation could explain an increase of close to 8 points 
(7.7 to be precise) which is not far from the increase in the average unemployment rate recorded 
in Spring of 2020.  
The results with initial unemployment claims as the dependent variable (panel b of table 3) show 
an immediate impact of the restrictions and a complete asymmetry in the sense that one finds 
significant coefficients only for tightening, not for a loosening of restrictions. The point estimates 
that the very strong immediate response is followed with one lag by a further increase in claims, 
which then is partially reversed during the following few weeks.  Increases in infections also have 
a significant contemporaneous impact on unemployment claims, but it is fully compensated one 
period later. 
The different lag structures found for the unemployment rate and initial claims is due to the 
more gradual increase in the unemployment rate already documented in Figure 1. This also ex-
plains why infections seem to matter more for initial claims and deaths, which are a lagging 
indicator) for the unemployment rate.  A further difference between the results for the unem-
ployment rate and initial claims is that explanatory power is twice as high for the latter.  
The impact of controls such as the number of new infections and the number of deaths has some 
impact, but any effect dissipates quickly as the sum of the coefficients over all significant lags is 
zero. 
Furthermore, we also estimated the same equation separately for each Oxford component listed 
in Table 1.  The results are reported in table 4 in the annex. 
This strategy can provide some evidence on the appropriate design of policies from an economic 
point of view. Table 4 in the annex shows that school closures and stay-at-home regulations are 
most critical for the economy. In addition, the results also confirm in all cases that the impact 
on unemployment is governed by substantial asymmetries. If the government switches to 
tighter regulations, the increase in unemployment is higher in absolute value than a decrease 
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These results for individual social distancing restrictions also confirm that the state of the pan-
demic has only a marginal impact, whether one adds as controls the number of new infections 
or the number of deaths.  The short time lags are also confirmed. As a rule, the reaction of un-




The Covid-19 pandemic led to an unprecedented recession and spike in unemployment as policy 
makers had to resort to lockdowns to limit the spread of the disease.  
This paper provides evidence on the impact of the lockdowns on labour markets in the US. We 
document considerable heterogeneity among individual states, both in terms of the labour mar-
ket performance and the time path of the restrictions imposed.  
We used panel threshold models specified for US states and based on weekly data. Two labour 
market indicators are used, namely the insured unemployment rate (IUR) and initial jobless 
claims (IJC). The details policy responses to the pandemic are proxied by the different compo-
nents of the Oxford stringency index. Again, these individual indicators (e.g. school closures, 
prohibitions on mass gatherings, etc.) shows considerable variation across the US. 
We find an impact of the policy measures on the labour market, which is strong, rapid and asym-
metric.   
The impact is rapid: the unemployment rate increases within 2-4 weeks of policy measures being 
taken and unemployment claims respond almost immediately. 
The impact is asymmetric: tightening measures has an impact that is about 50% greater than 
that of easing measures. 
The overall ‘Oxford Stringency Indicator’, an average of eight different policy intervention types, 
has the strongest impact on labour markets.  Applying the same methodology using its individual 
components show that the results are very robust, and that school closures and stay-at-home 
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Annex:  
Table 4: Impact of different NPIs on the labour market 
a) insured unemployment rate 
School closures 





𝛥𝑑𝑒𝑎%-! + 0.036((.(!()𝛥𝑑𝑒𝑎%-/ − 0.018((.((,)𝛥𝑑𝑒𝑎%-1	
𝑅2 = 0.221, 	 𝑆𝐸𝑅 = 1.417 
 
Working place closures 




𝑅2 = 0.222, 	 𝑆𝐸𝑅 = 1.418 
 
Cancellation of public events 
𝛥𝑢#% = −0.181			((.(13) + 0.005((.((/)𝛥𝑂1,%-! + 0.016((.((1)𝑑1,%-/𝛥𝑂1,%-/ + 0.027((.((1)𝑑1,%-1𝛥𝑂1,%-1	
+0.040
((.((1)
𝑑1,%-*𝛥𝑂1,%-* + 0.014((.((,)𝛥𝑑𝑒𝑎 − 0.025((.(!()𝛥𝑑𝑒𝑎%-! + 0.034((.(!()𝛥𝑑𝑒𝑎%-/−0.020((.((,) 𝛥𝑑𝑒𝑎%-1	
𝑅2 = 0.198, 	 𝑆𝐸𝑅 = 1.438 
 
Restrictions on gatherings 
𝛥𝑢#% = −0.206			((.(13) + 0.007((.((1)𝛥𝑂*,%-! + 0.025((.((1)𝑑*,%-/𝛥𝑂*,%-/ + 0.028((.((1)𝑑*,%-1𝛥𝑂*,%-1	
+0.036
((.((1)
𝑑*,%-*𝛥𝑂*,%-* + 0.017((.((,)𝛥𝑑𝑒𝑎% − 0.026((.(!()𝛥𝑑𝑒𝑎%-! + 0.031((.(!()𝛥𝑑𝑒𝑎%-/ − 0.018((.((,)𝛥𝑑𝑒𝑎%-1	
𝑅2 = 0.214, 	 𝑆𝐸𝑅 = 1.424 
 
Close of public transport 






























𝑑,,%-*𝛥𝑂,,%-* + 0.013((.((.)𝛥𝑑𝑒𝑎% − 0.027((.(!!)𝛥𝑑𝑒𝑎%-! + 0.032((.(!!)𝛥𝑑𝑒𝑎%-/ − 0.018((.((.)𝛥𝑑𝑒𝑎%-1	
𝑅2 = 0.106, 	 𝑆𝐸𝑅 = 1.518 
Stay-at-home requirements 






𝑑.,%-*𝛥𝑂.,%-* + 0.017((.((,)𝛥𝑑𝑒𝑎% − 0.026((.(!()𝛥𝑑𝑒𝑎%-! + 0.030((.(!()𝛥𝑑𝑒𝑎%-/ − 0.017((.((,)𝛥𝑑𝑒𝑎%-1	
𝑅2 = 0.239, 	 𝑆𝐸𝑅 = 1.401 
 
Restrictions on internal movement 






𝑑0,%-*𝛥𝑂0,%-* + 0.021((.((.)𝛥𝑑𝑒𝑎% − 0.032((.(!!)𝛥𝑑𝑒𝑎%-! + 0.026((.(!!)𝛥𝑑𝑒𝑎%-/ − 0.016((.((.)𝛥𝑑𝑒𝑎%-1	
𝑅2 = 0.133, 	 𝑆𝐸𝑅 = 1.495 
 
International travel controls 





𝛥𝑑𝑒𝑎%-! + 0.034((.(!!)𝛥𝑑𝑒𝑎%-/ − 0.023((.((.)𝛥𝑑𝑒𝑎%-1	




Note: Panel model with fixed effects for the 51 US states (including District of Columbia), weekly data 
from Feb 22 to Oct 10. Standard errors in parentheses below regression coefficients. The constant is the 
average of state level fixed effects. O denotes the specific policy covered by the Oxford index, d is equal 
to 1 if a policy is tightened and 0 otherwise, inf is the number of new infections and dea the number of 
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Table 4 continued,    
b) initial unemployment claims 
School closures 
𝛥𝑖𝑢𝑐#% = −0.067			((.(!() − 0.003((.((!)𝛥𝑂!,%-* + 0.009((.((!)𝑑!,%𝛥𝑂!,% + 0.029((.((!)𝑑!,%-!𝛥𝑂!,%-!	
+0.0001
((.((((,)
𝛥 𝑖𝑛𝑓 − 0.0001
((.((((,)
𝛥 𝑖𝑛𝑓%-! 	
𝑅2 = 0.572, 	 𝑆𝐸𝑅 = 0.335 
 
Working place closures 
𝛥𝑖𝑢𝑐#% = −0.048			((.(!/) + 0.015((.((!)𝑑/,%𝛥𝑂/,% + 0.021((.((!)𝑑/,%-!𝛥𝑂/,%-! − 0.003((.((!)𝑑/,%-1𝛥𝑂/,%-1	
−0.003
((.((!)
𝑑/,%-*𝛥𝑂/,%-* + 0.0001((.((((,)𝛥 𝑖𝑛𝑓% − 0.0001((.((((,)𝛥 𝑖𝑛𝑓%-! 	
𝑅2 = 0.380, 	 𝑆𝐸𝑅 = 0.404 
 
Cancellation of public events 
𝛥𝑖𝑢𝑐#% = −0.058			((.(!/) + 0.036((.((!)𝑑1,%𝛥𝑂1,% + 0.025((.((!)𝑑1,%-!𝛥𝑂1,%-! + 0.004((.((!)𝑑1,%-/𝛥𝑂1,%-/	
−0.003
((.((!)
𝑑1,%-*𝛥𝑂1,%-* + 0.0003((.((((,)𝛥 𝑖𝑛𝑓 − 0.0003((.((((,)𝛥 𝑖𝑛𝑓%-! 	
𝑅2 = 0.443, 	 𝑆𝐸𝑅 = 0.382 
 
Restrictions on gatherings 
𝛥𝑖𝑢𝑐#% = −0.053			((.(!/) + 0.003((.((!)𝛥𝑂*,%-! + 0.013((.((!)𝑑*,%𝛥𝑂*,% + 0.021((.((!)𝑑*,%-!𝛥𝑂*,%-!	
−0.005
((.((/)
𝑑*,%-*𝛥𝑂*,%-* + 0.0002((.((!) 𝛥 𝑖𝑛𝑓% −0.0003((.((!) 𝛥 𝑖𝑛𝑓%-! 	
𝑅2 = 0.408, 	 𝑆𝐸𝑅 = 0.394 
 
Close of public transport 
𝛥𝑖𝑢𝑐#% = 0.016			((.(!1) + 0.021((.((/)𝑑,,%𝛥𝑂,,% + 0.012((.((/)𝑑,,%-!𝛥𝑂,,%-! − 0.004((.((/)𝑑,,%-1𝛥𝑂,,%-1	
+0.0002
((.((((!)
𝛥 𝑖𝑛𝑓% − 0.0003((.((((!)𝛥 𝑖𝑛𝑓%-! 	
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Stay-at-home requirements 
𝛥𝑖𝑢𝑐#% = −0.007			((.(!/) + 0.006((.((!)𝛥𝑂.,%-! + 0.031((.((!)𝑑.,%𝛥𝑂.,% − 0.004((.((!)𝑑.,%-1𝛥𝑂.,%-1	
+0.0003
((.((((!)
𝛥 𝑖𝑛𝑓% − 0.0003((.((((!)𝛥 𝑖𝑛𝑓%-! 	
𝑅2 = 0.254, 	 𝑆𝐸𝑅 = 0.436 
 
Restrictions on internal movement 
𝛥𝑖𝑢𝑐#% = 0.027			((.(!*) + 0.012((.((!)𝑑0,%𝛥𝑂0,% + 0.005((.((!)𝑑0,%-!𝛥𝑂0,%-! − 0.003((.((!)𝑑0,%-*𝛥𝑂0,%-*	
+0.0003
((.((((!)
𝛥 𝑖𝑛𝑓% − 0.0003((.((((!)𝛥 𝑖𝑛𝑓%-! 	
𝑅2 = 0.085, 	 𝑆𝐸𝑅 = 0.489 
 
International travel controls 
𝛥𝑖𝑢𝑐#% = 0.060			((.(!*) + 0.012((.((1)𝑑",%-!𝛥𝑂",%-! − 0.008((.((1)𝑑",%-*𝛥𝑂",%-*	
+0.0003
(.((((!
𝛥 𝑖𝑛𝑓% − 0.0004((.((((!)𝛥 𝑖𝑛𝑓%-! 	
𝑅2 = 0.006, 	 𝑆𝐸𝑅 = 0.510 
Note: Panel model with fixed effects for the 51 US states (including District of Columbia), weekly data 
from Feb 22 to Oct 10. IUC=Initial unemployment claims (logs). Standard errors in parentheses below 
regression coefficients. The constant is the average of state level fixed effects. O denotes the specific 
policy covered by the Oxford index, d is equal to 1 if a policy is tightened and 0 otherwise, inf is the number 
of new infections and dea the number of deaths. R2 adjusted coefficient of determination and SER the 
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Introduction 
 
Congress passed the first COVID-19 relief package for businesses and individuals in March, when 
the Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security (CARES) Act came to life, which provided, 
among other things, one-time stimulus checks for individuals, extended unemployment insurance 
(UI) benefits, relief for state and local governments, liability protection, and the Paycheck 
Protection Program for small-business loan forgiveness. 
 
The COVID-19 pandemic has kept economists busy analyzing every possible economic side of 
the coronavirus impact. This paper is meant to present an overview of what economists have 
analyzed regarding the implications of two of the main components of the CARES Act that impact 
individuals: the increased UI benefits and the stimulus checks. We present the findings from the 
literature on these two policies with an eye on potential future governmental interventions. Taken 
together, these two components alone have been effective at providing stimulus and lowering 
poverty. Kaplan et al. (2020) find that the initial UI benefits and stimulus payments boosted 
aggregate consumption by two percentage points, while Bayer et al. (2020) show that the CARES 
transfers reduced the output loss due to the pandemic by up to 5 percentage points. By summarizing 
the impact of these two provisions of the CARES Act, we hope that this paper will inform readers 
on the potential impact of similar provisions in the next stimulus bill. Importantly, this paper will 
not focus on the large COVID-19 literature that discusses health impacts, distancing measures, 
epidemiological models, pandemic-induced mortality changes, or the impact of other policies, 




Unemployment Insurance Benefits  
 
CARES provisions. The CARES Act provisions prescribe an additional 13 weeks of federally-
funded benefits under the new Pandemic Emergency Unemployment Compensation (PEUC) 
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UI benefits and new applicants. These benefits were then extended for another 13 weeks (and 
potentially for another seven following those) through the Extended Benefits program. Normal 
benefits included an additional $600 per week for up to four months, which is a provision that 
expired on July 31st, 2020. On August 8th, a reduced weekly check of $300 was reinstated for an 
additional six weeks subject to state application. All states but South Dakota applied for it. Finally, 
there is also a new program, the Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA,) for individuals who 
are self-employed, seeking part-time employment, or who otherwise would not qualify for regular 
UI benefits. The PUA program provides up to 39 weeks of benefit. Importantly, the CARES Act 
also required states to relax the criterion of actively searching for work to qualify for these benefits 
to account for illness, quarantine, and movement restrictions. 
 
Impact of COVID-19 on unemployment. The COVID-19 pandemic has impacted employment 
greatly, especially for lower-pay and nonessential occupations, as shown in Liu and Mai (2020.) 
Over March and April 2020, job losses were larger for these occupations, especially for those with 
higher physical proximity or lower work-from-home feasibility. Between April and June 2020, the 
industries that were hit harder also recouped more jobs, but the recovery was far from full. Chetty 
et al. (2020a) show that high-wage workers experienced a recession that lasted a few weeks, and 
are now facing an almost-back-to-normal market, and they rarely lost jobs, whereas many low-
wage workers lost their job because of the pandemic and had to experience a recession that would 
last for several months, with a job market that is still far from normal. Forsythe et al. (2020a) show 
that nearly all industries and occupations saw contraction in postings and spikes in UI claims, with 
essential jobs taking the smallest hit and leisure and hospitality services the biggest hit. The 
pandemic-induced increase in unemployment led to the largest rise in UI claims in U.S. history 
(see, i.a., Cajner et al. 2020, Chetty et al. 2020b, Goldsmith-Pinkham and Sojourner 2020, and 
Kong and Prinz 2020 for indicators of labor-market changes during this period.) These patterns in 
the data suggest that an extension of the UI benefits set to expire at the end of 2020 and an 
extension of the already-expired increased UI benefits are a key component of any potential 
stimulus bill. 
 
Effectiveness of UI benefits and difficulty to reach the most marginalized. The effectiveness 
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successful at stimulating consumption, leading to an increase in GDP. Han et al. (2020) show that 
UI benefits, their expansion, and the stimulus checks led to a decline in poverty during the 
pandemic, which would have risen in the absence of these programs. Cortes and Forsythe (2020) 
show that 49 percent of the UI and CARES benefits went to workers who were in the bottom-third 
of the earnings distribution before the pandemic happened, which reversed the increase in labor-
earnings inequality that followed the beginning of the pandemic because of the concentration of 
job losses among low-paying jobs. Montenovo et al. (2020) document the disparities in job losses 
by occupation and relate the pre-pandemic sorting by gender, race, and ethnicity into different 
occupations and industries to the gaps in unemployment across these categories. Bhutta et al. 
(2020) use detailed data from the Survey of Consumer Finances to estimate that an additional 38 
percent typical working families would be able to cover six months of expenses after an 
unexpected income disruption, such as a job loss, under the increased UI benefits implemented 
with the CARES Act compared to the standard UI benefits alone. The immediate effectiveness of 
UI benefits to meet basic needs is also documented by Karpman and Acs (2020) and Giannarelli 
et al. (2020,) both of which also discuss the difficulty to reach the poorest part of the population. 
Delays in payment of UI benefits, also due to an overwhelmed system, are also documented in 
Bitler et al. (2020.) Parolin et al. (2020) also provide evidence for the challenges involved with 
reaching the most-marginalized parts of the population and they argue for the need of an expansion 
of UI benefits to contain poverty. In particular, they show that minorities were hit particularly hard 
by the pandemic and that the expiration of the CARES Act benefits led to an increase in poverty 
which was even higher than pre-pandemic levels. Bell et al. (2020) find that in California alone, 
communities of concentrated poverty and with a higher share of racial and/or ethnic minorities 
have received UI benefits at such a lower rate than wealthier, whiter communities that the number 
of regular UI beneficiaries would have been 23 percent higher if the rate of receipt of UI benefits 
across the two types of communities had been equalized. Since it was particularly difficult to reach 
the individuals in the population who would benefit the most from these programs, this evidence 
is suggestive of a need for even-greater outreach from the government to the most-marginalized 
parts of the U.S. population. 
 
Temporary vs. permanent layoffs. While UI benefits have been generally effective, a separate 
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are on temporary layoffs and those who are permanent job losers. The individuals on temporary 
layoffs are those who are only unemployed on a temporary basis because they lost their job because 
of the lockdown but they expect their unemployment to end as soon as the lockdown ends. The 
individuals who are permanent job losers are those who lost their job but who do not expect to 
resume their job as soon as the lockdown is over. Barrero et al. (2020) estimate that 42 percent of 
pandemic-induced layoffs will result in permanent job loss.  Carroll et al. (2020) use a consumer 
model in which individuals are part of three possible employment categories (employment, 
temporary layoff, permanent job loss) and then estimate the impact of the increased unemployment 
insurance benefits (as well as the stimulus checks) on consumer spending for consumers of each 
of these categories. They note that spending would be lower even without unemployment shocks 
because restrictive measures to contain the pandemic, such as lockdowns, led to the limited access 
of goods and services, therefore limiting spending opportunities. The employed, by definition, do 
not receive any UI benefits. Those individuals who are on temporary layoffs particularly benefit 
from the CARES Act provisions, which provide them with the means to smooth their consumption 
throughout their transitory shocks. Their spending recovers fully within a year. For those 
individuals who are permanent job losers, the authors estimate that regular consumption spending 
takes three years to recover on average. The impact of UI benefits is high, but the permanent job 
losers would particularly benefit from an expansion of UI benefits if the lockdown was extended, 
as their unemployment shock is always longer than the length of the lockdown itself. Because the 
increased UI benefits have already expired, but at the same time employment has not yet come 
back to normal and further restrictions are being put into place, we can interpret these results to 
mean that the permanent job losers would benefit from an extension of the UI benefits as long as 
restrictions are in place because their unemployment will be long-lasting even following the end 
of pandemic-induced restrictions. Gregory et al. (2020) also differentiate between those on 
temporary layoffs and those who are permanent job losers and find that the lockdown 
disproportionately disrupts the latter group, because it takes a much-longer period of time for them 
to find a new job. The difference between a temporary pandemic-induced unemployment and a 
more permanent job loss is important to inform policy, as discussed in Gallant et al. (2020) and in 
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Generosity of UI benefits and return-to-work decisions. The effectiveness of the UI benefits is 
also due to their generosity: as reported by Ganong et al. (2020,) this leads to a median replacement 
rate (the level of total UI benefits divided by the pre-unemployment wage) of 134 percent. They 
find that around two-thirds of workers have a replacement rate greater than 100 percent (as in, they 
receive higher benefits than the wage they used to receive.) This generosity has spurred a lot of 
discussion on whether such high benefits would reduce workers' willingness to go back to work 
because they suddenly make more than their previous wage (see, for example, Barrero et al. 2020.) 
Both Petrosky-Nadeau (2020) and Boar and Mongey (2020) show that this is not the case because 
the UI benefits are too small and too short-lived to make it worth it for individuals to give up a 
return-to-work offer. Their findings are confirmed by data evidence showing that return-to-work 
and employment rates were not lower in states where the UI benefit expansion was larger (see 
Altonji et al. 2020, Bartik et al. 2020, Dube 2020, and Marinescu et al. 2020.) In the very short-
term, Fang et al. (2020) find that expanded UI benefits would lead to higher unemployment in the 
second half of the year, with larger effects with higher benefits, but that the policy would still 
enhance well-being for the population as a whole. 
 
Optimality of UI benefits. The studies discussed so far analyzed the effectiveness of UI benefits 
and their impact on return-to-work offers, but they did not focus on whether the policy intervention 
was optimal. Theoretically, Guerrieri et al. (2020) show that abundant social insurance is a key 
ingredient of an optimal policy response in a pandemic (together with a loosening of monetary 
policy,) where such a policy would reallocate income from workers in sectors that are not 
particularly affected by the pandemic to workers in sectors that are particularly hit by the 
pandemic. Bredemeier et al. (2020) provide evidence for this result quantitatively. Mitman and 
Rabinovich (2020) find that the $600/week-policy was close to optimal and that UI benefits should 
be optimally increased at the start of the crisis but then lowered as the economy reopens to align 
incentives to return to work. Nevertheless, coupling extended UI benefits with a re-employment 
bonus would be an even-better option as individuals would receive much-needed help while 
maintaining all incentives to search for a job. It is worth noting that the previously-discussed 
studies both empirically and quantitatively show that return-to-work rates were not significantly 
affected by increased UI benefits, therefore indicating that this disruption was likely minimal. 
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Kapička and Rubert (2020) analyze the optimal policy by including virus transmission and by 
examining what the optimal labor-market policy would be to save lives and find that it would have 
been optimal to shut down businesses, impose a quarantine several weeks before the pandemic 
peak, and move a quarter of workers out of employment to limit transmission. 
 
 
Stimulus Checks  
 
CARES provisions. The CARES Act provision prescribes a direct cash payment of $1,200 for 
each adult with an annual income of $75,000 or less plus $500 for each child. For incomes higher 
than $75,000, the benefit begins to phase out and is nil for any income at or above $99,000.  
 
Impact of stimulus checks on spending. Carroll et al. (2020) use their model to also estimate the 
impact of the stimulus checks on consumer spending for consumers in each of the three 
employment categories: those who are employed, those who are on temporary layoffs, and those 
who are permanent job losers. The employed are the ones that suffer the least, save a good part of 
the stimulus check upon receipt, but their spending rebounds immediately as soon as the lockdown 
ends. The lack of spending choices available during the lockdown induces the saving, while 
spending rebounds once those choices become available again due to those individuals’ healthy 
finances. For the other two groups, i.e. both for the individuals on temporary layoffs who expect 
to resume their job once the lockdown ends and for the individuals who are permanent job losers 
who do not expect to resume their job, the unemployment insurance benefits provide a much-
bigger impact on their spending because of the larger per-individual amount. For those individuals 
who are permanent job losers in particular, the impact of the checks on immediate consumption is 
quite small because they know they will need to smooth that check over a longer period of time. 
For the employed, whose impact on spending is only due to the stimulus checks, the authors find 
that, even without a lockdown, only about 20 percent of the stimulus amount would be spent 
immediately. The fact that only 20 percent of the checks would be spent even in the absence of 
any restrictive measures is indicative of the impact that the pandemic directly had on spending. 
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weekly state-level data, as in Kobayashi et al. (2020,) and in the aggregate, as verified by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (2020) analysis in April, which showed that aggregate income rose 
because of the policy interventions despite the output and consumption decline caused by the 
restriction measures. 
 
Optimality of stimulus checks. The previously-discussed papers take government interventions 
as given. The optimality of these interventions, however, is not examined. By contrast, Nygaard 
et al. (2020) analyze what would be the (constrained-)optimal allocation of the stimulus checks 
under information that can be observed by the government through the individuals’ tax returns, 
such as the individuals’ marital status, age, income, or number of children. To derive the optimal 
allocation of stimulus checks, they first use a life-cycle consumption-savings model with 
heterogeneous consumers to predict the consumption responses to $100 increments of cash 
transfers by age, income, marital status, and number of children. They then compare all feasible 
allocations of the stimulus checks across households to examine whether the government could 
both spend less and achieve more stimulus than what was accomplished under the CARES Act, 
and derive the allocation that leads to the highest stimulus effect. They find that the poor and the 
young, especially those with children, should have received a larger check, which is an allocation 
that would have allowed for the same stimulus effect at half the cost of the actual allocation. 
Nygaard et al. (2020) further study the optimal allocation of a second round of stimulus checks. 
They find that the first round of checks was not large enough. Consequently, the optimal second-
round policy is similar to the optimal first-round policy: money should be allocated to the young 
and to poor households with children. Their findings also suggest that a stricter income 
requirement would lead to a larger stimulus effect.  
 
Empirical analysis of spending patterns following stimulus. A separate strand of this growing 
literature uses large administrative datasets, such as transaction records, or large-scale surveys 
(such as Wozniak et al. 2020, among others,) to measure how consumption changed following the 
pandemic. Bhutta et al. (2020) estimate that an additional two percent of typical working families 
would be able to cover six months of expenses after an unexpected income disruption, such as a 
job loss, thanks to the receipt of the stimulus check. Baker et al. (2020) find that recipients on 
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consumers. Coibion et al. (2020) find that individuals reported having spent or planned to spend 
around 40 percent of the total transfer on average, where the amount is higher for the unemployed, 
the more financially-constrained, those in larger households, less educated, and who qualified for 
smaller transfers. Armantier et al. (2020) find that 29 percent of all stimulus payments was used 
for consumption, with another 35 percent used to pay down debt and the rest saved. Chetty et al. 
(2020a) find that stimulus payments to low-income households had large effects on their 
consumption. Karger and Rajan (2020) use transaction-level data during the two weeks before and 
after the stimulus check to analyze the change in credit- and debit-card spending immediately 
following the stimulus receipt. They find that the poor spent most of their check, while those in 
better financial health spent 23 percent of their transfer. Sahm et al. (2020) find that poorer 
individuals spend most of their checks to repay debt and that the richest individuals are those who 
save the largest share of the amount received. Misra et al. (2020) use transaction-level data from 
debit cards and find that about 40 percent of every dollar in stimulus is spent within the first four 
days from receipt and document geographical differences in spending. Li et al. (2020) also 
document geographical differences by using transaction-level data from debit cards owned by low-
income households, but also find that the stimulus payments had a positive and sizable effect on 
spending for low-income households and that the positive effect from the stimulus payment was 
four times as high in absolute value as the negative effect that the lockdown had on spending for 
the same group. Positive effects on the poverty level were also found by Han et al. (2020.) All of 
these data findings are consistent with the models discussed above: the poor, the young, and those 
with children are likely to benefit from higher amounts of stimulus as they are more financially-
constrained and would spend a higher amount of the transfer received for any check amount.  
 
Difficulty to reach the most marginalized. Finally, while the most disadvantaged would benefit 
the most from these stimulus payments, Bitler et al. (2020) discuss how many individuals remained 
and still are in distress despite the unprecedented policy response due to delays in implementation, 
the modest payments outside of UI benefits, and statutory requirements that exclude individuals 
that would benefit the most from the payments themselves. In particular, Marr et al. (2020) 
estimate that 12 million non-tax-return filers who are eligible for the stimulus check did not 
automatically receive it and had to request it. Because of this extra hurdle, there was a nearly-20-
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individuals below and above the poverty rate, at the expense of the poorer individuals. The papers 
discussed suggest that an implementation which does not favor those who are the most in need is 
far from an optimal allocation of the stimulus checks and leads to payments being made to those 
who would consume less of the overall payment because of their better financial health, and 
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